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Chapter 1: What Do We Know About Interstate War Outcomes?
“Now, philanthropists may easily imagine there is a skillful method of disarming and overcoming
an enemy without great bloodshed, and that this is the proper tendency of the Art of War.
However plausible this may appear, still it is an error which must be extirpated; for in such
dangerous things as War, the errors which proceed from a spirit of benevolence are the worst.”
– Clausewitz, On War
Introduction
Witnessing the slaughter at the Battle of Fredericksburg, General Robert E. Lee stated to
James Longstreet, “it is well that war is so terrible, lest we grow too fond of it.” Yet the costs of
war, which have only increased over time, have done little to deter humans from returning to
the fray. In every corner of the world, organized peoples of every faith, creed, and nation have
repeatedly engaged in this destructive pursuit. Indeed, it is the brutality and great cost in blood
and treasure of war which, for millennia, has driven its study. While interstate war is a relatively
rare form of political violence, its import is paramount to international relations. As a result, war
is the single most studied topic in the field of international relations and we know a great deal
about war – but the puzzle remains incomplete. The inquiry on the nature of war generally stops
when war begins. Entire paradigms center around a basic question: why do states go to war?
However, we know relatively little about the determinants of war outcomes. This dissertation
explores the latter.
The gravity of understanding war and its correlates forms the raison d’etre of the field of
international relations. The past several decades of world politics scholarship have been centered
on seeking empirical explanations to a host of questions related to war occurrence. These
questions have largely been influenced by potential sea-changes wrought by the dramatic third
wave of democratization, the fall of the Soviet Union, and the subsequent transition into
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unipolarity with the end of the Cold War – what Fukuyama (1992) dubbed “the end of history.”
Yet, empirical evidence casts doubt on the degree of change in a post-Cold War and relatively
more democratic world. While the most contentious debate surrounding the topic is that of the
democratic peace, the proposition that democracy substantially constrains war occurrence, a
growing body of research relates to democracy and war outcomes. This work suggests that
democracies not only win the majority of the wars they fight, but that they win because they are
democracies. ‘The democratic victory’, like the democratic peace, proposes that democracies are
functionally differentiated units; responding to international anarchy in ways that set them apart
from other regimes types. While numerous authors suggest that through “selection effects” and
“military effectiveness” democracies usually win the day, the question, like the democratic
peace, remains unsettled and caught between competing and central paradigmatic assumptions
about the nature of world politics. In part, the unsettled nature of this topic stems from the vast
complexity that is the course of a war and a dearth of quality data. This dissertation introduces a
novel set of terrain metrics and, in turn, presents a general critique of the democratic victory
proposition and seeking a unified theory of war outcomes built on the interaction of capabilities,
strategy, and terrain.
What Do We Know About War Outcomes?
War occurrence dominates study in the field, yet outcomes have been largely ignored.
This is not to say that outcomes are of secondary importance. Rather, quality inquiry on the topic
is especially difficult. To paraphrase Kuhn ([1962] 2012), imagine collecting random jigsaw puzzle
pieces from separate puzzle boxes. Regardless of one’s skill or time spent, completing this puzzle
is nigh impossible. Even if some pieces fit together, we are no closer to a coherent product.
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Paradigms, the constellation of interrelated ideas and conceptions which structure scientific
inquiry, tell us which pieces to choose, and serve as the proverbial picture on the box to guide
the fitting of pieces together. In the question of war occurrence, scholars have ample direction.
Be it in first image human nature explanations, second image domestic institutional explanations,
or third image structural explanations, paradigmatic assumptions suggest an answer to the
question. States go to war because of human nature, problematic domestic politics, or
international anarchy. Traditionally, there have been no such paradigms to structure our answers
to the question of outcomes. Thus, scholars typically decided the question did not have a
scientific answer, instead assuming chance, or left the study to other fields – such as military
sciences.
With the crystallization of neoliberalism as a distinct paradigm in the 1980s, the
contemporary study of war outcomes in international relations began. Simply, we started to
explore outcomes again because it was assumed there was an answer. Neoliberalism suggests
that domestic political institutions shape and predict international political outcomes. The
greatest example of this rests with the democratic peace. While not a novel proposition – with
roots as deep as Kant’s Perpetual Peace [1795] – the democratic peace proposition drove decades
worth of paradigmatic competition. In this sense, liberalism suggests that democracies are a
unique set of actors on the world stage (Russett 1993). Whereas realism, arguably the dominant
paradigm in international relations,1 suggests a general unit functional homogeneity (Waltz
1979). That is, the anarchic structure of the international system produces like units across time
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The statement is on dominance is not necessarily a comment on quality but on volume. In this sense, the
longevity of political realism in explaining international outcomes suggests that realism is the mean by which all
other paradigms are measured.
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and place (Buzan, et al. 1993). The democratic peace, a mid-level theory, is the most tested
proposition in the whole of the field (Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, 1996). In turn, the competing
evidence and work by realists and liberals evaluate the paradigmatic theory which first prescribed
the work.
While classical iterations of realism and liberalism previously facilitated this course of
science in the study of war occurrence, only recently was this process possible in studying
outcomes. The same neoliberal paradigmatic assumption which predicts peace predicts victory.
Beginning with Lake (1992), the democratic victory proposition suggests that democracies, by
virtue of being democratic, are more likely to win wars. Again, the core assumption that
democracies are functionally differentiated units in anarchy suggests an answer to the outcomes
puzzle. Stam (1996) further articulated the proposition by suggesting two theses upon which the
victory is predicated. The first, the selection effects thesis, suggests that democratic leaders are
cautious in their selection of war, fearing electoral retribution if the war is unpopular,
unwinnable, or overly costly. The second, the battlefield effectiveness thesis, posits that
democratic soldiers enjoy superior effectiveness on the battlefield given traits concomitant to
democratic societies, such and greater individualism and leadership. While certain caveats have
been added by proponents of the victory, the causal logic remains largely unchanged. In short,
the democratic victory contends that democracy is an endogenous cause of victory because
democracies are superior in realizing capabilities in war – either by choosing when to apply them
via selection effects or how they apply them through battlefield effectiveness.
Anarchy, Democracy, and War
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Democracies behave differently than other regimes. This basic proposition has fueled
several decades of empirical, theoretical, and paradigmatic debate. Broadly, this debate
responds to a fundamental quandary in the study of international politics: How do states respond
to international anarchy? The condition of international anarchy is a valence point between both
neorealism and neoliberalism, with divergence instead in the consequences of this anarchy.
Neorealism, on one hand, suggests “self-help is necessarily the principle of action in anarchy”
(Waltz 1979, 111). Neoliberalism, on the other, contends that the condition of international
anarchy “does not imply that it entirely lacks organization,” and while anarchy may be constant,
responses to it vary by actor – and type of actor (Axelrod and Keohane 1993, 86). While this
difference has spurred competing theories and findings on multiple issue areas, such as the
prospect for meaningful cooperation, the divergence is perhaps most pronounced relating to
topics surrounding conflict.
This is in large part a product of the field’s foundational normative concern with war.
From Thucydides to modern scholars, the field of international relations has been driven by this
concern and seeks to explain why war happens. Waltz (1959) famously categorized explanations
for war occurrence into three images. First image classical realists such as Morgenthau (1948),
Carr (1939), and Niebuhr (1952) argue the causes and course of war “have their roots in human
nature” (Morgenthau 1948, 4). In the second image, international trends are the result of
domestic political outcomes and diverse actors (Hoffmann 1978). Waltz’s (1959; 1979) third
image posits the international system, characterized by persistent international anarchy,
structures state behavior. These states may be diverse in construction and composition, but
maintain a foundational unit functional homogeneity – namely the jealous guarding of
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sovereignty. That is, all states exist in anarchy and the “survival logic of self-help” pushes states
toward sovereignty (Buzan, et al. 1993). Anarchy precipitates like-units and these like-units
create an anarchic structure (Buzan 1991). Given the constant nature of anarchy and units,
variation in the distribution of capability serves as the primary predictor of international political
outcomes. Second image explanations suggest that organization of the units themselves, as well
as international institutions, have a defining influence on international political outcomes – to
the point that, when paired with constructivist first image explanations, “anarchy is what states
make of it” (Wendt 1992). That is, despite system structure, certain regime types are functionally
different. The gulf between these images of explanation have precipitated substantially different
and competing explanations and predictions relating to war occurrence and outcomes.
The democratic peace proposition is among the greatest examples of this divide. The
proposition suggests that democracies are less likely to fight wars with other states, or at least
other democracies. Its causal explanation traces its roots back to a Kantian second image
explanation (Kant 1795; Doyle 1983). Through a combination of norms and institutional
constraints, democratic peace theorists contend that domestic political processes and outcomes
make democracies more peaceful despite the condition of international anarchy. The proposition
is among the most widely researched theories in political science, largely because of its immense
theoretical and policy implications. Put simply, if the democratic peace is valid, then much of the
debate between second and third image explanations would be settled. Democratic dyads would
be demonstrated to exist beyond the reach of the anxiety concomitant to anarchy.
However, this question is far from settled as empirical tests of the proposition yield mixed
results. These findings suggest democracies, at the monadic level, are no less war-prone than
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non-democracies, but are less likely to go to war with other democracies (Small and Singer 1976;
Bremer 1991, 2000; Chan 1984; Moaz and Abdolali 1989; Rummel 1983, 1995; Weede 1984). The
inconsistency of results between the monadic and dyadic levels raise several important critiques.
If democratic institutions – and a public opinion which pacifistically reflects this democratic ethos
electorally and this ethos is reflected institutionally – constrained democracies from going to war,
then one would expect to see it reflected at the monadic level. Layne (1995) states, “if citizens
and policy makers of a democracy were especially sensitive to the human and material costs of
war, that sensitivity should be evident whenever their state is on the verge of war, regardless of
whether that adversary is democratic: the lives lost and money spent will be the same” (12). The
weight of explaining democratic dyadic peacefulness thus rests heavily on the ethos of
democratic norms and culture. Yet this explanation has been plagued by definitional and
methodological issues, while other factors such as contiguousness and variable changes in power
have proven a more robust explanation. Beyond this, democratizing states are proven to be more
belligerent than those which have not undergone transition (Mansfield and Snyder 1995). In
short, the substantial evidence in favor of the dyadic democratic peace remains inconclusive
given its numerous flaws.
Democracy and War Outcomes
The prominent debate on the democratic peace spawned related research on the nature
of democracy and conflict – namely that of democracy and war outcomes. Recent scholarship
suggests democracies behave differently in war. That is, democracies both initiate and settle wars
for different reasons than nondemocratic regimes – which would be expected if democracies are
functionally different. This proposition stems from the assumption, again, that the internal
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structure of democracies influences the outcome of their international interactions. Classically,
Tocqueville (1835) suggested democracies were less successful in war given their internal
structure. Later classical realists, such as Carr, Kennan, and Lippmann shared this position.
However, current research demonstrates the opposite: democracies win the large majority of
the wars they fight – some eighty percent of them (Reiter and Stam III 2002).2 While various
works provide nuance to this proposition (Valentino et al, 2010; Graham et. al, 2015), this
scholarship again suggests that the internal structure of democratic states heavily predicts
international level political outcomes.
In the democratic victory literature, what causes a democracy to be successful in war?
Reiter and Stam (2002) provide two basic propositions. First, democratic leaders are painfully
aware that their positions and power are dependent upon popular support. As wars progress and
costs continue to accrue, public support for conflict decrease. Therefore, democratic leaders are
more selective when initiating war so to only enter conflicts with a high probability of victory and
which can be resolved quickly – dubbed ‘selection effects’. In this sense, democracies win more
wars because they are relatively more cautious at choosing when, where, and who to fight (Reiter
and Stam III 2002; Bennett and Stam III 1998; Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2004; Bueno de Mesquita
and Smith 2010). Second, soldiers within democratic societies enjoy greater individuality. This
emphasis provides superior initiative and leadership to democratic soldiers, or ‘military
effectiveness’ (Reiter and Stam III 2002). Democracies may also enjoy other advantages in
fighting wars. Democratic states may be more efficient in organizing resources during times of

2

This is something of a misrepresentation of the data by proponents of the victory: democracies only win around
60% of their wars when draws and transformations are included in this count.
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war, while adopting strategies that decrease the costs of war, both in blood and treasure (Lake
1992; Valentino, et al. 2010; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010). Graham, et. al. (2015) argue
democracies enjoy war advantages due to their tendency to participate in larger coalitions.
Democratic war goals often are less costly to apportion, thereby decreasing the costs associated
with joining and participating in coalitions. The authors maintain that fighting with larger
coalitions accounts for most – if not all – of the advantages democracies enjoy in war. These
points, again, put forward a second image explanation for democratic war success: state-level
political structures and processes of functionally different units predict international political
outcomes. In this conception, democracy is an endogenous cause of victory.
Beyond Regime Type: Alternative Explanations
Democracies may win the large majority of their wars but, like the democratic peace,
propositions surrounding democracy and war outcomes are not without their faults. Given the
complex nature of war, a wide range of factors interact to determine a war’s outcome. Strategy
is a significant predictor of both a war’s duration and outcomes (Mearscheimer 1983; Stam 1996).
Bennett and Stam (1998) define strategy, at length, as:
“We define military strategy as the general way in which a state uses its military
forces in a war, classified into the three basic types of strategy as maneuver, attrition, and
punishment. Maneuver strategies (sometimes referred to as blitzkrieg strategies) are
those where states focus on the use of speed and mobility to disarm the opponent by
disrupting the opponent's ability to organize effectively its own forces. Attrition
strategies, by contrast, do not focus on speed and movement but instead seek to destroy
or capture opposing forces, making them incapable of continuing to fight. Typically, an
attrition strategy seeks large confrontations with the enemy (Mearscheimer 1983, 34)
that wear down the opponent. Finally, punishment strategies attempt to inflict such high
costs on an opponent that it ceases to attack or surrender, although its military forces
may not actually be defeated in battle” (354).
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Intuitively, certain strategies relate to certain outcomes. A strategy of attrition, seeking
to outlast an enemy, may lead to a longer war than a maneuver strategy, which seeks rapid
disruption. Strategy, as well as outcomes and duration, are also linked to a state’s doctrine.
Doctrine, as distinct from strategy, is intersection of a state’s goals and policy. Doctrine can be
either offensive or defensive, whether the goal is to revise or defend the status quo (Bennett and
Stam III 1998). Taken in tandem, there are 18 strategy-doctrine combinations. Strategy is then
the application of capabilities in the attempt to bring power to bear on an opposing actor. Further
complicating outcomes and durations, terrain influences the cost and effectiveness of strategies
and doctrines. Relative distance, proximity, and the loss of strength3 gradient likely influence on
outcomes as well, despite changes in the technology and tools of war (Boulding 1963; Webb
2007).
Beyond this, variables traditionally associated with war outcomes maintain strong
predictive power. The structural assumptions surrounding the third image contend, given
constant international anarchy and unit functional homogeneity, that variations in the
distribution of power serve as the primary predictor of international political outcomes (Waltz
1959; Waltz 1979). Military capability is indeed a powerful predictor of war outcomes (Desch
2002; Henderson and Bayer 2013). From 1800 to 1998, the more militarily capable state won
some seventy-percent of all contests (Arreguin-Toft 2001; Mearscheimer 1989). World War II, an
obviously important case, demonstrates this point: While democratic France was quickly
defeated by Nazi Germany’s blitzkrieg (maneuver strategy) and the democratic United Kingdom

3

Boulding (1963) famously suggests that power decays over distance, meaning the further a state is from a given
place, the less effective their application of power will be.
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retreated en masse at Dunkirk, it was totalitarian Soviet capability, aided by terrain, which held
the Nazi onslaught. By the time Germany was fighting the Allies from both the east and west, the
Allies enjoyed a fourfold advantage in iron and steel (Desch 2002)). A similar “gross mismatch”
existed, to the benefit of the American’s in the Pacific (Desch 2002). Beyond aggregate capability,
wealth has a strong effect on war outcomes, to the point that Henderson and Bayer (2013)
contend that the relationship between democracy and outcomes is irrelevant when military
capability and wealth are taken in tandem.
Place over Politics: Power, Terrain, Strategy, and Regime Type
Like the democratic peace, the democratic victory literature challenges the validity of the
core assumptions of realism, specifically, the foundational concept that international political
outcomes are primarily explained by changes in the distribution of power amongst functionallysimilar state actors in anarchy. In turn, realist scholarship challenges the validity of the victory
proposition. As coined by Desch (2002), realism responds with a general “democratic pessimism.”
Analogous to the faults in the core assumptions of the peace – be it discrepant evidence and
cases, methodological problems, or lasting questions of definitions – a host of issues with the
democratic victory proposition call for a general pessimism. First, given the rarity4 of war itself
and the limited number of democracies populating the system – especially before the crest of
third wave and concomitant to the end of the Cold War – every case is highly important to the
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Geller and Singer (1998) note the rarity of war, writing “if we note that the number of territorial states in the
global system has ranged from fewer than 30 after the Napoleonic Wars to nearly 200 at the end of the twentieth
century, that gives us about 400 nondirectional pairs of states in 1816 and about 18,000 pairs today. And even if
we recognize most wars are between neighbors, and thus reduce the possible pairs at war in a given year to the 40
bordering neighbors in 1816 and 317 in 1993, the potential is never approached. There were no wars in 81 of the
180 years since the modern interstate system came into being, and seldom more than one in any given year” (1).
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validity of the victory. Yet, as Desch (2002; 2008) notes, the removal of Israeli victories in three
cases, the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the 1967 Six-Day War, and 1973 Yom Kippur War, renders
democracy insignificant in the prediction of victory. Second, definitions of democracy derived
from Gurr’s (1990) and Marshal, et al.’s (2013) Polity data potentially exclude cases. Alternative
regime type indices provide some 30 cases where a state is coded as democratic by Polity and
not by another or vice versa. This casts doubt on the causal logic that questionably democratic
institutions promote victory. Third, alternative explanations suggest that democracy is not an
endogenous cause of victory. As Henderson and Bayer (2013) suggest, wealth also predicts
outcomes in war. Democracies tend to be wealthier and therefore are more often successful in
war. But this does not imply that wealth produces democracy as the weight of evidence suggests
that wealth is exogenous to democratization.5
Fourth, and most germane to this study, there are missing pieces of the outcomes puzzle.
Namely, previous work glosses over the seminal importance of terrain. This is not to say previous
authors have not sought to reckon with the role of terrain, but rather have not assigned it enough
importance. This is less a fault of their work than a fault of their data. Major developments in the
field of spatial analysis and the generation of novel and readily available terrain data, there is no
longer an excuse for not fully exploring the role of terrain in outcomes. Terrain features in nearly
every facet of a war – defining the landscape of a given place, changing the cost of movement,
and potentially aiding the weak and humbling the strong. While intuitively essential, previous
work took an overtly general measurement of terrain. Replicated in nearly every work on the
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But this does not imply that wealth produces democracy as the weight of evidence suggests that wealth is
exogenous to democratization. Rather wealth supports regime stability – regardless of type (Przeworski and
Limongi 1997; Morrison 2009; 2015)

13

democratic victory, including works critical of the proposition, Stam’s (1996) terrain data is
generated from the 1983 New York Times’ Atlas of the World. While highly detailed, this atlas
was never meant to provide such data. Largely, the classifications taken from the atlas are weakly
operationalized and haphazard amalgamations of very different types of terrain features. Again,
this is less a fault of the author as it is the source material. Of course, this was never the purpose
of the source material.
Given these issues and the paradigmatic weight of answers to the outcomes question, the
topic is hardly settled. The question of what drives war outcomes demands an answer. States
and societies constantly prepare for the rare event that is war, but it is war itself which often
rewrites power relationships – either dyadically, regionally, or globally. Pragmatically, there are
policy implications as well. Knowing that the odds of victory are low, even if capabilities are
mismatched in a state’s favor, may restrain a state’s decision to go to war in folly. Combined, I
find the normative motivation for my study. From a theoretical position, my work fills in a gap in
realist thought. The democratic victory presents a concise and consistent theory of war outcomes
from a neoliberal prospective. No such theory exists in realist thought. The prevailing realistdemocratic pessimism is less an alternative than a repudiation with addition. In this sense, my
study is a work of realist thought, but the data itself is not party to a specific paradigm. However,
the implications support the realist position. The question of war outcomes is firmly in the realm
of normal science in a Kuhnian sense, and therefore is separated from grand paradigmatic
debates. Yet it is conclusions in normal science which ultimately evaluate paradigmatic theory.
Thus, my work is necessarily a roundabout paradigmatic evaluation and my results cast doubt on
the validity of the democratic victory and supports the essential assumptions of neorealism. This
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debate is of secondary importance in a topic that is still relatively incipient given the dearth of
published work on the topic.
My theory of war outcomes is predicated on third image explanations of war, but
necessarily engages first image realism. In this sense, I propose that we must consider the agency
of states, but this agency is constrained and informed by structural considerations. To this end, I
turn to an updated version of Clausewitz’s first image theory of war outcomes. The anarchic
nature of the international system and unit functional homogeneity are constant features of the
system structure. Given the variable distribution of capabilities across state actors, states
necessarily enter war in unequal positions. This inequality, even when small, allows for the
prediction of outcomes on the basis on capabilities. Put simply, the most powerful state will win
the war if we take power to be the ability to get other actors to do what they want. Capabilities
are the means of realizing power.
However, there are two primary factors which impact this realization. The first is strategy.
Strategy is the scheme by which states apply capabilities – at times giving states either strategic
advantage, disadvantage, or neither. The second is terrain. Terrain is felt in every facet of the
application of strategy. War occurs in place and therefor the features of that place impact the
application of capabilities. Terrain may facilitate a state’s application of strength or hinder it.
In war, opposing states generally engage the same terrain, at least conceptually, as armies
occupy the same broad space. Locally, terrain may be very different, but given the scale of this
study and the attempt at general results, we can assume that terrain is a static and structural
variable in each individual war. However, the impact of terrain is often unequal. The primary
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difference is how states choose to strategically engage terrain. One cannot effectively blitz
through a mountain range and one cannot fight pitched battles in dense jungles. The second
difference relates to capabilities. A state with quick and mobile capabilities may more easily
traverse open areas than a state reliant on foot traffic.
In summary, a state’s ability to win war is dependent on their ability to realize power.
Capabilities are the means of power, strategy is the application of power, and terrain impacts the
application of capabilities in realizing power. Unless democracies inherently possess or can
produce more capabilities, more effectively choose how to apply them, or more wisely engage
terrain than non-democracies, there is little reason to suggest that democracies enjoy
advantages concomitant to democratic regime type.
Plan of the Dissertation
The goal of this study is to provide a deeper insight into the study of war outcomes. My
primary addition to the field is the generation of novel terrain metrics, both specific to each war
and generally comparable among all interstate wars. By mapping every interstate war in the
Correlates of War population and engaging new elevation and landscape data from Global Multiresolution Terrain Elevation Data 2010 (GMTED2010) and History Database of the Global
Environment (HYDE), I generate three novel indices of terrain features. The first measure is spatial
extent or an approximation of the total area of a given conflict. No other work on war outcomes
has produced a similar measure. This allows us to know where a war was and was not fought.
Given the diversity of terrain features, even regionally within a state, knowing the spatial limits
of a war increases the accuracy of the other indices. The second measure is terrain ruggedness. I
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generate a terrain ruggedness index (TRI) for every war, capturing the degree of topographic
heterogeneity.6 The third measure is one of land cover class heterogeneity, which I take to
measure trafficability.7 Be it forests, plains, tundra, crops, or urban landscape classes, armies
necessarily move across space, either in the actual course of battle or between contests. In turn,
the dominant make-up of a given place can be measured by percentage trafficable when the
twenty-eight HYDE classes are coded as a binary trafficable or non-trafficable by cost of
movement.
Terrain analysis is coupled with replication and reimagining of previous work on
outcomes. The first step in this process begins by testing the various correlates of war outcomes.
My work expands the temporal frame of previous works on the topic, and in doing so I add further
data to earlier work. I test two basic models of war outcomes. The first, the neoliberal model,
suggests democracy promotes victory. The second, the neorealist model, suggests capabilities
promote victory. I find mixed support for the democratic victory model. When Israeli victories in
1948, 1967, and 1973 are removed from the population, regime type fails to predict victory in
multinomial logistic models. This suggests that the democratic victory is predicated not on
democracy per say, but on one democracy: Israel. The unique factors which determine these
wars – some combination of Israeli or Arab strategy, capabilities, and motivations – do not
necessarily translate to other wars, settings, or actors.

6

A terrain ruggedness index is generated by calculating the difference in elevation (in meters) from a center cell
and eight adjacent cells (in this study, cells are 1 km2 in area). These differences are then squared and averaged,
then the square root of this value produces a TRI (Riley, et al. 1999).
7
HYDE data is presented as a gridded time series of 28 unique landscape classes, spanning some 12,000 years. This
allows for a best-approximation of these classes by year for each year between 1816-2003.
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Beyond this, the introduction of terrain raises further doubts on the endogenous claims of victory
proponents as cursory evidence suggest democracies are not superior in selecting strategy on
the basis of terrain. I find consistent support for the realist model. In every model, state
capabilities and alliance capabilities predict victory. However, I suggest that this is only part of an
incomplete picture. In twenty-two wars, states which are grossly outmatched win the day.
Granted these are a complex set of anomalies, but in nearly every of these mismatches, evidence
suggests terrain plays a significant role. Beyond this, our measures of capabilities may overstate
some advantages held by states. For instance, Desch (2002) notes America enjoyed a gross
mismatch against Japan during WWII, meaning capabilities, not democracy, best explains
American victory. I agree, but in reality, the capabilities mismatch is overstated in the CINC
dataset. The sheer power projection necessary to island-hop, and the jointly rugged and nontrafficable terrain, means that the war was never so simple as a threefold capabilities advantage
held by the Americans. Our explanation is incomplete without the addition of agency and terrain.
This dissertation is divided into four chapters beyond this introduction. Chapter two
presents both theory and operationalization. I introduce a general realist theory of war outcomes
and detail the essential elements of the liberal theory. I then identify and describe the population
of cases, detail the operationalization of relevant independent variables, and discuss novel data
collection. Chapter three presents findings from multinomial logistic regression. Broadly, these
findings suggest that capabilities are the primary predictor of war outcomes, with mixed support
for regime type as a predictor of victory. In the fourth chapter, I present a classification of terrain
and demonstrate the impact of terrain on the application of capabilities through a series of minicase studies and the comparative method. I conclude this chapter with a preliminary test of a
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strategy selection model. This model suggests that both regime type and capabilities do not
predict strategic advantage or disadvantage, whereas terrain does. Given this, there is reason to
doubt that democracies are superior in applying capabilities. This point also calls for deeper
exploration and future research on strategy selection models. Chapter five presents a general
summary of the dissertation while discussing practical implications of the work.
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Chapter 2: Toward a Theory of War Outcomes
“War… is the continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means” Clausewitz, On
War
Introduction
This dissertation seeks to explain interstate war outcomes, with a particular consideration
for the effect of regime type. This, in itself, is nothing novel – but this dissertation introduces
novel elements which are lacking in the broader study of war. The field’s preoccupation with war
is something of a paradox. War is among the most studied of political events, yet is an extremely
rare event. While rare, the consequences of war in blood, treasure, and politics, underwrite its
prominence in the field of international relations and political science writ large.
War is firmly a political activity, assuming as Morgenthau (1948) does, that “international
politics, like all politics, is the struggle for power” and, as Clausewitz ([1832] 2007) does, that
“that war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument” (1.1). The politics of
states are consumed with preparation for this rare event, driven by an anxiety concomitant to
the reality that states must prepare for war or pay the cost of weakness in a self-help system.
The threat of war is so pervasive that preparations for war may be, as James (1968) suggests, the
“real war.” Given the gravity of war, especially its impact on state behavior, the majority of works
relate to war occurrence – i.e. the decision made by states to go or not go to war. Less attention
has been paid to war outcomes, despite the fact that it is a war’s outcome that largely determines
the political realignment following the conflict.
Largely, this is a problem of the complexity of warfare itself. Once slipped, the dogs of war
create a havoc that is difficult to measure. The cost of acquiring quality information increases
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proportionately with the complexity of political phenomena. This is evidenced in relatively lowinformation rational and relatively high-information models of war occurrence, with the former’s
eminent and the latter’s limited use (Geller and Singer 1998; Allison and Zelikow 1999). When
considering war outcomes however, the complexity of the event – seemingly bound by an
indefinite combination of uniqueness, a multiplicity of variables, and the winds of fortune –
makes for difficult science. As Thucydides (History of the Peloponnesian War [1972]) writes,
“consider the vast influence of accident in war, before you engage in it. As it continues, it
generally becomes an affair of chances from which neither of us are exempt, and whose event
we must risk in the dark” (1.74.2). Gilpin (1981) contends, “leadership, calculation, control over
events – these are merely the illusions of statesmen and scholars. The passions of men and the
momentum of events take over and propel societies in novel and unanticipated directions” (202).
It is likely impossible to create a model which entirely and satisfactorily predicts the course and
outcomes of wars.
Paradigms and the Puzzle of War Outcomes
This difficulty does not mean that paradigms have not addressed war outcomes. The
problem of war and theoretical responses to it form the foundation of the two major paradigms
in international relations thought and have done so since their earliest inceptions and have
continued this centrality –with some variation - throughout gestalt switches from classical
realism and liberalism to neorealism and neoliberalism (Holsti 1985; Baldwin 1993). Differences
in paradigmatic assumptions about the nature of war, stemming from differences in assumptions
on the nature of world politics, gave rise to the greatest debates in the field.
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Now, nearly thirty years after the end of the Cold War, paradigmatic gestalt switches, and
American unipolarity, the field of international relations has settled into normal science – or the
closest equivalence to normal science when simultaneous and competing paradigms exist in the
same field. Instead of the grand debates of the 1980s on ontological questions and the image of
the world, normal science has instead sought to defend mid-level theories, born of these core
assumptions. The democratic peace, the prospects for cooperation, terrorist mobilization, and
other questions have risen to prominence. In some sense, the importance of war outcomes in
relation to changes in the distribution of power and standing amongst the members of the
international system suggests that war outcomes should be at the forefront of paradigmatic
debate. Yet the difficulty in studying war outcomes and the rarity of the event itself – as well as
the frequency in which states prepare for it – relegates war outcomes to the realm of mid-level
theory.
Yet it is mid-level theory – the realm of normal science – which evaluates the validity of
paradigms in a Kuhnian sense or research programs in the language of Lakatos. Normal science
is puzzle-solving. It was only recently that war outcomes became a puzzle to be solved in the
field. This is not because of the unimportance of the puzzle. As Kuhn (2012) writes,
“The really pressing problems, e.g., a cure for cancer or the design of lasting peace,
are often not puzzles at all, largely because they may not have any solution. Consider the
jigsaw puzzle whose pieces are selected at random from each of two different puzzle
boxes. Since that problem is likely to defy even the most ingenious of men, it cannot serve
as a test of skill in solution. In any usual sense it is not a puzzle at all. Though intrinsic
value is no criterion for a puzzle, the assured existence of a solution is” (37).
The challenge of studying an almost inexplicable puzzle left scholars, at least in political
science, to assume it was not worth their time, was too complex, or better left for other fields.
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The crystallization of two new paradigms, neorealism and neoliberalism, mandated that war
outcomes was a puzzle worth solving – not because of a suddenly increased normative or
empirical importance in solving it in a post-Cold War world – but because there was an assured
existence of a solution. Neoliberalism suggests that democracies are functionally different units
and produce reliably different outcomes than non-democracies.
Take, for instance, the democratic peace proposition. It proposes that democracies are,
at minimum, less likely to enter into wars with other democracies given democratic norms and
institutional constraints (Russett 1993). In the course of normal science, this proposition is among
the most tested in the whole of political science. Findings are mixed: at the monadic level, there
is very limited support and at the dyadic level strong support – with dyadic findings contested on
definitional, methodological, and theoretical grounds (Layne 1995; Singer and Wildavsky 1996).
The core assumptions of paradigmatic theory, in this case competing conceptions of anarchy and
its consequences, form the basis of the democratic peace as well as the critiques leveled against
it. In turn, evidence – or problems with evidence – evaluate paradigms and fuel debate at the
center of paradigms and research programs (Vasquez 2003; Waltz 1997). The goal of normal
science, even when competing paradigms and programs coexist, is confirmation, not anomaly.
Yet anomaly is the very thing that drives paradigmatic change and revaluation and in a field with
two paradigms with competing core assumptions; one’s confirmation is the other’s anomaly. The
paradigm selects the problem and normal science is the puzzle-solving mechanism. The
democratic victory is no different. The puzzle is worth answering, even if imperfectly, because of
the assumed existence of an answer as inferred by the core assumptions of neoliberalism.
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Proponents of the democratic victory, especially the works of Stam (1996), Bennett and
Stam (1996; 1998), and Reiter and Stam (1998; 2002), contend that democracies, by virtue of
being democratic, enjoy advantages in war. These advantages are hypothesized to result from
selection effects and military effectiveness theses. The validity of these claims speaks to a basic
point of contention within paradigmatic debate: are democracies functionally differentiated
units in world politics? The implication being, if democracies enjoy advantage in war because of
democratic institutions – beyond certain functional efficiency – then the puzzles proposed by the
paradigm can be answered because they are assumed to have an answer. In turn, this answer
allows for evaluation of the proposition, it’s given answer, and alternative explanations.
Towards a Theory of War Outcomes
My causal logic rests on a basic assumption: war is an incredibly complex phenomenon
and its outcomes are influenced by a host of factors, to the point that no two wars are perfectly
alike. Indeed, the uniqueness of war means no monocausal explanation will ever entirely explain
war outcomes generally. War is the most extreme form of human political behavior. It “is not
merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse,
carried on with other means” (Clausewitz 2007, 28). If this is true, its outcomes must have
political correlates. War outcomes, thus, can be predicted, albeit imperfectly, along political lines.
Evaluation of these predictions then have implications at the paradigmatic level.
I suggest that structural considerations – at the interstate level - are of the utmost
importance in predicting a war’s outcome. As Clausewitz (2007) writes, “The political object is
the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from
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their purpose” (29). War is a result of the international anarchy which shapes the system and
places like-units into a system of self-help. In this sense, power is the primary consideration in
predicting a war’s outcome. Indeed, it may well be the only consideration if we could divorce war
from place, time, and agency. If power is the ability to get other actors to do what one wants,
victory in war is the realization of power. Capabilities are then the means of power. We must
both consider a state’s capabilities, the execution of those capabilities, and the factors that
impact the application of capabilities to understand and predict war outcomes.
Since wars happen in time and place, the factors that impact the execution of power are
of secondary but immediate importance as they influence the efficacy of capabilities. Specifically,
factors like terrain (where wars are fought) and time (when wars are fought), serve as power
multipliers or inhibiters; aiding or impairing a state’s ability to bring power to bear on another
actor.
The final consideration is state agency. This would include regime type, but Waltz’s third
image suggests that states share a general unit functional homogeneity – all states in anarchy are
shaped by structural pressures to be like-units. Regime type, then, should have little to do with
war outcomes outside of the fact that some states are more efficient in the extraction of
resources from society. Put more simply, some states are superior in accumulating capability.
This operates under the assumption that regime type is not an endogenous cause of either state
capability or effective use of capability. If there is a relationship between democracy and victory,
the factors that promote victory also promote democracy (i.e. wealth). The greatest function
agency has on a war’s outcome would be selection of strategy, which dictates how capabilities
are used to reach political ends. The efficacy of agency – evident in strategy selection and the
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application of capabilities – is determined by its interaction with place and time.8 This logic
suggests that power, manifested in coercive capability, expressed strategically by agency, and
altered by terrain, is the primary predictor of war outcomes generally. However, we cannot
discount the complexity of war. Abstract unquantifiable and unpredictable elements still impact
outcomes. Be it the bold and brave actions of a few soldiers or an irregular occurrence like a flood
or avalanche, unpredictable elements may radically change the prospects of victory, either locally
in a battle or even an entire war. We may well say that the final variable in war outcomes is
Fortuna’s rudder.
War:
This study will use Small and Singer’s (1982) prominent definition of war. The founders of
the Correlates of War (COW) operationalized war “…in terms of violence. Not only is war
impossible without violence (except of course in the metaphorical sense), but we consider the
taking of human life the primary and dominant characteristic of war” (Small and Singer 1982,
205-206). Famously, Small and Singer provided two key criteria to define war. First, a war must
have a minimum threshold of 1,000 battle-related deaths. Second, war is sustained violence
between organized participants. Small and Singer used this definition to then differentiate types
of wars, based largely off their second criteria: type of participant.
While their first works emphasized the most dominant actor in the international system
– states – later COW data expanded into the realm of extra-state and civil wars (Sarkees and
Wayman 2010a). Intuitively, there should be ample similarity in the correlates of war outcomes

8

While detailed later in the work, time can be taken to mean the historical setting – including technology available
to the participants.
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between different types of wars, or even in lower intensity conflicts such as militarized interstate
disputes, but given the distinction of state actors as the dominant actors on the world stage, only
interstate wars will be considered in this study.
Inter-state wars are periods of sustained violence between state actors with a minimum
threshold of 1,000 battle-related deaths. Battle-related deaths, or fatalities, include those dying
later from combat injuries and or from diseases contracted within the theater of war. The
minimum threshold in interstate wars of 1,000 deaths is shared among all participants per year
(beginning at the start date of a given war). Civilian deaths are excluded from this count (Sarkees
and Wayman 2010a, 14-16). COW counts all states meeting had to meet basic criteria including
having population, territory, independence, sovereignty, and enjoying diplomatic recognition.
States also, almost universally, have organized armed forces – a basic requirement to qualify for
war participation. States are considered to be a participant in a given war if they meet the
requirements of suffering a minimum of 1,000 battle-related deaths or have a minimum of 1,000
armed forces personnel engaged in a conflict reaching the threshold of 1,000 battle related
deaths (18). To qualify as an interstate war, states must do the ‘bulk’ of the fighting and be the
primary combatants. Initially, this determination was largely a qualitative judgement by the COW,
but at present, the determination is made by measuring which actor (s) (or type of actor) causes
the most deaths (19).
Between the 1823 French Invasion of Spain (COW #1), following the Napoleonic Wars,
and the 2003 American-led Invasion of Iraq (COW #227 227), the Correlates of War identifies a
population of 94 interstate wars. This dissertation will use a variation of this measure,
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disaggregating especially complex wars, such as World War I and II, as discussed in further detail
below. The analysis here covers a total of 104 wars.
The coding of war duration has remained unchanged since Singer and Small’s (1972) initial
publication. The start date of a war may be determined in several ways. A formal declaration or
equivalent may be used as long as sustained violence begins immediately. If sustained combat
begins in advance of a declaration, the first day of combat is used to demarcate the start date.
The end date, again, may use a formal armistice or ceasefire if that date marks the end of
sustained hostilities. If it does not, the date which most closely relates to the end of hostilities
will mark the end date. Each war participant’s entrance and exit from a war is individually
recorded (Sarkees and Wayman 2010a, 20-21). The length of the war is generally calculated by
subtracting the start date from the end date and is measured in days or months. In this study,
length is recorded in months. If a cessation of hostilities, resulting from an armistice or truce,
occurs but is not longer than thirty days, no break is counted. If a break does occur and surpasses
the thirty-day mark and sustained hostilities later resume, then the war duration will discount
the time of the cessation. War transformations occur when something occurs to fundamentally
change the nature and course of a war. This may be an escalation in intensity to a war from a
MID, the entrance of additional actors – thus making it an interstate war – or some other
transformation.
Models of War Outcomes
Given the complexity of war and war outcomes, and their position in a larger paradigmatic
debate, I present two models explaining war outcomes. The first, the realist model, emphasizes
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the relative power of actors in a war as the primary predictor of war outcomes, as well as the
execution of this power via strategy. This follows the basic assumptions of the realist paradigm –
that in an anarchic world and with unit functional homogeneity, changes in the distribution of
power determine international political outcomes. The second, the liberal model, suggests that
while power may be a primary consideration, state-level characteristics found in democracies
(selection effects and military effectiveness), give advantage to democracies in war. These
models are briefly detailed below and at length in the following chapter. The dependent variable
for each model is war outcome. While there are differences in the data between the prominent
works on the democratic victory and in this analysis given the inclusion of original data, there are
also minute differences given the dates of the studies. Numerous works (Polity and National
Material Capabilities Index) have been updated since initial publication of the various cited by
Stam, Bennet, and Reiter. As such, small discrepancies exist in shared data, as well as added cases
and years. Rather than use previous data, I use the most recent data available on the assumption
that this data is improved.
Realist Model
The realist model includes variables related to the measure of relative capabilities in a
given war and the use of this power to defeat an enemy state. The realist paradigm is predicated
on the assumption of international anarchy. In this setting, there is no higher authority which
states can appeal to adjudicate disputes when they inevitably arise between self-interested
actors. Given this, states must prepare for war or pay the cost of weakness. These states are
concerned with their continued survival and security. In a self-help system, states consider
themselves relative to other states and the currency of this consideration is power. Given this, I
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include the following predictor independent variables in the realist model: military capabilities,
strategy, and loss exchange ratio. I include the following variables as controls: alliance assistance,
initiator, distance, terrain roughness, land cover class, trafficability, spatial extent, and length.
Liberal Model
The liberal model includes the above variables but adds considerations relating to regime
type. Liberalism in international relations thought is built on the edifice of neorealism,
acknowledging the importance of anarchy and the self-help nature of the system. However,
liberalism diverges in the assumption that democracies are functionally different from their peers
on the world stage. The internal structure of states predicts international political outcomes. In
the democratic peace, this includes institutional constraints and democratic political norms (as
well as valence characteristics shared among democracies). The democratic victory proposition
assumes that selection effects and democratic military effectiveness give advantages to
democracies in war. To test this model, I include the following predictor variable in addition to
the realist model: regime type. I also add the following control variable: democratic initiator.
These variables all are detailed at length in chapter two.
Dependent Variable and Population of Cases
This study employs the single-state as the unit of analysis. This work seeks to explain a
state’s success and failure in interstate war. The dependent variable is then interstate war
outcomes. The following details the dependent variable and the population of cases
War Outcomes and Wars, 1816-2003
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If war is never accidental but purposeful behavior, then war outcomes are also
purposeful. In this sense, outcomes are politically purposeful relative to objectives and doctrine
in war. In other words, no state is willing to accept an outcome it does not agree to – unless
totally conquered. More often, an outcome is purposeful as determined by the course of a
conflict as previously out of reach or previously unacceptable terms. A state’s ability to reach a
desired outcome is a measure of its political power vis-à-vis an opponent’s. Winning a war is not
necessarily the defeat of an enemy – i.e. killing more enemy soldiers, razing cities, capture of
territory, destruction – but rather the realization of goals. Conversely, defeat is the inability to
realize goals or the acceptance of previously unacceptable terms. The terms of victory and defeat
vary by goals and motivation of the states. A war’s outcome is then a political decision. At the
most basic level, war ceases when fighting ceases and state interactions are reinstated to at a
level of violence below the threshold of war severity. This study’s dependent variable – interstate
war outcomes – is difficult to operationalize given its polysemous nature. To simplify this
inherently complex phenomena, I follow COW operationalization of outcomes. Victory means
the capitulation of opposing states and defeat is the inability or unwillingness to maintain
opposition to the victor. A state then can win, lose, or draw (either in stalemate, tie, or
compromise). In some cases, wherein a state may withdraw from a conflict without the other
side realizing their goals, wars are transformed as a state continues hostilities with a non-state
actor. All transformations are recoded as win, lose, or draw.
Operationalization of war outcomes also determines the population of wars available to
study. COW presents a population of 94 interstate-wars between 1816 and 2007. This coding
provides 337 total cases with the single-state as the unit of analysis and 74 wars with winners

31

and losers, two wars ending in compromises, eight transformations, and eight stalemates.
Following Stam’s (1996) coding, I also disaggregate three wars – World War I, World War, II, and
Vietnam. These wars, especially the two World Wars, are exceptionally complex. Their
aggregated form provides utility in the onset of war -i.e. the study of why states go to war – but
their aggregated form over simplifies the course of these wars. World War I is disaggregated into
three separate wars: German-Belgian, Eastern Front, and Western Front. World War two is
disaggregated into 11 wars: American-Japanese, German-Belgian, German-Danish, GermanDutch, German-French, German-Greek, German-Norwegian, German-Polish, German-Soviet,
Western (USA/UK vs. Germany/Italy), German-Soviet, Italian-Greek, and German-Yugoslav. The
Vietnam War is disaggregated into two wars: by American involvement and the subsequent
Northern victory over South Vietnam following American withdrawal. This too entails a degree
of simplification. Following Stam’s coding, several parties to the World Wars are not included in
set of actors. For instance, British soldiers participated in the French, Greek, and Norwegian
theaters of WWII (as well as in the Pacific) but are excluded from the analysis. While Stam applies
this simplification to Vietnam and Korea as well (omission of several states in each), I maintain
COW war participation in these two wars. This simplification is a response to the challenge of
studying multilateral wars. Wherever possible, I yield to COW coding for the sake of consistency.
There are four cases present in Stam’s dataset which are purposefully omitted from my
analysis. These wars include the Serbo-Bulgarian War (COW extra-state war #391), GermanCzech (not included in any COW data), German-Austrian (not included in any COW data), and the
First Indochina War (COW extra-state war #457). These conflicts are inconsistent with the
operationalization of interstate war provided by the COW. The Serbo-Bulgarian and First
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Indochina Wars are both extra-state wars, with a primary participant in the conflict not being a
sovereign member of the interstate system. The German-Czech and German-Austrian Wars are
not included in COW data in any form. This is largely a consequence of COW’s definition of war.
While the Germans acted coercively in Czechoslovakia and Austria – i.e. moving armed forces
into these states – there was little formal resistance. This resistance fails to reach the severity
necessary to constitute a war. These four discrepant cases are coded by Stam following Dupuy
and Dupuy (1986), but this source is purposefully less cautious in its operationalization of wars
and system membership. Stam also deviates from COW coding by aggregating the SinoVietnamese Punitive War (COW #193) and the Sino-Vietnamese Border War (COW #208). While
violence below the threshold of war continues among the PRC and Vietnam between these two
dates, I follow COW coding by treating them as two distinct conflicts with two distinct outcomes.
Stam also codes the duration of the Vietnamese-Cambodian War (COW #189) beyond the COW
end date and with a Vietnamese victory. COW ends this war with a transformation outcome
(Khmer Insurgency, extra-state war #479).
There are also several wars included in this analysis which are not included in Stam’s work.
The first set are wars which are omitted from Dupuy and Dupuy’s (1986) history – and therefore
Stam’s analysis – but are present in COW coding. These include the Conquest of Egypt (COW #65),
Second Central American War (COW #70), Sino-Russian War (COW #83), War of Estonian
Liberation (COW #107), War of Latvian Liberation (COW #108), Franco-Turkish War (COW #116),
Lithuanian-Polish War (COW #117), Saudi-Yemeni War (COW #125), Ifni War (COW #158), Second
Laotian War, Phase Two (COW #170), War of the Communist Coalition (COW #176), and the War
over Angola (COW #186). The second set are wars which occurred after 1982, the end date of
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Stam’s analysis. These wars, as coded by the COW, include: War over the Aouzou Strip (COW
#207), Gulf War (COW #211), War of Bosnian Independence (COW #215), Azeri-Armenian War
(COW #216), Cenepa Valley War (COW #217), Badme Border War (COW #219), Kargil War (COW
#223), Invasion of Afghanistan (COW #225), and Invasion of Iraq (COW #227).
Finally, I make several changes to COW coding. First, I omit four wars from the analysis:
The Naval War (COW #52), Off-Shore Islands War (COW #153), Taiwan Straits War (COW #159),
and War for Kosovo (COW #221). These wars are fundamentally different than other wars. The
former three are primarily naval conflicts, and where fighting occurs on land, the area is
extremely small. This makes capturing terrain metrics – the primary control variable of interest
and source of original data in this analysis – difficult. The latter is primarily waged in the air by
NATO states. While sea and air power are crucial elements of modern warfare, the lack of
measurable ground fighting presents unique challenges in measurement. Secondly, I alter the
COW outcome coding of several wars originally coded as transformations. I code Mexico as the
victor of the Franco-Mexican War (COW #40), Cuba and Ethiopia as victors in the Second Ogaden
War (COW #187), and Vietnam as the victor in the Vietnamese-Cambodian Border War (COW
#189) following Stam. I also code Cuba and Angola as victors in the War over Angola (COW #186),
Bosnia and Croatia as victors in the War of Bosnian Independence (COW #215), Coalition forces
as victors in the Invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq (COW #225; COW #227). Finally, I code War of
the Communist Coalition as a draw. I make these changes for two reasons. First, the relatively
small number of transformations in the COW data make them challenging to study independent
of other outcomes. Secondly, in each of the above cases, the transformation occurs only when
one state abandons the fight or is defeated, but war-level hostilities continue between a state
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actor and a non-state actor. In the cases of Cambodia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the state is defeated
and replaced with a new government.
In the case of the War of the Communist Coalition, the NVA, fighting alongside the Khmer
Rouge, controlled roughly half of Cambodia before withdrawing in 1971 after growing tensions
with an increasingly powerful and autonomous Khmer Rouge. The bulk of the fighting occurred
between the Cambodians, Americans, and South Vietnamese against the NVA. The NVA was not
defeated in Cambodia (evident in their victory in Vietnam) – just as the Americans and
Cambodian State failed to achieve victory given the ongoing civil war (intra-state war #785)
following NVA withdrawal. Neither side was victorious and neither side was defeated. Similarly,
in Bosnia, Yugoslavia withdraws its forces in June of 1992 facing international pressure. Bosnia
maintains its independence and system membership – thereby achieving its doctrinal goals.
Bosnia would continue to fight against the Yugoslav sponsored Serbian-Bosnians and former JNA
members through 1995 (intra-state war #877), but maintained its independence following in the
interstate portion of the war.
Transformations as originally coded are immediately relevant to the liberal model and the
democratic victory proposition. If democracies are superior in selecting their wars, then their
selection should extend beyond the simple consideration of victory over an opposing state.
Transformations entail the continuation of conflict after an opposing state withdraws or is
defeated. Given this, the efficacy of selection must also consider the implication of continued
war against non-state actors. The cases of the American led Invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq
detail this point. The United States quickly defeated the Taliban government and the Hussein
regime respectively, making these particularly short wars. The conflicts would continue however
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as costly quagmires against insurgent forces. However, the relatively limited number of
transformations involving democracies (COW #176 Communist Coalition, COW # 225 Invasion of
Afghanistan, COW #227 Invasion of Iraq) makes this point difficult to study beyond qualitative
analysis. This point is further addressed in chapter four and five.
Outcomes are coded simply by the Correlates of War consensus among historians on who
“won” (Sarkees and Wayman 2010b). This is aided by the fact that, in most cases, there are clear
victors – those who achieved the preferred war outcome. Only two inter-state wars in the COW
dataset are coded as ‘ties’ (Korean War and Egyptian War of Attrition). Concomitant to the
complexity of war, some ambiguities exist in coding of outcomes. Specifically, some states are
defeated at some point in a war or win only Pyrrhic victories – where in “victors suffered far more
than the vanquished” (182). Regardless, their position within the winning coalition and ability to
enjoy the spoils of victory – even if at great cost – include these states as victors. There are also
cases of states ‘switching sides’ during the course of a conflict which adds to the complexity of
coding outcomes. In these cases, states are given two separate records of participation and thus
separate outcomes. Fascist Italy initially fought with Axis powers before being defeated by the
Allies. It then joined and won the Second World War with the Allies – albiet, not in the
disaggregated form of these data. The sole case present in my dataset is Germany in the War of
Latvian Liberation. Germany both wins and loses this war. Pertinent to this study, these data code
outcomes as:
Outcome (Original COW Coding; disaggregated WWI, WWII, Vietnam; 105 Wars; 322 cases)
1. Win
2. Lose
3. Compromise (both sides gain something)

36

War Name
Franco-Spanish War
First Russo-Turkish
Mexican-American
Austro-Sardinian
First SchleswigHolstein
Roman Republic
La Plata
Crimean
Anglo-Persian
Italian Unification
First SpanishMoroccan
Italian-Roman
Neapolitan
Franco-Mexican
Ecuadorian-Colombian
Second SchleswigHolstein
Lopez
Naval War
Seven Weeks
Franco-Prussian
First Central American
Serbo-Bulgarian
Second Russo-Turkish
War of the Pacific
Conquest of Egypt
Sino-French
Second Central
American
First Sino-Japanese
Greco-Turkish
Spanish-American
Boxer Rebellion
Sino-Russian
Russo-Japanese
Third Central
American

COW
Number
1
4
7
10

Sutton
Number
1
2
3
4

Stam
Number
1
2
3
4

CO
W

Sutton
X
X
X
X

x
x
x
x

Stam
x
x
x
x

13
16
19
22
25
28

5
6
7
8
9
10

5
6
7
8
9
10

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x

31
34
37
40
43

11
12
13
14
15

11
12
13
14
15

X
X
X
X
X

x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x

46
49
52
55
58
60

16
17

X
X
X
X
X
X

x
x

61
64
65
67

21
22
23
24

16
17
18
19
20
24
25
21
22

X
X
X
X

x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

70
73
76
79
82
83
85

25
26
27
28
29
30
31

30

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

x
x
x
x
x
x
x

88

32

31

X

x

18
19
20

23

26
27
28
29

x
x
x

x

x
x
x
x
x
x
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Fourth Central
American
Second SpanishMoroccan
Italian-Turkish
First Balkan
Second Balkan
World War I
WWI_German_Belgian
WWI_Eastern_Front
WWI_Western_Front
Estonian Liberation
Latvian Liberation
Russo-Polish
Hungarian Adversaries
Second Greco-Turkish
Franco-Turkish
Lithuanian-Polish
Manchurian
Second Sino-Japanese
Chaco
Saudi-Yemeni
Conquest of Ethiopia
Third Sino-Japanese
Changkufeng
German_Czech
German_Austrian
Nomonhan
World War II
WWII_American_Japa
nese
WWII_German_Belgia
n
WWII_German_Danis
h
WWII_German_Dutch
WWII_German_Frenc
h
WWII_German_Greek
WWII_German_Norwe
gian
WWII_German_Polish

91

33

32

X

x

x

94
97
100
103
106

34
35
36
37

33
34
35
36

X
X
X
X
X

x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x

38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

88
88
88

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x

107
108
109
112
115
116
117
118
121
124
125
127
130
133

136
139

37
38
39

40
41
42

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

x
x
x

x
x
x

x

x
x
x
x
x
x

57

x

x

57

51

x

x

58
59

53
52

x
x

x
x

60
61

55
61

x
x

x
x

62
63

54
48

x
x

x
x

55

43
44
45
46
47
49

56

X
X

38

WWII_German_Soviet
WWII_Western
WWII_Italian_Greek
WWII_German_Yugosl
av
Russo-Finnish
Franco-Thai
First Kashmir
First-Indochina War
Arab-Israeli
Korean
Off-Shore Islands
Sinai War
Soviet Invasion of
Hungary
IfniWar
Taiwan Straits
Assam
Vietnam War, Phase 2
Vietnam_N_S
Second Kashmir
Six Day War
Second Laotian, Phase
2
War of Attrition
Football War
Communist Coalition
Bangladesh
Yom Kippur War
Turco-Cypriot
War over Angola
Second Ogaden War,
Phase 2
VietnameseCambodian
Ugandian-Tanzanian
Sino-Vietnamese
Punitive
Iran-Iraq
Falkland Islands
War over Lebanon

64
65
66

59
58
56

x
x
x

x
x
x

67
68
69
70

x
x
x
x

X
X
X
X

x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x

x

X
X
X
X
X

x
x

x

X
X

x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

81

X

x

x

90
91

80
82

X
X

x
x

x
x

92
93
94
95

87
83
85
86

X
X
X
X

x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x

148
151
153
155

71
72

60
50
62
63
64
65
66

73

68

156
158
159
160
163

74
75

67

166
169

76
77
78
79
80

69
70
79
71
72

170
172
175
176
178
181
184
186

81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

187

89

189
190
193
199
202
205

142
145
147

73
74
75
76
78

X
X
X

x
x
x
x
x
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War over the Aouzou
Strip
Sino-Vietnamese
Border War
Gulf War
Bosnian Independence
Azeri-Armenian
Cenepa Valley
Badme Border
War for Kosovo
Kargil War
Invasion of
Afghanistan
Invasion of Iraq

207

96

X

x

208
211
215
216
217
219
221
223

97
98
99
100
101
102

x
x
x
x
x
x

103

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

225
227

104
105

X
X

x
x

95
Wars
4.
5.
6.
7.

x

88
War
105 Wars s

War transforms into different category
War ongoing
Stalemate, fighting stops/no satisfactory agreement
Conflict continues at intensity below war-level fatalities

This study simplifies this coding with the following variation:
Win, Lose Draw 2 (WLD2) (105 Wars, 322 Cases)
•

Includes all (disaggregated WWI, WWII, Vietnam) but codes outcomes following Stam: #40
Franco-Mexican – Mexico wins, #187 Second Ogaden War – Ethiopia/Cuba Win, #189
Vietnamese-Cambodian – Vietnam wins. Also recodes: #176 Communist Coalition - draw,
#186 War over Angola – Angola, Cuba wins, #215 Bosnian Independence – Bosnia, Croatia
wins #225 Invasion of Afghanistan – coalition win, and #227 Invasion of Iraq – coalition win
1. Win
2. Lose
3. Draw

Table 1: Population of Interstate Wars, 1816-2003

Hypotheses:
Informed by the literature, I present the following hypotheses:
H1: States with a higher proportion of a conflict’s total capabilities are more likely to win their
wars
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H2: States with a higher ratio of soldier quality are more likely to win their wars
H3: States fighting with higher levels of capability assistance from alliances are more likely to win
their wars
H4: Democracies (Polity IV scores of 6 or higher) are more likely to win their wars
H5: States which initiate a war are more likely to win their wars
H6: Democracies are more likely to win wars as the initiator
H7a: States with strategic advantage are more likely to win their wars
H7b: States with strategic disadvantage are more likely to lose their wars
H8: States with lower loss exchange ratios are more likely to win wars
H9- States which are further away from the theater of war are less likely to win wars
H10: Punishment strategies are more effective in rugged and non-trafficable terrains
H11: Mobility strategies are more effective in level and trafficable terrains
Predictor Variables:
Military Capability
By its nature, war outcomes are inexorably linked to military capability. This reality was
as relevant to Thucydides as it is to this study. Put simply, every element of war – from the
decision to inaugurate it and the strategies employed in fighting, to its duration and outcomes –
is impacted by the relative military capability of participants. Proponents on both sides of the
democracy and war outcomes debate recognize this point. Indeed, this basic assumption forms
the foundation of some of the most simple and lasting theories within political science, such as
balance of power theory. This aside, the question remains, to what extent, when other variables
are considered, does relative capability determine war outcomes? Henderson and Bayer (2013)
and Desch (2002; 2008) both emphasize that military capability serves as the primary predictor
of war outcomes in response to the democratic victory literature but the democratic victory
suggests democracies are superior in their application of capabilities (Reiter and Stam 1998). To
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explore this question, I use data from the COW National Materials Capabilities (NMC) dataset
(Singer 1987). The following details the relevant variables present in the NMC data, specifically
the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) as discussed in Greig and Enterline’s (2017)
MNC Data Documentation, Version 5.
The goal of the NMC data is to operationalize and measure power. While power and
capabilities are not synonymous, capabilities are placed in operational terms in the effort to
measure power (2). Given the temporal scale of the data, there is a good deal of ambiguity in
measuring power across states and across time. For this reason, these measures are specifically
selected for their ability to translate across time, place, and state. This raises several important
considerations when using this data. First, comparison in the data is not perfect. It is questionable
to suggest that “equal values of the same indicator make equal contributions to capability” (2).
Secondly, possible alternatives exist for coded values. Third, multiple sources were consulted in
compiling the NMC data. In ideal cases, several sources provided overlapping information.
Fourth, given limitation in available data, some values are estimated in these cases. Fifth, there
are inevitable errors within the dataset. This may arise from inaccurate source data or errors of
estimation. This risk necessarily increases with temporal distance (2-3). Despite these
considerations, this dissertation will benefit from the recent (2/2017) update to the NMC. I will
use several basic measures from the NMC data as aggregated in CINC, listed below:
The Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) is an aggregated measure of six elements
of a state’s capability. These include, military personnel (milper; in thousands of people), military
expenditures (milex; 1816-1913 – in thousands of current year British pounds; 1914-2012 – in
thousands of current year U.S. dollars), iron (pig iron, 1816-1899) and steel production (1900-
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2012) (irst; in thousands of tons), energy consumption (pec; in thousands of coal tonequivalents), total population (tpop; in thousands of people), and urban population (upop; 18162001 in thousands of people living in cities greater than 100,000 people; 2002 to 2012 in
thousands of people living in cities greater than 300,000 people). A state’s CINC score is a
measure of a state’s relative share of capabilities, each component separately weighted. As a
result, a state’s CINC score always ranges between 0.0 and 1.0 and is reported by state per year.
Each composite score is individually computed per year, before being aggregated. A state’s score
is created by placing their capabilities in the numerator and total system capability in the
denominator, giving the percent share (7-8) (Sarkees and Wayman 2010a).
In war, a state’s military capability is only relevant in relationship to an opposing state’s
or states’ capabilities. A state’s relative capability (concap) is measured by dividing a state’s
capability by the total capability of all actors in the war (State A Capability / State A Capability +
State B Capability). Simply, conflict capability is a state’s relative capacity to employ relative
capabilities coercively against another actor. This is in turn filtered through other factors – such
as distance, terrain, and strategy. It serves as a baseline for a state’s potential for coercive action
against another state. I also measure the relative quality of a state’s military by measuring
spending per soldier by each participant. This is calculated by dividing military expenditures
(milex) by military personnel (milper). This value is then divided by the opposing states spending
per soldier ([State A milex/milper]/[State B milex/milper]) to create a ratio of troop quality
(qualrat). The inclusion of troop quality ratios follows their inclusion in various works in the
democratic victory literature.
Democracy
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Are democracies more successful in war by virtue of being democratic? The democratic
victory proposition rests on two assumptions. First, selection effects: Democratic states are more
cautious than non-democracies when selecting conflicts because leaders are both more
constrained and are fearful of electoral retribution if a war is long or unsuccessful. Second,
military effectiveness: Democratic soldiers enjoy the advantages concomitant to democratic
societies, such as a higher degree of individuality and superior leadership. These basic theses
form the logical and theoretical foundations of the democratic victory. To this end, I engage Polity
IV to measure regime type by state. Polity is unique in its preeminent use in the field, given its
wider temporal frame that alternative regime type indices,.
How democracy is defined largely impacts the answers authors find. The most basic
definition of democracy is a procedural one. Schumpeter (1976) famously suggests such a
definition of democracy as an “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in
which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s
vote” (Schumpeter 1976, 269). This seemingly simplistic definition differentiates a procedural
version of democracy from a more substantive one. More specifically, Schumpeter provides this
definition to differentiate it from an “eighteenth century” definition of democracy as “that
institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by
making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in
order to carry out its will” (250). Increasingly substantive definitions of democracy provide the
“analytic differentiation” necessary to study the substantial diversity which exists between
modern democracies (Collier and Levitsky 1997, 430). This gap has only widened as membership
in the democratic club grows. Whereas many first wave democracies were defined substantively
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by their liberalism, the third wave of democracy often precipitated tenuously liberal or entirely
illiberal democracies (Zakaria 1997; Schmitter 2015; Diamond 2002). Identifying “democracy with
adjectives” provides differentiation but simultaneously risks “conceptual validity” (Collier and
Levitsky 1997, 340).
Each time an additional substantive qualifier is added – such as “authoritarian democracy,
neopatrimonialism democracy, military-dominated democracy, and proto-democracy” – the
conceptual link to the essence of what a democracy ‘really is’ weakens (Collier and Levitsky 1997,
341). Sartori (1970; 1984) suggests a remedy for this problem of “conceptual stretching” (1034).
One can move up or down, when appropriate, the ladder of “abstraction” (or in Collier and
Levitsky’s [1997] terms, “generality”). As one moves down the ladder, the number of cases
decrease and the specific number of characteristics needed for inclusion increases, with the
inverse being true as one climbs it. These categories are subordinate and superordinate
respectively. Procedural definitions of democracy are high up the ladder and firmly in the
superordinate. This procedural definition is applied generally to literature surrounding both the
democratic peace and democratic victory. The notion that democracies are less likely to go to
war or, in soberer, dyadic claims, less likely to go to war with other democracies, assumes that
this is the case because of two traits found in democracies generally: institutional constraints and
democratic norms. Likewise, democratic triumphalism rests on selection effects and military
effectiveness.
The democratic peace is consistently plagued by definitional problems. If the democratic
peace is to be akin to a law – a great rarity in the social sciences – and democracy has a ‘low N,’
then each deviant case is highly important. These difficult cases, ranging from the War of 1812
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to World War One, cast serious doubt on the validity of the argument. In response, democratic
peace’s proponents have made use of diminished subtypes of democracy. For instance, Doyle
(1983) explains away the discrepant evidence of Wilhelmine Germany by classifying it as a
“bifurcated democracy,” with democratic domestic politics and non-democratic foreign policy
(216). Ultimately, this “definitional tinkering,” as dubbed by Layne (1995), risks committing the
sin of conceptual stretching. Each additional case which is explained away by a moving a case
into a subordinate, diminished subtype moves us further away from a definition of democracy
which accurately defines the concept. This method of defining away important and costly deviant
cases has created something of a ‘head I win, tails you lose’ operationalization of democracy in
the democratic peace.
Bearing these definitional concerns in mind, this study operationalizes the concept of
democracy using the Polity IV measure because of its prominence in the field and inclusion in
every quantitative study of the democratic victory, but does so conscious of the problems
associated with it. Works related to democracy and war outcomes have the benefit – or perhaps
more aptly, suffer the pitfall – of having less published work on the topic. In this sense, less
discrepant evidence has been uncovered to this point, therefore there has been less temptation
to resort to endless diminished subtypes.9 Reiter and Stam (1998; 2002), Stam (1996), Bennett
and Stam (1998), and Lake (1992) make use of POLITY III scores (Jaggers and Gurr 1995). POLITY
III rates states on a ten-point democracy or autocracy scale, with ten values being a high

9

See Vasquez (2003) and Waltz (2003) for debate along similar lines relating to grander paradigmatic theory.
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democracy or high autocracy respectively. The more recent POLITY IV (Marshall, et al. 2013) rates
states from a -10 low (high autocracy) to a 10 (high democracy).
There exist, however, doubts about the objectivity of the POLITY scores as detailed by
both Oren (1995) and Gleditsch and Ward (1997). Oren (1995) notes that POLITY scores are
overtly normative and value laden, rather than being objective indicators of democratic quality.
The case of Imperial Germany highlights this point. Imperial Germany consistently receives scores
far below The United States, France, and the United Kingdom, despite its own democratic
characteristics and the flaws present in the democratic institutions of the French Third Republic,
Imperial United Kingdom, and Jim Crow America. In recent years, the perception of Imperial
Germany is now relatively higher, not because new facts about the nature of the Imperial German
regime have emerged, but because the normative perception of Germany under the Kaiser
became increasingly favorable as perception of contemporary Germany improved. The
perception of democracy has not changed over time to encompass a deeper understanding of
what truly constitutes a democracy but rather changes so to “subtly redefine our kind to keep
our self-image consistent with our friends' attributes and inconsistent with those of our
adversaries” (Oren 1995, 147). While reprisals abounded for German-Americans during WWI (let
alone interned Japanese-Americans during WWII) and Upton Sinclair was arrested for publicly
reading the Bill of Rights under the Sedition Act, no such actions were taken upon English
speakers in Imperial Germany. This is reflected in the fact that the United States, as well as many
other Western democracies, have near universal ‘perfect’ scores of ‘+10’ in the POLITY index
(during these times). These perfect scores are equally applied to America historically as well, and
“American values are projected backward and other polities, past and present, are ahistorically
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compared to the present American ideals” while “considerable historical experience suggesting
that political norms are elastic over time is ignored” (Oren 1995, 150). It is hard to imagine that
a slave-holding America, a Jim Crow America, or a pre-19th amendment America being scored a
“10” on Polity scores, yet it consistently does. In this sense, POLITY scores are potentially less
about valence democratic characteristics, but rather normative perception.
Gleditsch and Ward (1997) echo similar sentiment, albeit more generally. The authors
note, as does Gurr et. al. (1990; 106), that most authors who use POLITY data take its reliability
as a “given” (362). That is, POLITY data has not been subject to extensive empirical verification of
the reliability and validity of its measures; nor have the analytical construction of its variables.
Their study draws a number of important conclusions. First, POLITY variables are categorical –
intentionally – but often are not treated as such in the literature in which they are employed.
Compounding this, states with the same score are not equivalent, but broadly comparable. The
authors note “vastly different temporal, spatial, and social contexts support the same democracy
and autocracy scale values” (380). POLITY data also present autocracy scores which are “highly
nonlinear, asymmetric, and intransitive,” democracy scores are also intransitive (albeit less so
than autocracy scores), are overdetermined (given the weight of executive recruitment in
determining democracy scores), and scores change very slowly (with little change to either
democracy or autocracy score over short periods of time, averaging about a decade for changes
to occur) (380). Gleditsch and Ward conclude this discussion by suggesting that those using
POLITY data should pay careful attention to the categorical nature of these data, especially
democratic peace scholars.
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With these points in mind, this dissertation will engage POLITY IV regime scores, while
recognizing Gleditsch and Ward’s (1997) advice on the treatment of POLITY data as categorical
and considering alternatives to POLITY. However, the limited number of cases makes alternatives
problematic. Despite the novel approach of alternatives, such a the Varieties of Democracy (VDem), the temporal frame would dramatically reduce the temporal scale of this study. Beyond
this, purely treating Polity IV as categorical is equally problematic given the relative diversity of
possible scores, as well as the relative dearth of democracies. Regardless, this suggests that Polity
data should be taken with some skepticism in final results.
Initiator
States often enter wars with an inequality in preparation. The state which inaugurates a
war likely makes the decision to initiate war on the basis of a perceived advantage present at the
time (Organski and Kugler 1980; Gilpin 1981; Blainey 1988). Germany’s WWI Schlieffen Plan
demonstrates the logic of this advantage: German forces would seek to initiate war with France,
seeking quick and decisive victory in the west, before engaging Russia in the east – thereby
enjoying the advantages of initiation as the Russian military machine was slow to mobilize. The
execution of the plan also demonstrates the limitations of this advantage. Through a combination
of the fallibility of the plan, its execution, and the defensive strategy of French targets, Germany
found itself mired in trench warfare in the west. Regardless of the eventual outcome in this war
of attrition, the initial successes in Belgium and Eastern France allowed for Germany to seek to
preserve the battlefield status quo – meaning German soldiers enjoyed more permanent
trenches and camps relative to the British and French forces. The Germans enjoyed a favorable
loss exchange ratio (.85:1), in part due to this advantage.
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Initiators also enjoy the advantage of choosing the initial location of the war. The
Germans again demonstrate this advantage with the Manstein Plan in 1940. Rather than engage
the Maginot Line along the French-German border, the Germans selected the location of fighting
with their Blitz through Belgium – bypassing the French fortifications and eventually flanking the
east-facing defensive installations from the west. In the same sense, Western Allied forces
enjoyed the advantage of initiation with the invasion of Normandy. German command was duped
by Operation Bodyguard – with inflatable tanks and phony aircraft in Kent (the closest point to
Pas de Calais), false radio chatter detailing skis to be used in an imagined invasion of Norway, and
other deceptions – and were relatively ill prepared for a landing on the beaches of Normandy.
I predict, following a range of works, including Stam (1996), Bennett and Stam (1996),
Reiter and Stam (1998; 2002), Desch (2002; 2008), Henderson and Bayer (2013) and Cochran and
Long (2017), that initiators enjoy advantage in war. This is given their advantage in choosing when
and where a war is fought. Initiation follows coding by the COW (Sarkees and Wayman 2010b).
However, proponents of the democratic victory suggest that one of the primary reasons
democracies seem to be successful in war is due to their superior selection of the wars they fight.
These “selection effects” suggest that democratic leaders are fearful of possible electoral
retribution when engaging in long, costly, or difficult wars. Following the coding of Reiter and
Stam (1998) I generate an interaction of a state’s POLITYIV score and initiation variable.
While proponents of the democratic victory proposition suggest this advantage is owed
to both selection effects and military effectiveness, I am primarily focused on selection effects in
quantitative analysis. This is due to the work of Cochran and Long (2017), which demonstrates a
lack of democratic military effectiveness when loss exchange ratio data is included in analysis of
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outcomes. The question then is, are democracies superior in their selection of wars. Interaction
effects are generated in several ways. First outcomes are recoded from the original COW coding
(1 = initiator; 2 = target) to Stam’s coding (Initiator_2; 0 = target; 1 = initiator). The first measure
(Poli_Init) is generated by multiplying a PolityIV score and initiator dichotomous coding
(PolityIV*Initiator_2). Second, following Stam’s non-monotonic politics and initiation interaction
variable, recodes COW initiators (1 = target; 0 = initiator), then multiplies PolityIV and initiation,
before transforming into Poli_init_1 as x-.5 (x=(poli_init+11)/10). Third, the variable is
transformed into poli_init_2 [(x-.5)ln(x)]. This creates a variable which with a median value at -10,
decreasing as the score increases, until it rises again as PolityIV scores approach ten (see Reiter
and Stam III 2002, Appendix 2.1).
Strategy
Strategy, as defined by Mearscheimer (1983), is “how a nation’s armed forces are
employed to achieve specific battlefield objectives” (28). Decision makers must choose how to
do this effectively or pay the cost of failure. In this sense, “decision makers attempt to foresee
the nature of the war” (28). Intuitively and by definition, strategy has a significant impact on the
course and outcome of a war – and a number of studies have demonstrated this point
(Mearscheimer 1983; Stam 1996; Reiter and Stam III 1998; 2002; Desch 2002; 2008 Bennett and
Stam III 1998; Henderson and Bayer 2013). Strategy is an essential piece of the war outcomes
puzzle. A state may have vast wealth, spend that wealth on military capability, and be in a
relatively advantageous position, but if these elements are not deployed well, they are all for
naught. This section will first detail, then operationalize strategy as it will be used in this
dissertation.
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This study codes three distinct strategies: maneuver, attrition, and punishment. While a
strategy used in a given war is specific to that war, these three broad categories of strategy
encompass the general spirit and direction of these choices – and are well represented in the
literature (Mearscheimer 1983; Bennett and Stam III 1998; Reiter and Stam III 2002). These
strategies are detailed, using definitions from Mearscheimer (1983) and Bennett and Stam
(1998), below:
•

Maneuver (M): this strategy makes use of both relative speed and mobility to defeat an
opponent. Specifically, speed and mobility are used to disrupt an opponent’s ability to
organize their forces and resources (Bennett and Stam III 1998, 354). Maneuver strategies
may seek to surround, encircle, or divide enemy forces with speed and position.10
Attrition (A): this strategy seeks to erode and destroy an enemy’s capacity to continue
fighting. While maneuver strategies use speed to interrupt a state’s ability to organize,
attrition actively seeks to destroy and capture an opponent’s forces. Attrition is further
unique in that it seeks large-scale confrontation with enemy forces (Mearscheimer 1983,
34).11
Punishment (P): this strategy seeks to force high costs on enemy forces – with or without
tactical victories – to the point that continuing the conflict is not politically possible. That is,
to make the choice of continuing to participate in the conflict so costly as to outweigh the
benefit. Bennett and Stam (1998) note this seeks “the erosion of political resolve among elites
or mass publics, or both” (354). This includes targeting primarily civilians.

•

•

In addition, doctrine is distinct from strategy. Whereas strategy is the plan for how a state
seeks to meet their objectives, doctrine describes a state’s goals and their general orientation
toward reaching them. Doctrines can be, broadly, either offensive (O) or defensive (D). Taken in
tandem, there are 18 possible doctrine-strategy combinations in warring dyads:
Table 2: Strategy-Doctrine Combinations
Initiator
Doctrine
Offensive
10

Initiator Strategy Target Doctrine

Target Strategy

Code

Maneuver

Maneuver

OMDM

Defensive

Maneuver strategies also include Fabian hit and run styled defenses, such as those employed by Mannerheim’s
Finnish forces during the 1939-40 Russo-Finnish War.
11
Attrition is the modal strategy employed by states between 1816 and 2003
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Offensive
Offensive
Offensive
Offensive
Offensive
Offensive
Offensive
Offensive
Defensive
Defensive
Defensive
Defensive
Defensive
Defensive
Defensive
Defensive
Defensive

Attrition
Punishment
Maneuver
Attrition
Punishment
Maneuver
Attrition
Punishment
Maneuver
Attrition
Punishment
Maneuver
Attrition
Punishment
Maneuver
Attrition
Punishment

Defensive
Defensive
Defensive
Defensive
Defensive
Defensive
Defensive
Defensive
Offensive
Offensive
Offensive
Offensive
Offensive
Offensive
Offensive
Offensive
Offensive

Attrition
Punishment
Attrition
Maneuver
Maneuver
Punishment
Punishment
Attrition
Punishment
Punishment
Attrition
Attrition
Attrition
Maneuver
Maneuver
Maneuver
Punishment

* Strategic
advantage for
initiator

+ Strategic
advantage for
target

# No strategic
advantage to
initiator or
target

Bennett and
Stam 1998, 355

OADA#
OPDP#
OMDA*
OADM+
OPDM*
OMDP+
OADP+
OPDA*
DMOP+
DAOP+
DPOA*
DMOA*
DAOA#
DPOM*
DMOM#
DAOM+
DPOP#

I make use of doctrine and strategy data as compiled by Reiter and Stam (1998) and used
in Bennett and Stam (1996; 1998), Reiter and Stam (2002) and Desch (2002). Doctrine data were
synthesized from Dupuy and Dupuy (1986) and Holsti (1991). Maneuver, attrition, and
punishment strategy classifications were synthesized from Dupuy (1983), Dupuy and Dupuy
(1986), and Clodfelter (1992). When multiple strategies are employed in a conflict, the strategy
which “absorbs the majority of the state’s military assets” is used. If there is more than one state
party to the conflict on a given side, the strategy of the state with larger capability is used (6).
Given the incredible diversity of war, there are difficult cases which do not immediately ‘fit’ one
of the three strategy categories. Bennett and Stam (1996) code the three cases disagreed upon
by the above strategy sources (Germany in WWI, Germany against the U.S. and U.K. in WWII, and
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Israel in the Yom Kippur War) in the modal strategy of attrition (247).12 For the nineteen wars not
included in Stam’s strategy coding, I provide original strategy-doctrine coding following narrative
descriptions by the COW (Sarkees and Wayman 2010a) and Clodfelter (Clodfelter 2017). The
modal strategy of attrition was applied in difficult cases.
Loss Exchange Ratio
A loss exchange ratio (LER) details the ratios of losses between opponents in wars. Put
simply, the deaths suffered by one side relative to the other. This calculation serves as measure
of a state’s military efficacy or the rate at which it incurs costs relative to the enemy. In bilateral
wars, this calculation is particularly simple (State A battle deaths/State B battle deaths). It is a
measure of the cost of war in blood. In multilateral wars, LERS have traditionally been more
difficult to measure given the complexity of ‘who is killing whom.’ This is compounded in cases
where non-state actors are major participants, such as the National Liberation Front (NLF) or Viet
Cong in the Vietnam War. Introduced by Cochran and Long (2017), the Loss Exchange Ratio
Dataset (LERD) is unique in its capture of this measure by using battle-level data to capture LERs
in multilateral wars. This measure of efficacy is an important alternative to the problematic HERO
and CHASE data used in previous studies on the democratic victory. Cochran and Long find that
when LERs are included, democracies do not enjoy inherent advantages in war, thereby casting
doubt on the military effectiveness thesis. I include LERs as provided by Cochran and Long. Given

12

I consciously exclude the ‘leadership’ variable(s) which are employed by the democratic victory literature. It is an
important question and holds weight relative to the validity of the democratic victory but, simply put, the evidence
presented by Stam and his coauthors is not convincing. Desch (2002) effectively dismantles it, showing major
inconsistencies present in the leadership coding in the Combat History Analysis Study Effort (CHASE) and Historical
Evaluation Research Organization (HERO; see Dupuy 1983 and its updates). Beyond this, Cochran and Long (2017)
adequately express LERS as an alternative measure of effectiveness apart from CHASE and HERO data.
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that the authors replicate Stam’s work, I generate LERs for bilateral wars missing from the
published data. In missing multilateral wars, the data is coded as missing. I then generate natural
logs (ln) of LERs (lnLER) for use in my analysis.
Control Variables:
Coalition Capabilities
States with larger coalitions have an advantage in war (Gartner and Siverson 1996). Larger
coalitions bring more to the table, be it material resources or troops, all while reducing cost to
individual participants. Graham, et al. (2015) note that democracies are more likely to fight wars
in relatively larger coalitions than nondemocracies. In this sense, the authors suggest democratic
victory is the result of “quantity (not quality)” (2). They argue democracies are more likely to form
coalitions because of their valence interests by nature of being jointly democratic; fighting for
similarly ‘democratic’ motivation. More tangibly, they contend that the spoils of war are more
easily divided among fellow democracies. The study’s strongest example of a democratic
coalition – the allies during World War Two, comprised of democratic Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, and Britain in 1939 and later democratic America in December of 1941 – is deeply
flawed. For one, the state which provided highest support in lives lost was the Soviet Union, a
totalitarian regime. They, like the United States following Pearl Harbor and subsequent German
declaration of war, joined the fight because it was pragmatic policy – that is, fighting against a
state which had aggressed against them. Certainly the U.S. had engaged in material support for
the British and Allied cause prior to 1941, but this can be equally explained by the basic premise
of balance of power theory – states actively seek to correct perceived dangerous concentrations
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of powers (Waltz 1979, 117-118). This would mean collaboration was an ad-hoc response to the
distribution of power (Grieco 1993). Even if we do not assume this is balancing behavior resulting
from a position of self-help, the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, and Canada’s actions could
potentially be explained by their history as British settler colonies (see Fails and Krieckhaus 2010
for a critique along similar lines of Acemoglu, et al. 2001).
Regardless of possible propensity of democracies to join coalitions, coalition size remains a
proven corollary of victory – to the point that Graham et al. (2015) suggest coalition size “actually
accounts for much of the empirical relationship between regime type and victory and, in many
specifications, subsumes any direct effect of regime type on victory” (3). However, Graham et. al
(2015) use a set of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), as opposed to interstate wars – as a
population of cases (Moaz 2005). These authors use MIDs of both low and moderate intensity
(9). This is problematic because it implies that states join coalitions in relatively low intensity
conflicts for the same reasons they do in high intensity conflicts. Presumably it is easier to
participate in a low risk, low intensity MID than a war. Instead, I will use coalition data from the
COW dataset. Relative alliance capabilities are calculated, following Stam’s coding, by adding
additional participants’ CINC scores divided by total opponent capability (total side CINC scoreunit of analysis state/total opponent capabilities).
Distance
Power decays over distance. Boulding (1963) suggests that the further a state is from the
place it seeks to exercise its power, the weaker it will be. This occurs for a number of reasons:
distance compounds organization and command problems, lowers morale, increases domestic
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dissent, and weakens soldiers and equipment (Bueno de Mesquita 1981, 41). This may also
exacerbate unfamiliarity with terrain, leading to less efficient strategy selection. Distance
decreases morale and it is possible that this could have a more pronounced impact on
democracies (under the assumption that there is a strong sense of the rule of law) in that the
spoils of war are less accessible to soldiers. Put simply, as distance from a conflict increases, a
state’s efficiency in fighting there should decrease. There is some evidence to suggest that this
effect in less pronounced in recent history. This would assume, as Boulding did, that innovation
in transportation and air and missile capability have mitigated the loss of strength gradient
(Boulding 1965). Martin (2016) suggests that today there is not a loss of strength gradient, but
rather a “loss of time gradient” (91-101). Specifically, Martin suggests that with proper afloatsupport logistics – and their speedy use – power is not lost with distance. On the contrary, Webb
(2007) suggests that only with the use of forward-positioned bases can a state mitigate the loss
of power by decreasing relative distance from a target. Both Webb (2007) and Martin (2015) have
noticeable normative agendas: preserving American forward-positioned bases to more
efficiently serve interventions and promoting policy beneficial to British afloat-support,
respectively.
Regardless, recent history, such as the Argentine invasion of the British Falkland
(Malvinas) Islands, seems to support the notion that distance still decreases the ability to bring
power to bear on another actor and necessitates careful consideration in this dissertation. Major
technological developments, especially in ocean transportation, likely mitigated some of the
impact of oceans over time – if a state maintained a blue-water navy. The presence of oceans,
regardless, is a permanent obstacle to power projection that has long been speculated to
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decrease a state’s ability to project power, to the point of dramatically shaping world political
outcomes (Mahan 1890; Modelski 1987). I diverge from traditional coding of distance in the
democratic victory literature. The majority of works measure distance between capitals. This is
often a fine measure of power projection. However, in some cases, states project power to a
front, which is either shared contiguously between states fighting or in a separate state all
together. In these cases, I count distance in kilometers to this front. In cases where this is not
possible, either because there are multiple fronts or the war is especially complex, I code distance
by kilometers to capitals. Defending states, fighting in their own territory, are coded as 1 km.

Terrain
Like time, politics happen in place. More specifically, war happens in place and the place
in which war occurs has a dramatic impact on the course, duration, and outcome of the conflict.
Would Finland have been able to fight numerically superior Soviet forces in the Winter War to a
LER .2:5.1 of without the aid of its remote and harsh landscape? Would Germany have been able
to blitz through Belgium and France were the terrain not agreeable to such a strategy? Terrain
impacts nearly every facet of a war. As Clausewitz (2007) states, “one cannot conceive of a
regular army operating except in a definite space… Its [terrain’s] importance is decisive in the
highest degree, for it affects the operations of all forces, and at times entirely alters them.” The
influence of terrain “may be felt in the very smallest feature of the ground, but it can also
dominate enormous areas” (56). The largest original source of data and novelty in this
dissertation is in the introduction of new terrain data – as well as new types of terrain data – into

58

the question of war outcomes. Terrain data will act as a control variable, given that both parties
to the war fight nominally in the same terrain. This variable should alter predictor variables –
acting as a power multiplier, changing the efficacy of strategy, and the course of wars.
Recent work on war outcomes has addressed the importance of terrain. Reiter and Stam
(1998; 2002) – and replicated by Henderson and Bayer (2013) – find that terrain has a substantial
impact on the efficacy of certain strategies and, as a result, a war’s outcome. These sources use
The New York Times Atlas of the World (1983) to measure the “ruggedness” of terrain in a given
war. While the authors confirm that increasingly rugged terrains lead to longer wars and benefit
certain strategies, there exist doubts about the precision of these claims. This source is
problematic for several reasons. First, the authors are flawed in their operationalization of
“ruggedness.” Reiter and Stam (1998) write:
“Terrain codings come from New York Times Atlas of the World (1983) and correspond
to the location of the majority of battles fought during a war (Dupuy and Dupuy 1986).
We then scaled the terrain types to match the predicted movement times, using data
from Dupuy (1979, 1983) that estimate movement speed over various terrains. In cases
involving more than two actors on one side, we used the average of terrain scores
weighted by the size of the forces fighting in particular terrain. The final terrain index
ranges from 0.3 to 1.2; 1.0 corresponds to the speed at which vehicles and troops can
move on open rolling terrain, similar to the plains of Eastern Europe. Higher scores
correspond to desert areas with flat, hard-packed surfaces. A score close to 0.3 indicates
very difficult movement for vehicles, such as rugged mountains and dense jungles. (Reiter
and Stam 1998, 382)
These authors confuse the concepts of “ruggedness” with “cover type.” In part, this is a
problem of the technical jargon of various fields and a lack of communication between the fields
of political science and geography, but the failure to operationalize the term ruggedness leaves
the term confused. The authors use ruggedness to imply trafficability – again without considering
the use of that concept in military studies and without explicit definition of the term. Trafficability
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is the ease of traversing a land cover type – with certain types being easier to traverse than others
(Engineers 1961). Hard pact covers, such as the lightly undulating hills and plains of Eastern
Europe, are more trafficable than the jungles of Vietnam. There is no doubt this measure is
important to war outcomes but Reiter and Stam’s (1998) treatment of cover is limited in its
examination of this important correlate of war outcomes.
These authors use landscape categories as defined by (Dupuy and Dupuy 1986) then code
terrain by war using the New York Times Atlas of the World (1983) – which is primarily published
for a popular audience, with an emphasis on visual and aesthetic representation of land cover
classes. Second, the data is outdated to a fault. That is not to suggest that there have been major
changes in terrain – although in some ways there certainly have – but in the some thirty-five
years since publication, major advances in Geographic Information Systems have transformed
our capacity for measuring terrain. In this sense, previous authors treatment of terrain may have
been appropriate for the time but it is far behind the times today. As such, I will include not only
additional measures beyond land cover classes but substantially more detailed and accurate
data. These variables will include a terrain roughness index (TRI) and trafficability. Put simply,
these measures will serve as a proxy for how easy it is to move across a defined space.
In landscapes with high scores on the TRI and low trafficability, I predict that strategies
which lead to more decisive wars (namely maneuver) will be less effective. This may also mitigate
certain advantages in asymmetrical wars, aiding the weaker state. This gives armies the chance
to hide or limit exposure while facing strong opponents. These novel data demonstrate that
Stam’s terrain coding does not adequately capture terrain. While there is a significant linear
correlation between Stam’s terrain variable and this study’s trafficability variable, the
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relationship is very weak (not shown). There is no significant relationship between elevation and
Stam’s terrain variable. This implies that Stam’s terrain variable fails to account for elevation
ruggedness and may be inaccurate in its treatment of land cover as reported in the studies which
employ this measure.
These authors use landscape categories as defined by (Dupuy and Dupuy 1986)
then code terrain by war using the New York Times Atlas of the World (1983) – which is primarily
published for a popular audience, with an emphasis on visual and aesthetic representation of
land cover classes. Second, the data is outdated to a fault. That is not to suggest that there have
been major changes in terrain – although in some ways there certainly have – but in the some
thirty-five years since publication, major advances in Geographic Information Systems have
transformed our capacity for measuring terrain. In this sense, previous authors treatment of
terrain may have been appropriate for the time but it is far behind the times today. As such, I will
include not only additional measures beyond land cover classes but substantially more detailed
and accurate data. These variables will include a terrain roughness index (TRI) and trafficability.
Put simply, these measures will serve as a proxy for how easy it is to move across a defined space.
In landscapes with high scores on the TRI and low trafficability, I predict that strategies
which lead to more decisive wars (namely maneuver) will be less effective. This may also mitigate
certain advantages in asymmetrical wars, aiding the weaker state. This gives armies the chance
to hide or limit exposure while facing strong opponents. These novel data demonstrate that
Stam’s terrain coding does not adequately capture terrain. While there is a significant linear
correlation between Stam’s terrain variable and this study’s trafficability variable, the
relationship is very weak (not shown). There is no significant relationship between elevation and
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Stam’s terrain variable. This implies that Stam’s terrain variable fails to account for elevation
ruggedness and may be inaccurate in its treatment of land cover as reported in the studies which
employ this measure.
The geographic assessments of ruggedness and trafficability, which enable the
quantitative measurements of discrete regions on the earth’s surface (in this case, within spatial
extents derived from a variety of sources), are grounded in the field of geographic information
science and spatial analysis. In the context of geographic information science, spatial analysis
refers to the mathematical, statistical, and geometric techniques that can be utilized to assess
spatially explicit data. Bunge’s Theoretical Geography (Bunge 1966) effectively codified spatial
analysis as a field of study in and of itself, and since then, the broader field of geographic
information science has grown rapidly as authors such as Goodchild (1987) and Mark (2003) have
continued to provide a theoretical framework for the assessment of spatial data. Technological
advancements allow for massive amounts of spatial data to be processed and analyzed rapidly
using cutting edge computer systems and increasingly allow for complex analyses of localized
areas or broader assessments on continental or global scales. For the purposes of this project,
this includes the assessment of global elevation and land cover data derived from satellite borne
optical and radar sensors and their analysis within a Geographic Information System for spatial
extents determined through cartographical representations of historical and narrative
descriptions of interstate wars.
Spatial extent can be taken to mean the boundaries of a conflict as determined by political
and military actors during the conflict and estimated by cartographers after the event – or more
simply, where a war is fought. The first challenge in collecting this data is determining where a
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war was fought – as well as where it was not fought. Wars are spatially limited affairs with
relatively clear boundaries. The nature of sovereignty in interstate war suggests that there are
maximum boundaries of conflicts at or near the borders of non-participant states. In this sense,
interstate wars almost universally take place within participant borders. Thus, determining
spatial extent begins by determining war participants as coded by the COW. War entails combat,
movement of armed forces, as well as positioning and repositioning in light of opposing
movement. Combat occurs in fixed locations (battles, skirmishes, etc.) but movement between
these points is essential to the outcomes of wars. Combat locations and lines of movement then
establish the minimum boundaries of a given war.
To determine spatial extent, I first turned to narrative descriptions found in Sarkees and
Wayman (2010), as well as Clodfelter (2017) and Dupuy and Dupuy (1986), to determine the
general course of the war – including major battles and campaigns. Secondly, I compiled a range
of maps detailing these battles and campaigns, as well as the general course of troop movements.
This task was complicated by the diversity of quality in these sources – largely a result of the
historical nature of these conflicts. Whenever possible, I use academic or professional sources.
When such sources were unavailable, I turned to open-source maps hosted on Wikimedia or
elsewhere. For every map, I ensure that the cartographical representation fits the COW narrative
as well as Clodfelter (Clodfelter 2017) and Dupuy and Dupuy (1993).
The maps, while usually in digital form, were not spatially enabled to allow for analysis
within GIS software. Therefore, the maps were then georeferenced (associating the maps with
geographic coordinates) using Quantum Geographic Information System (QGIS) software and
open-source satellite global images provided by Google. The Google satellite image collection,
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like nearly all web-mapping services, uses a pseudo-Mercator projection (WGS 84: EPSG 3857),
so the gathered maps were all transformed to that coordinate system. Maps were georeferenced
using ground control points (GCP) referencing either cities or prominent landscape features (such
as peninsulas, volcanoes, bays, etc.) then transformed using linear or polynomial
transformations. Then, using these georeferenced versions of the source data, I create
vectorized-polygons in shapefile format representing war extent. This was done by manually
digitizing the boundaries that encapsulated the extent of military activities for each war. This
process was repeated for all 94 wars in the COW population, as well as the various disaggregated
versions; bringing the total count of these shapefiles to 105. The polygon for the First Central
American War was also used for the Third Central American War given a lack of cartographical
representations and a similar spatial narrative by the COW. In generating these files, I made the
decision to act conservatively in the spatial extent of wars – erring on the side of smaller extents,
rather than larger, more inclusive extents. On only one polygon is a pure estimate informed by
the COW narrative: The Nomohan War.13 These polygons (or groups of polygons in some cases),
each representative of a single war’s spatial extent, were then used to generate topographic and
landscape heterogeneity metrics. To compile trafficability data, I first transformed shapefiles
from EPSG 3857 to EPSG 4326 to match the input land cover data.
The Terrain Ruggedness Index (TRI; Riley, DeGloria, and Elliot 1999) provides a relative
measure of an area’s ruggedness, and as such, was used to measure topographic heterogeneity
for this research. Digital elevation models (DEMs) are the only requisite input data for calculating

13

This conflict is likely exaggerated by spatial extent, as the war was generally limited to a single engagement at
Nomohan. Thus, the spatial extent of this conflict should be taken with some caution. However, elevation and land
cover data is reliable in the sense that the surrounding region shares a relatively homogenous terrain.
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TRI. DEMs are available from numerous sources at a wide range of resolutions. For our purposes,
where measuring relative terrain ruggedness on a large scale was the primary goal, high
resolution datasets were not required. Therefore, I use the Global Multi-resolution Terrain
Elevation Data 2010 (GMTED2010) – jointly produced by the National Geospatial Intelligence
Agency (NGA) and the United States Geological Survey (USGS). In this dataset, elevation data is
presented globally in one square kilometer pixels, with height relative to sea level in meters
(Danielson and Gesch 2011). Although the elevation data is recent and not modelled to be
concurrent with the historical cases presented here, it was deemed acceptable for analysis due
to the relatively slow nature of changes in topography. While natural catastrophes and sea level
change may alter the landscape quickly, those changes are unlikely to manifest as noticeable
discrepancies in coarse resolution elevation data, and I assume that the GMTED2010 dataset is
representative of the landscape for the time range under analysis. TRI for each pixel is calculated
by measuring the difference in elevation between it and its eight adjacent neighbor pixels. These
differences are then squared and averaged, with the square root of this value producing a TRI
(Riley, DeGloria, and Elliot 1999, 25). Once the global TRI dataset was processed I compiled
statistics for each war extent polygon, including total area, mean TRI, minimum TRI, maximum
TRI, and TRI standard deviation. These data measure ruggedness presented in one square
kilometer sections (~30 arc second resolution) of each war in the COW dataset. The primary
variable of interest is the mean TRI of a given war but variations are also presented in TRI
minimum values, TRI maximum values, and TRI standard deviations. Mean TRI data is also
presented as a categorical variable following Riley, DeGloria, and Elliot (1999): 1) level (0-80 m),
2) nearly level (81-116 m), 3) slightly rugged (117-161 m), 4) intermediately rugged (162-239 m),
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5) moderately rugged (240-497 m), 6) highly rugged (498-958 m), and 7) extremely rugged (9594367 m). No wars occur in the extremely rugged TRI category.
The second terrain variable, trafficability, measures the cost of traveling over a given
space. Trafficability, in the spirit of Clausewitz, will be a literal measure of the ‘nature of the
ground’. This variable is calculated using the HYDE 3.1 spatially explicit database of humaninduced global land-use change over the past 12,000 years database (Goldewijk, et al. 2011).
HYDE details land use trends from 1770 to 2010. It presents twenty-eight landscape classes for
the entire planet for each year, using recent moderate resolution remote sensing data to
calculate a baseline and hindcasting land use and land cover changes based on a variety of
historical sources. HYDE data is presented at a .5-degree resolution (~55 km2), with a percentage
of area covered for each of the twenty-eight land classes for each .5-degree grid cell. Although
the spatial resolution is significantly lower than that of the elevation data, the HYDE data was
selected because of its high temporal resolution. Using higher resolution data (such as GlobCover)
would provide only a single snapshot of current or recent land cover and would not consider the
vast anthropogenic changes that have altered the landscape over past two centuries. I use the
war extent polygons to select each .5-degree grid cell that falls within, and calculate the average
percentage for each of the 28 land cover classes in each war. I then further collapse classes into
two broad categories for this study: trafficable and non-trafficable. Trafficable classes are cover
types which can be easily traversed, such as hard pact terrains, plains, tundra, and cropland. Nontraversable classes are cover types which are difficult to traverse, such as forests, dense
shrublands, and water. Land cover trafficability coding follows HERO coding (Dupuy 1983). For
multiyear wars, I select HYDE data from the first year of the war.
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Table 3: Trafficability and Landcover Classes from HYDE Data
Land Cover Type
Tropical Evergreen Broadleaf Forest
Tropical Deciduous Broadleaf Forest
Temperate Evergreen Broadleaf Forest
Temperate needleleaf Forest
Temperate Deciduous Broadleaf Forest
Boreal Evergreen Needleleaf Forest
Boreal Deciduous Needleleaf Forest
Savanna
C3 Grassland/Steppe
C4 Grassland/Steppe
Dense Shrubland
Open Shrubland
Tundra
Desert
Polar Desert/Rock/Ice
Secondary Tropical Evergreen Broadleaf Forest
Secondary Tropical Deciduous Broadleaf Forest
Secondary Temperate Evergreen Broadleaf Forest
Secondary Temperate Evergreen Needleleaf Forest
Secondary Temperate Deciduous Broadleaf Forest
Secondary Boreal Evergreen Needleleaf Forest
Secondary Boreal Deciduous Needleleaf Forest
Water/Rivers
C3 Cropland
C4 Cropland
C3 Pastureland
C4 Pastureland
Urban land
*coded as trafficable during Russo-Finnish War given winter
conditions
Goldewijk, Kees Klein, Arthur Beusen, Gerard van Drecht, and
Martine de Vos. 2011. "The Hyde 3.1 Spatially Explicit Database
of Human-Induced Global Land-Use Change over the Past 12,000
Years." Global Ecology and Biogeography 20: 73-86.

Time

Trafficable NonTrafficable
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0*
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
11
17
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Politics is necessarily temporal. Pierson (2004) effectively illustrates this point with an
allegorical ‘social sciences kitchen’. This restaurant boasts only the finest ingredients and the
most nuanced methods of measurement. It does not, however, place any stock in when the
‘perfect’ and painstakingly measured ingredients are combined, in what order, and over which
period of time. All too often, political scientists have committed similar sins. Given that science
seeks theory which approaches law, there is temptation to engage in the ahistorical; to make the
assertion that when the necessary conditions exist, regardless of temporal setting or even place,
that the expected outcome will occur. That A will always lead to B. That democracies will never
go to war against democracies. The neorealist paradigm itself is often subject to this basic
criticism – although Buzan, et al. (1993) effectively speak to the use of historical evidence by
structural realism. Specifically, the authors note realism looks to history to identify moments of
continuity – for instance, imperialism – as evidence of the static international system and its
continued consequences. Buzan, et al. write, “the structure of the system is so powerful that it
will generate common patterns of behavior among very different types of units,” (87) while Waltz
(1990) concludes “the logic of anarchy obtains whether the system is composed of tribes, nations,
oligopolistic firms or street gangs” (37).
Similarly, the effects proposed by democratic victory proponents that democracy has on
war outcomes should occur whenever and wherever democracy occurs. In this sense, whenever
two states meet in a fair fight and all else is equal – assuming one state is democratic and the
other is not – the democracy should hold an advantage. This advantage should hold regardless
of when war occurs. Specifically, it should hold whenever an elected executive fears retribution
in the court of public opinion – therefore such executives would more cautiously select their wars
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– and whenever democratic soldiers enjoy the advantages of superior leadership and initiative
concomitant to democratic societies. Time should be largely irrelevant because folly is
constrained through democratic institutions.
This dissertation considers time to be a central element of the outcomes puzzle, with both
selection effects and military effectiveness in mind. If both benefits are tied to regime type and
the notion that democracies are functionally differentiated units, time should not strongly
influence democratic war outcomes. However, there is just reason to be skeptical. The modes of
warfare itself evolved dramatically over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries. The engines of
war, once driven by horses and black powder, are now highly mechanized and even
autonomatized. I predict that these changes likely have a profound impact on soldiers and their
efficacy – certainly more than the supposed benefits wrought by participation in a democratic
army. Cannons ended the castle. Barbed wire and the machine gun ended the cavalry charge.
Tanks rolled over trenches. Each development dramatically changed the way soldiers fight wars.
What made the three most effective militaries of the twentieth century – Imperial Germany
(WWI), Nazi Germany (WWII), and democratic Israel (1948-1973) – so successful? I hypothesize
the temporal setting is essential to understanding the battlefield effectiveness – more
specifically, temporal setting in relation to terrain and strategy choices. This is not to say that war
itself fundamentally changes. As Alfred Thayer Mahan (1890) wrote at the turn of the 20th
century, “when the march on foot was replaced by carrying troops in coaches, when the latter in
turn gave place to railroads, the scale of distances was increased, or, if you will, the scale of time
diminished; but the principles which dictated the point at which the army should be
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concentrated, the direction in which it should move, the part of the enemy's position which it
should assail, the protection of communications, were not altered” (Introduction).
Time, as operationalized here, is a component, even if in a limited sense, of the CINC data.
More specifically, the unequal effects of time are a component of the CINC data. States generally
have an unequal access to the benefits of changing technology in war. Whereas one state quickly
deployed tanks, another may not have (or did not have the capability to do so). These effects are
pronounced in various conflicts, especially in those surrounding the introduction of perioddefining weaponry. In 1934, the Saudis engaged the Yemeni with tanks in a foreshadowing of
mismatches to come across WWII – with the Italians using armor against foot soldiers in Greece,
Germany in Poland, Russia in Finland, among other cases. Given this, I do not include further tests
of time in quantitative data (preliminary tests yield statistically insignificant results – not shown)
beyond CINC data. These points are considered in qualitative analysis in chapter four. Broadly, I
consider three distinct periods of time as they relate to military effectiveness: 1816-1869, 18701938, 1939-2003 as informed by Clodfelter (2017) and Dupuy and Dupuy (1993). These periods
are limited to available data on war, namely Correlates of War data, but offer an interesting test
of the impact of the weapons and technology of war on the strategies used therein. While further
explained in the section strategy, the claim here is not that time (i.e. temporal modes of war)
determines strategy used, but rather efficacy of a given strategy vis-à-vis terrain. Each period has
a unique modus operandi in the form of a combination of weapons and mobility. While the
dominant tool(s) always have some showing prior to the period of its dominance (i.e. the tank in
WWI, dominant in WWII), these periods mark a major war which were altered by a new mode of
war (start of data

Franco-Prussian War

World War II

end of data). The first period (1816-
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1869) was dominated by the muzzle-loading flintlock rifle and horse-drawn cannon. The second
(1870-1935) saw the widespread adoption of the breech loaded, smokeless cartridge and new
actions (both of which saw limited action in previous conflicts); with the influx of the railroad
providing rapid troop movement. Additional developments in this period include the machine
gun and barbed wire– which effectively castrated the cavalry change. The third period (19362003) ironically saw the greatest leaps in military technology, including the development of the
nuclear bomb, but has largely been static in its mode of war. The greatest development of this
period, arguably, is the tank (see Mearscheimer 1983, chapter 2).
I will make the conscious decision to largely disregard the possession of nuclear weapons.
While there is no doubt of the destructive capabilities associated with nuclear weapons, the third
time-period (1939-2003) only saw the use of nuclear weapons twice: at Hiroshima and Nagasaki
on August 6th and 9th of 1945, respectively. During this period, only one war, the 1999 Kargil War,
occurred between a nuclear dyad. Several schools of thought have developed surrounding the
use of nuclear weapons in war. The first, nuclear revolution – as best represented in the work of
Waltz (1983) – contends that the nature of nuclear weapons has ended war among their
possessors. That is, the sheer destructive capability of nuclear weapons raises the cost of a
nuclear war to the point that no actor would dare enter such a war. No state would readily
commit such inevitable suicide. The second, nuclear irrelevance – detailed at length by Mueller
(1988) – suggests that the unbearable cost of using nuclear weapons en masse against major
population centers (and an equally unbearable second strike) makes their possession largely
irrelevant. Their irrelevance dictates that the conventional balance of power remains the primary
consideration – even if nuclear weapons are used tactically on the battlefield. The final school,
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roughly labeled crisis escalation, risk manipulation, and limited war – exemplified in the work of
Geller (1990) and, more recently, Powell (2015) – contends that nuclear dyads use the risks
associated with nuclear weapons to manipulate their interactions. Consequently, these dyads
accelerate crisis quicker than other dyads, short of war (or to the point of limited war or MIDs).
While these schools of thought offer a rich vein of important debate, they primarily address the
prospects of war occurrence as opposed to war outcomes. Beyond the Kargil War, no nuclear
dyad has gone to war during the period in question. Further, the possession of nuclear weapons
has not prevented or necessarily changed the course of wars between asymmetrical dyads – in
that wars still occurred in Korea, Hungary, Vietnam, the Falklands, Afghanistan, and Iraq and were
fought with conventional arms, tactics, and strategies. The use of nuclear weapons, including
their tactical use on the battlefield, would be transformative and necessitate a new period of
study and, until that happens, it is not necessary to include nuclear weapons in this study.
Interaction Variables:
Terrain Interactions
I predict that specific strategies will be more effective in certain terrains. Given the
fallibility of military and political leadership, states will, at times, choose a poor strategy for a
given terrain. Over the course of the two hundred years of this study, this error will no doubt
repeat itself numerous times. However, if democratic soldiers are indeed more effective soldiers,
their efficacy should mitigate some of the effects of a poor strategy. This may be impossible to
isolate, given that when a democracy is successful in a war while using an appropriate strategy,
it may appear to be caused by democratic effectiveness. It can only be tested if democracies tend
to win war in strategy combinations that are not as effective for nondemocracies. Regardless, to
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test the efficacy of a given strategy in a specific terrain – efficacy being the ability to bring the
war to a preferred conclusion – I interact strategy and terrain variables. Interactions all become
increasing costly to traverse as the score increases. This is achieved by using percent nontrafficable (Ntraff), terrain ruggedness (TRI), and spatial extent (area). I will then, like Bennett
and Stam (1998), rank strategies by presumed speed, before interacting strategy and terrain. I
reverse the ranking of Stam’s strategy scale, with the strategies pairs the most dependent on
movement ranked at 1 and the least movement dependent strategies ranked at 9. Attritionattrition pairs are ranked at 5 and are the model score.
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Chapter 3: Capabilities, Democracy, and Interstate War Outcomes
“Once the belligerents are no longer mere conceptions, but individual States and Governments,
once the War is no longer an ideal, but a definite substantial procedure, then the reality will
furnish the data to compute the unknown quantities which are required to be found.” Clausewitz,
On War
No question has received more attention in international relations than “why do states
go to war?” A fraction of that work has addressed the question war outcomes. This chapter asks,
“why do states win, lose, or draw wars?” While this question is the natural dovetail of the first,
answers are hard to come by. Largely, this reflects the complexity of war. Whereas a relatively
low amount of information is needed to construct basic models of war occurrence, the
complexity of war calls for substantially more information to study outcomes. The goal of political
science – the development of general theory approaching law (no small feat in the social
sciences) to explain political behavior – is difficult to realize in such a complex process. War is
both rare and each war is arguably a unique affair. There are moments where the bravery of a
few people or a fluke event like an avalanche or flood might dramatically change the course of a
battle and even a war. Few general political phenomena are so challenging to study. With such
complex topics, science needs a framework through which to frame a response. This framework
came with the crystallization of new paradigms in international relations thought, in the form of
neorealism and neoliberalism in the 1980s.
Specifically, neoliberalism suggest that democracies are functionally differentiated units.
There is then an answer provided by this paradigm: if democracies conduct themselves
differently in the course of war, then there should be a predictable difference in outcomes when
democracies are involved. Beginning with Lake (Lake 1992) and taking final form in the works of
Stam (1996), Bennett and Stam (Bennett and Stam III 1996), and Reiter and Stam (1998; 2002),
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this difference is articulated in the democratic victory proposition. The democratic victory
proposes that democracies are more likely to win their wars by virtue of being democratic,
explained by two points: selection effects and battlefield effectiveness. The selection effects
hypothesis suggests that democratic leadership is more effective in choosing interstate wars –
only choosing wars which they are likely to win, and win quickly given the fear of electoral
retribution and the court of public opinion. The battlefield effectiveness hypothesis suggests that,
on the battlefield, democratic soldiers and leadership are superior on the basis of individualism,
leadership, and organization.
This chapter responds to the democratic victory proposition with a test of realist and
liberal models using multinomial logistic regression. The democratic victory is part of two larger
questions. First, the most basic, what predicts interstate war outcomes? The second, a
paradigmatic question, does liberalism provide a superior explanation of the complexity of
interstate war? Given this, my answer is part of a larger polemic on the nature of international
relations. Theoretically, I suggest that power is the primary predictor of war outcomes. Power is
applied via strategy but ultimately hinges on the translation of applied power in place – which is
physically defined by the terrain of a given space and given meaning by the peoples and politics
in this space. As there is little evidence to suggest that democracies are superior in their selection
of wars by terrain – or selection of strategy by terrain – then democracy has little to do with war
outcomes. The empirical evidence confirms the first point, that power is the primary predictor of
war outcomes. This point is largely a valence characteristic among paradigms, however the
reasons for this shared position vary. Realism suggests that power is the primary consideration
in predicting international political outcomes as both anarchy and unit functional homogeneity
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are constant. States then enter contests with varying levels of power, measured by capabilities.
If power is the ability to realize outcomes, then states with more power are more likely to win
wars. Capability, however, does not always translate into power and is affected by its application
(strategy) and the factors which impact its application (terrain). Neoliberalism shares these
positions but suggest that democracies are functionally differentiated units in anarchy, and
therefore, respond to international anarchy differently. In this sense, liberalism and the
democratic victory suggest democracies are more effective in the exercise and the application of
capabilities – meaning they are more powerful.
My work finds a complex relationship between democracy and interstate war but
suggests that democracy is not endogenous to the effective exercise of power. Of course, there
is never a clean answer in such a challenging topic. Democracy, represented by POLITY IV data
(Marshall, et al. 2013), remains predictive of war outcomes when all wars and states are
considered. However, the removal of three wars, Israel’s 1948, 1967, and 1973 victories, render
POLITY IV insignificant. Even when these wars are considered, there are issues in the
operationalization of democracy which make the answer unclear. The inclusion of loss exchange
ratios, following Cochran and Long (2017) render democracy measures insignificant. Regardless,
my work calls the democratic victory into question because I find little support for selection
effects and LERs suggest that democracies are no more effective on the battlefield. If democracy
predicts victory, it does not cause it. While not falsified, inconsistencies in the democratic victory
suggest that either novel methods of study and data are necessary in support of the proposition
or, at an extreme, dismissal of the proposition is necessary. The subsequent chapter on the role
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of strategy and terrain in war suggests the latter as I find no support for the selection of
appropriate strategy for various terrains by regime type.
Competing Conceptions of War Outcomes
Democracy and War
The democratic victory proposition is predicated on the basis of democracies winning a
sizably higher proportion of their wars. Stam (1996), Reiter and Stam (1998; 2002), and Bennett
and Stam (1996) suggest democracies win around 80 percent of their wars. This is only
conditionally true. In a binary classification of wars, democracies are indeed this successful.
However, when draws and transformations are considered, that number falls to around 60%. This
still suggests that democracies are more likely to win wars, and even more so, are less likely to
lose wars.14 Given either that democracy itself is a relatively modern feature of regime types or
the monadic democratic peace proposition15, democracies have fought a smaller number of wars
(50 of 131 states participating in wars between 1816-2003 or 38%). These proportions hold when
alternative classifications of democracy are considered, including the Lexical Index of Democracy
or LEID (Skaaning, et al. 2015), the Dichotomous Coding of Democracy (Boix, et al. 2014), and the
most novel source, Varieties of Democracy or V-Dem (Coppedge, et al. 2016)16

14

At least in the sense of outright defeat. Transformations may denote victory against one opponent, but certainly
the American experience in Afghanistan and Iraq suggest that victory against a very durable insurgency is fleeting.
Still, the American’s have not been defeated either.
15
There is overall little support for the monadic peace but Rummel (1995) strongly maintained this position.
Rummel’s work does suggest that democracies, or liberal states, are certainly more peaceful in their interactions
with their own populace. Democide is rare amongst these actors, at least compared to the massive death toll in
twentieth century totalitarian states (Rummel 1994).
16
Tables here include aggregated WWI, WWII, and Vietnam, as well as the Naval War, Taiwan Straits War, OffShore Islands War, and Kosovo War.
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Table 4: War Outcomes by Regime Type
Marshall et
al, 2013
Democracie
s
(+6-+10)
Anocracies
(-5 - +5)
Autocracies
(-10 - -6)
All regimes

Skanning,
et al, 2016
Democrac
y (4-6)
Autocracy
(0 - 3)
All
regimes

Boix, et al,
2014
Democrac
y (1)
Autocracy
(0)
All
regimes

Win

Lose

50

63.3
%

8

10.1
%

32

39%

49

39.2
%
45.8
%

4
0
5
1
9
9

48.8
%
40.8
%
34.6
%

13
1

Win
53
96
14
9

58.9
%
39.2
%
44.5
%

Lose
11
11
2
12
3

Win
52
10
0
15
2

61.18
%
40.3%
45.7%

12.2
%
45.7
%
36.7
%

Lose
10
10
6
11
6

11.8
%
42.7
%
34.8
%

Draw/Stalemat
e
12
15.2%

Transform

Total

9

11.3
%

79

100%

8

9.8%

2

2.4%

82

100%

13

10.4%

9.6%

11.5%

12
5
28
6

100%

33

1
2
2
3

Draw/Stalemat
e
15
16.7%
22

9%

37

11%

Draw/Stalemat
e
13
15.29%
21

8.5%

34

10.2%

8%

Total

Transform
1
1
1
5
2
6

12.2
%
6.1%
7.8%

90

100%

24
5
33
5

100%

Transform
1
0
2
1
3
1

11.76
%
8.5%
9.3%

337
wars/countrie
s
(1816-2003)

337
wars/countrie
s
(1816-2003)
Total

85

100%

24
8
33
3

100%
337
wars/countrie
s
(1816-2003)
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Coppedge
Win
Lose
Draw/Stalemate Transform
et al, 2017
Democracy 36
60%
6
10%
9
15%
9
15%
60
(.75-1.0)
Ambivalent 8
5
31.2%
0
0%
16
50%
3 18.8%
(.5)
Autocracy 63 37.5% 69 41.1%
20
11.9% 16 9.5% 168
(0 - .25)
All regimes 107 43.9% 78 32%
34
13.9% 25 10.2% 244

Total
100%
100%
100%

253
wars/countries
(1900-2003)
There are inherent problems in quantifying and classifying regime types. Regime types

can be categorized into broadly comparable classes but, as Marshall, et. al. (2013) readily note,
these classes are a diverse lot. A one-point increase, say from 2 to 3, is not necessarily the same
as an increase from 3 to 4. The threshold for democracy, at 5, covers a wide range of individual
governments and types of governments. There is a loss of the local and peculiar when using such
data. This may be unavoidable and POLITY certainly serves as the standard for the field. However,
alternative classifications of democracy suggest equally viable answers to hard cases. Taking the
three alternatives listed above, there are a combined 31 discrepant cases from Polity. Foregoing
Polity given this is akin to “throwing the baby out with the bathwater,” but there is at least reason
to doubt that Polity gets every case “right.” This is especially important when every case matters
given the small number of wars and the even smaller number of wars involving democracies.
This is not an indictment of POLITY nor an endorsement of alternatives but this a major
cause for concern in the democratic victory proposition. Detailed below, the removal of just three
wars, the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, Six-Day war of 1967, and Yom Kippur War of 1973 render
democracy insignificant in the prediction of war outcomes. The democratic victory is then
predicated not on democracy but on three wars fought by one democracy – a democracy which
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has been alternatively conceptualized in 1948 by Coppedge, et al. (2016) and is problematic in
Polity IV as Israel was invaded on the date of COW system membership, meaning its infant quasidemocratic features had little to with victory.17 Given this, the democratic victory is predicated
on two wars fought by one democracy. This is hardly a position of strength upon which to build
such a bold theory. If we take further caveats to the democratic victory, presented by its
proponents, the position is even weaker. Bennett and Stam (1998) suggest democracies assumed
advantages are fleeting over time.18 Taken together and at face value, the democratic victory is
a provocative theory, predicated on second image paradigmatic assumptions in neoliberalism,
that is overly dependent on a very small number of cases and on one actor (Israel).
Table 5: Discrepant Cases from POLITY IV
Discrepant from
POLITY IV
France
United Kingdom
France
United States
Greece
Greece
Portugal
Belgium
France
United States
Germany
Lithuania
Finland
Finland
South Africa
India
Israel*
Greece
17

Year & War (Year at Close
of War)
1871 – Franco-Prussian
1900 – Boxer Rebellion
1900 – Boxer Rebellion
1900 – Boxer Rebellion
1913 – First Balkan
1913 – Second Balkan
1917 – World War I
1917 – World War I
1917 – World War I
1917 – World War I
1919 – Latvian Liberation
1919 – Lithuanian-Polish
1940 –Russo-Finnish
1945 – World War II
1945 – World War II
1949 – First Kashmir
1948 – Arab-Israeli
1953 – Korean

VDEM
NA
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0

Dichot. LEID
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1

1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1

Total
Cases
1
2
3
4
6
8
9
10
11
12
13
16
17
18
19
20
21
23

This point is further explored in Chapter four.
This proposition is not tested in this study but warrants further research. The authors disaggregate each war by
year and using multinomial logistic regression, test a dependent variable of win, lose, draw, or continue.

18
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Philippines
Cyprus
South Africa
Croatia
Armenia

1953 – Korean
1974 – Turko-Cypriot
1976 – War over Angola
1992 – Bosnian
Independence
1993 - Azeri-Armenian

1
1
0
0

0
1
0
0

0
1
1
1

24
27
28
29

0
17
Cases

1
4
Cases

1
10
Cases

31
31
Cases

Power and War Outcomes
Generally dubbed the realist model, or democratic pessimism by Desch (2002), an
alternative model to the democratic victory conceives of capabilities as the primary consideration
in determining war outcomes. The democratic victory itself does not discount the structural role
of capabilities, but rather suggests that democracies are superior in realizing power. Again, the
democratic victory is a second image explanation. The realist model suggests that power itself is
a component of the system structure. Concomitant to disparities in the distribution of power,
states vary in their efficacy of fulfilling state functions. However, there is no element of structural
realist theory which suggests that one regime type - which can be taken as the domestic
distribution of power and regular channels of exercising political power within a state – are
superior in either accumulating power vis-à-vis their system peers or exercising that power.
Taken from comparative politics, theorists have posited that this efficiency is an endogenous
source of democracy (Lipset 1959). This work has proven empirically problematic. Rather,
modernization seems to support regime stability, regardless of regime type (Przeworski and
Limongi 1997). This also appears to be the case beyond modernization, including wealth –
especially non-tax revenue (Ross 1999; Dunning 2008; Morrison 2009; Morrison 2015). Given this
combination, we can assume a general exogeneity of wealth and capabilities to regime type, as
well as the exercise of these elements as it relates to regime type.
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Still, realism does not enjoy a concise theory of war outcomes. The greatest example of a
realist model of war outcomes, in Clausewitz’s On War (1832), is a first image explanation of
international relations. A reasonable assessment of this stems from the core assumptions of
structural realism. Waltz (1979) presents three essential elements of the system structure:
constant anarchy and unit functional homogeneity, and variable distribution of capabilities. As
the distribution of capabilities is the sole variable in this conception, changes in this distribution
act as the primary predictor of international political events. It would be fair to apply this to war
outcomes, i.e. more capable states are increasingly likely to win wars. Substantial discrepant
evidence calls the universality of this into question. Weaker states often win wars or fare better
than anticipated. Indeed, there are some 22 wars where grossly mismatched states achieve
victory in war against powerful opponents. Meaning, not only do to the weak win, but the strong
lose. To square this circle, I suggest lessons in classical realism are broadly applicable to
neorealism’s third image position.
Clausewitz’s theory of war, in its simplest form, suggests the following. To achieve a
desired end (victory), actors apply means (capabilities). These ends are political goals and the
entire act of war is itself an extension of political intercourse by alternative means. These means
can be taken broadly as the application of power. While this is somewhat tautological, if power
is defined as the ability to what one wants, the second element of Clausewitz’s theory suggests
a deeper meaning. Power is realized through the application of means (capabilities) and
quantifiably so. Clausewitz suggests a series of elements impact the application of the means.
Clausewitz writes, “If we desire to defeat the enemy, we must proportion our efforts to his
powers of resistance. This is expressed by the product of two factors which cannot be separated,
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namely, the sum of available means and the strength of the Will” (Clausewitz 2007). This presents
both a third image and first image explanation. The first image explanation, will, is abstract but
may be best simplified into two categories: a combination of leadership and individual resolve,
and strategy. The former is likely unquantifiable, beyond being especially reductionist. Attempts
to quantify leadership variables and will, notably the Combat History Analysis Study Effort
(CHASE) and Historical Evaluation and Research Organization (HERO) datasets, are highly
inconsistent and largely fail in the pursuit of replicability (Desch 2002, 38-39).19 Strategy,
however, has room in third image explanations – albeit imperfectly. Structure, seen in an unequal
distribution of capability, shapes and limits agency in war by the capabilities available to a warring
party.
A common criticism of neorealism reads that it is overly deterministic and ahistorical,
overlooking the role of agency. Yet constructivist approaches to neorealism effectively preempt
this criticism. The most famous example rests in Walt’s (1987) balance of threat theory. Departing
from Waltz’s initial approach to balance of power, that states respond to dangerous
concentrations of power on the basis of the inherent danger of unbalanced power, Walt suggests
that state perception of power is key to explaining alliance formation. While this perception is
predicated on aggregate power and proximity, intent – rooted in agency – partially explains
balancing behavior. This suggests a major element of state decision making is explained by
statesmen responding to structural concerns. They do so with varying efficiency, but there is no
suggestion that an element like ideology, trumps structural concerns. Anarchy produces like-

19

These sources form the basis of Reiter and Stam’s (1998) leadership variables. Desch (2002) provides a succinct
criticism of these sources and findings built upon them.
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units but like-units are not identical. They are players in positions with uneven capabilities but
are functionally the same. These actors perceive, interpret, and respond to their surroundings.
We can apply a similar logic to the selection of strategy from a third image position.
Strategy is the application of means in war. It is strategic in that states apply capabilities
with the intent of achieving specific goals. The agency inherent in strategy selection is fertile
ground for the second image – i.e. that certain regimes are more likely to choose an efficient
strategy. This is an essential element of the war outcomes puzzle as the correct strategy vis-à-vis
an opponent’s strategy and terrain gives a state advantage in the application of means. However,
there is no relationship, at face value, between regime type and strategic advantage.20 There is
also no relationship, again at face value, with power and strategic advantage.21 This suggests two
basic points: one, second image explanations do not explain this essential element in war. The
second point is fairly abstract, but fitting with the above constructivist third image explanation.
States make decisions about the application of power on the basis of the perception of the power
environment, not strictly power. As stronger states occasionally find themselves in positions of
strategic disadvantage, this suggests selection is inconsistently effective – at times states choose
the correct strategy and at others, choose incorrectly. For instance, the democratic United States
selected an ineffective strategy against a much weaker North Vietnam. They do so with varying
degrees of effectiveness that, at least at this point in time and in this study, are unidentified.22

20

An admittedly informal test of this using multinomial logistic regression, with strategic advantage, strategic
disadvantage, or neither as a dependent variable and conflict capabilities, alliance capabilities, and POLITYIV
returns no significance for any of the IVs. This model is discussed in the following chapter. Terrain variables return
significance, suggesting states partially select strategy on the basis of terrain.
21
While the same test returns significance for strategic disadvantage and alliance capabilities.
22
In the conclusion of this dissertation, I suggest that this study is fertile soil for future research and detail a
potential avenue to answer questions pertaining to strategy selection.
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Here we approach the second element of Clausewitz’s theory. A host of factors influence
the application of the means. The primary factor this study is concerned with is terrain.
Capabilities are exercised through strategy but terrain influences the efficacy of strategy.23
Terrain, broadly taken to mean permanent features of a place including changes in elevation and
the characteristics of a landscape, may empower the weak or humble the strong. Terrain may
also have an equal impact on armies, leaving capabilities as the primary determinant of a contest.
In the broadest sense, terrain is a structural element of the war puzzle as both sides of a fight
engage in the same terrain. Actors occupy different places in the local sense but operate in the
same space. Difference in outcomes partially stems from actors engaging the terrain differently.
Research Design
To answer this question, why do states win wars, as well as the secondary question, are
democracies more successful in war by virtue of being democracy, I engage multinomial logistic
regression (MNL). As previously discussed, the dependent variable and population of cases are
drawn from the COW dataset and population of interstate wars, with limited variations. The
dependent variable, outcome, has three nominal categories: win, lose, and draw. All models set
lose as the reference category. MNL produces a set of odds ratios by each outcome relative to a
reference category per each independent variable. MNL operates under the assumption of the
independence of irrelevant alternatives, meaning, in this case, there is no meaningful alternative
available to states beyond win, lose, or draw. There are limited amounts of missing data among
independent variables, with the exception of loss exchange ratios. Cochran and Long’s (2017)

23

This point is explored in greater detail in the following chapter. What follows here is an oversimplification of
terrain to demonstrate its broad relationship with the third image.
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Loss Exchange Ratio Dataset demystifies the fog of war surrounding LERs in multilateral wars but
is temporally limited. Given this, I calculate LERs for remaining bilateral wars but remaining
multilateral wars are coded as missing. Therefore, there are only 270 cases with LER data of 322
total cases (83.5%).
Hypotheses:
H1: States with a higher proportion of a conflicts total capabilities (concap) are more likely to win
their wars (confirmed)
H2: States with a higher ratio of soldier quality (qualrat) are more likely to win their wars
(unconfirmed)
H3: States fighting with higher levels of capability assistance from alliances (capassist) are more
likely to win their wars (confirmed)
H4: Democracies (Polity IV scores of 6 or higher) are more likely to win their wars (unconfirmed)
H5: States which initiate a war are more likely to win their wars (confirmed)
H6: Democracies are more likely to win wars as the initiator (unconfirmed)
H7a: States with strategic advantage (winstrat) are more likely to win their wars (mixed)
H7b: States with strategic disadvantage (losestrat) are less likely to win their wars (supported)
H8: States with higher loss exchange ratios are less likely to win their wars
H9- States which are further away from the theater of war are less likely to win wars
H10: Punishment strategies are more effective in rugged and non-trafficable terrains
H11: Mobility strategies are more effective in level and trafficable terrains
Simple Models
As an initial test, I present three simple models – all using win, lose, draw (WLD2) as the
dependent variable and lose as the reference category (meaning odds ratios are relative to lose
category). Model One includes two measures of capabilities, state capabilities (concap) and
alliance capabilities (alliasst), and a binary initiation variable. All three IVs are significant in this
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model, where increases in state capabilities, and alliance capabilities increase the odds of winning
relative to losing – as does initiation. Model two adds regime type data as an independent
variable. Here we see initial support for the democratic victory. The previous IVs maintain their
significance, and increases in PolityIV scores increases the odds of winning relative to losing.
Alliance capabilities and regime type also predict draws.24 While regime scores have lower
significance relative to capabilities and initiation, model two supports the democratic victory
proposition. Both models one and two have 322 cases, including every state in every war in the
population.25
The picture changes in model 3. Model 3 removes three wars from the population: The
1948 Arab-Israeli War, 1967 Six-Day War, and 1973 Yom Kippur War, including a total of 18 cases
between the three wars. In this revised population, regime type (measured with Polity IV) has no
support. This immediately casts a degree of doubt on the democratic victory as it appears the
previous support was dependent not on democracy but on Israeli democracy.26 These models
establish a simple measure of support for the foundational idea that capabilities are primary
predictors of war outcomes. The lack of support for regime type sans Israel places the burden of
proof on triumphalists to demonstrate that Israeli democracy aided victories in the three wars

24

The relatively low number of draws relative to victory and defeat cast some doubt on this issue. The 1950-3
Korean War includes nearly as many cases as all other draws combined. As a result, the results here a skewed. The
following chapter suggests that terrain had a substantial impact
25
Seven cases have missing PolityIV data as these years or states are not included in Marshall, et al.’s reporting
(2013).
26
Beyond this point, Israel only engages what could be conceived of selection effects via initiation in 1967. Still, the
writing of war was on the wall. The selection was not so much war, but when was would be initiated. Israel’s Arab
neighbors had more or less selected the war but Israel’s surprise inauguration of that war would prove the
deciding factor in the conflict. There is room to suggest that Israeli victory, upon which the democratic victory is
predicated, has little to do with selection effects but rather strategy. The following chapter suggests an alternative,
the interaction of strategy and terrain.
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(while coming to terms with their stalemates in 1969 and 1982 against relatively weaker
opponents). The pseudo R2 – presented as Nagelerke R2 – are relatively low in these simple
models, at .196, .234, .298 respectively. While interpreting a pseudo R2 is always a challenging
endeavor and should always be taken with some skepticism, the low Nagelerke score suggests
that additional elements are necessary in building to a full model of war outcomes.
Model 1
Win
State
Capabilities
Alliance
Capabilities
Initiator
Draw
State
Capabilities
Alliance
Capabilities
Initiator
N=322
Nagelkerke R2:
.196
Model 2
Win
State
Capabilities
Alliance
Capabilities
Initiator
PolityIV
Draw
State
Capabilities
Alliance
Capabilities
Initiator
PolityIV
N=322
Nagelkerke R2:
.234
Model
3*
Win
State
Capabilities

B
2.359

Sig.
.000

Exp(B)
10.580

2.739

.000

15.478

1.006
-------

.001
--------

2.735
----------

2.155

.001

8.626

-------

--------

---------

B
2.281

Sig.
.000

Exp(B)
9.784

2.765

.000

15.877

1.047
.053
--------

.000
.009
--------

2.849
1.054
--------

2.109

.002

8.241

-------.085

-------.002

-------1.089

B

Sig.

Exp(B)

2.557

.000

12.903
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Draw

N=304

Alliance
Capabilities
Initiator
PolityIV
State
Capabilities
Alliance
Capabilities
Initiator
PolityIV
Nagelkerke R2:
.298

3.891

.000

48.949

1.170
-------------

.000
--------------

3.223
-------------

3.064

.000

21.411

-------------------.070
.016
1.072
*1948 Arab-Israeli War, 1967 Six-Day War, 1973 Yom Kippur
War excluded from analysis

To establish the elements to be included in full and substantially more complex models, I
present additional independent variables in simple models built on the foundational elements of
the above model – including capabilities, initiation, and regime type. I then compare these
models between two populations of cases, with and without Israeli victories. These IVs include
terrain variables (count27, TRIMean28, NTrafficability), strategic advantage and disadvantage
(with neutral strategy removed to prevent perfect multicollinearity), measures of soldier quality
(qualrat), and distance.
Models 4, 5, and 6 test terrain variables. The models produce limited significance for
terrain. This is expected as terrain is measured equally in each case by war. In this sense, these
limited models simply provide a spatial frame for power and democracy – reiterating that power
is the primary predictor and democracy conditionally predicts victory. While the weight of the
Korean war is an issue with the accuracy of results in the draw category, the inclusion of terrain

27

A variation of count is included in models called count1000. This measure divides count by 1000 km2, thereby
removing potential rounding errors in odds ratios.
28
A variation of TRIMean is included in models called TRIMean10. This measure divides TRIMean by 10m, again
removing potential rounding errors in odds ratios.
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provides some insight in this category. Only two draws, the Iran-Iraq War and the War of
Attrition, are fought in low ruggedness – high trafficability settings. As most draws occur in
challenging environments, in which terrain should have an unequal impact, and by their nature
all states involved in a draw share the same outcome, we can see initial significance in the role
of terrain in predicting war outcomes. However, the role is ultimately quite complex – serving an
intervening variable in the exercise of capabilities via strategy.
Model
4
Win

State
Capabilities
Alliance
Capabilities
Initiator
PolityIV
TRIMean10
Draw
State
Capabilities
Alliance
Capabilities
Initiator
PolityIV
TRIMean10
N=322/304*
Nagelkerke R2:
.305/.376*
Model
5
Win
State
Capabilities
Alliance
Capabilities
Initiator
PolityIV
NTraff
Draw
State
Capabilities

B

B*

Sig.

Sig.*

Exp(B)

Exp(B)*

2.293

2.564

.000

.000

9.906

12.985

2.691

3.804

.000

.000

14.746

44.871

1.028
.054
--------------

1.153
----------------------

.001
.008
---------------

.000
----------------------

2.795
1.055
-----------------

3.169
---------------

2.419

3.424

.001

.000

11.235

30.689

------.081
.066

-------.031
.070

-------.008
.000

-------.040
.000

--------1.084
1.068

-------1.066
1.073

B

B*

Sig.

Sig.*

Exp(B)

Exp(B)*

2.283

2.596

.000

.000

9.808

13.413

2.683

3.882

.000

.000

14.623

48.517

1.016
.052
-------------

1.135
-------.015
-------

.001
.010
--------------

.000
------.013
-------

2.763
1.054
----------------

3.111
------.985
-------
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Alliance
Capabilities
Initiator
PolityIV
NTraff
N=322/297*
Nagelkerke R2: .299/.376.*
Model
6
Win
State
Capabilities
Alliance
Capabilities
Initiator
PolityIV
Count
Draw
State
Capabilities
Alliance
Capabilities
Initiator
PolityIV
Count
N=322/304*
Nagelkerke R2:
.258/.324*

2.122

2.978

.003

.000

8.350

19.644

------.081
.027

------.068
.025

-------.005
.001

------.026
.005

--------1.085
1.027

------1.026
1.590

B

B*

Sig.

Sig.*

Exp(B)

Exp(B)*

2.305

2.594

.000

.000

10.026

13.389

2.816

3.965

.000

.000

16.710

52.698

1.044
.053
-------------

1.175
-------------------

.001
.008
--------------

.000
-------------------

2.841
1.055
----------------

3.237
-------------------

3.008

.003

.000

7.490

20.246

2.014

---------------------------------------.084
.068
.002
.020
1.088
1.071
-.016
-.019
.050
.032
.985
.981
*1948 Arab-Israeli War, 1967 Six-Day War, 1973 Yom Kippur War
excluded from analysis

Models 7 and 8 establishes the role of strategy in predicting war outcomes. Model 7
introduces strategic advantage. States with strategic advantage engage in a strategy that
provides relative advantage when compared to an opponent’s strategy (i.e. offensive-mobility v.
defensive-attrition) are more likely to win relative to lose. Similarly, in model 8, states with
strategic disadvantage are less likely to win relative to lose. While intuitive, strategic advantage
and disadvantage should be largely conditional. The Soviet Union prevailed despite strategic
disadvantage against Nazi blitzkrieg. Strategic advantage may also overcome power
disadvantages, as Chadian mobility strategy against Libyan attrition in the War over the Aouzou
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Strip demonstrates. The relationship becomes more complex in draws. Strategic advantage fails
to reach significance, but strategic disadvantage decreases the likelihood of drawing relative to
losing.
Model
7
Win

State
Capabilities
Alliance
Capabilities
Initiator
PolityIV
WinStrat
Draw
State
Capabilities
Alliance
Capabilities
Initiator
PolityIV
WinStrat
N=322/304*
Nagelkerke R2: .346/.381*
Model
8
Win
State
Capabilities
Alliance
Capabilities
Initiator
PolityIV
LoseStrat
Draw
State
Capabilities
Alliance
Capabilities
Initiator
PolityIV
LoseStrat
N=322/304*
Nagelkerke R2:
.399/.392*

B

B*

Sig.

Sig.*

Exp(B)

Exp(B)*

2.664

2.799

.000

.000

14.350

16.434

3.036

4.055

.000

.000

20.824

57.700

1.141
.063
2.406
-------

1.239
------2.183
-------

.000
.003
.000
--------

.000
------.000
-------

3.130
1.065
11.090
----------

3.454
------8.871
-------

2.200

3.260

.002

.000

9.027

26.060

------.089
---------

------.073
---------

-------.002
---------

------.015
---------

--------1.093
---------

------1.076
---------

B

B*

Sig.

Sig.*

Exp(B)

Exp(B)*

2.852

2.911

.000

.000

17.328

18.375

4.317

4.663

.000

.000

74.946

105.963

1.162
.057
-3.080
-------

1.246
-------2.306
-------

.000
.013
.000
--------

.000
------.000
-------

3.195
1.058
.046
----------

1.036
------.080
-------

3.512

3.699

.000

.000

33.503

40.421

---------------------------------------.090
.076
.002
.013
1.094
1.079
-2.881
-2.306
.000
.002
.056
.100
*1948 Arab-Israeli War, 1967 Six-Day War, 1973 Yom Kippur War
excluded from analysis
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Models 9 and 10 introduce distance and loss exchange ratios29 respectively. Distance
returns limited support, only showing significance in draws. As the distance a state must project
power increases, here measured in hundreds of kilometers (distance/100), the odds of a draw,
relative to losing increases – likely skewed by the Korean War in this category.30 Loss exchange
ratios (LERs) present a far more interesting picture. Cochran and Long (2017) introduce loss
exchange ratio to the question of democracy and war outcomes, defining them as the rate of
battle deaths suffered by battle deaths caused. Model 10 confirms their findings, as the inclusion
of LERs is not only significant – with the odds of victory relative to losing decreasing as ratios
increase – but renders regime type insignificant. Lastly, several variables – intuitively important
to the puzzle – fail to reach significance, including troop quality ratios (milex/milper).

29

Loss exchange ratio is taken from Cochran and Long (Cochran and Long 2017). Missing bilateral LERs are
calculated using COW battle death data (Sarkees and Wayman 2010a). However, calculating loss exchange ratios in
multilateral wars is a challenge, as the question of who kills who is difficult. As a result, the number of available
data for LERs only reaches 266 of 322.
30
A relatively low number of draws occur in the COW data and the Korean War – given its “collective security”
nature – includes a large number of states in the contest. In this sense, there are more draw score for this conflict
than the total of all other draws combined.
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Model
9
Win

B

B*

Sig.

Sig.*

Exp(B)

Exp(B)*

State
2.146
2.511
.000
.000
8.552
12.315
Capabilities
Alliance
2.611
3.842
.000
.000
13.617
46.607
Capabilities
Initiator
1.030
1.164
.001
.000
2.800
3.203
PolityIV
.049
------.020
------1.050
------Distance100
------------------------------------Draw
State
------------------------------------Capabilities
Alliance
1.319
2.319
------.005
------10.165
Capabilities
Initiator
------------------------------------PolityIV
.058
------.050
------1.019
------Distance100
.018
.016
.007
.024
1.366
1.444
N=322/304*
Nagelkerke R2: .257/.317*
Model
B
B*
Sig.
Sig.*
Exp(B)
Exp(B)*
10
Win
State
1.830
2.486
.000
.000
9.349
12.011
Capabilities
Alliance
1.292
3.816
.001
.000
8.321
45.434
Capabilities
Initiator
.859
.916
.009
.009
2.360
2.500
PolityIV
------------------------------------Loss Exchange
-.568
-.528
.000
.000
.567
.590
Ratio
Draw
State
------------------------------------Capabilities
Alliance
2.024
3.565
.009
.000
7.570
35.356
Capabilities
Initiator
------------------------------------PolityIV
.075
------.015
------1.078
------Loss Exchange
------------------------------------Ratio
N=322/304*
*1948 Arab-Israeli War, 1967 Six-Day War, 1973 Yom Kippur War
2
Nagelkerke R :
excluded from analysis
.335/.389*
Departing from the simple models, model 11 presents terrain interaction variables.
Generally, these interactions provide mixed results. When compared to Stam’s terrain
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interaction variables, the results are less clear – given the increased complexity of the variables
themselves. Trafficability x strategy fails to reach significance – an odd point when one considers
the numerous wars in which weaker states achieved victory in such terrain (e.g. Vietnam) with
effective strategy (e.g. punishment). Interestingly, trafficability, without interactions, reaches
significance sans Israeli victories in model 5. This may be because these wars are fought in highly
trafficable settings. Strategy x TRI reaches significance, with a negative coefficient – decreasing
the odds of victory relative to defeat. Similarly, area reaches significance with a negative
coefficient.
Several variables fail to reach significance. Soldier quality, or a ratio of dollars spent per
soldier, remains insignificant. Distance fails to reach significance in victory (model 9). However,
distance does correlate with capabilities. This suggest that states may only engage in wars in
which substantial power projection is necessary when they are capable of doing so. This intuitive
point suggests that distance is most important in considering war frequency, not outcomes.
Interestingly, regime type and initiation interactions fail to reach significance in simple models,
with or without Israeli victories (results not shown). This stands at odds with the basic premise
of Reiter and Stam (1998). An increase in the number of cases may explain the failure of
significance as they report significance as P = <.05.
Model
11
Win

State
Capabilities
Alliance
Capabilities
Initiator
PolityIV
Count1000

B

B*

Sig.

Sig.*

Exp(B)

Exp(B)*

3.364

3.599

.000

.000

28.892

36.573

4.513

5.339

.000

.000

91.232

208.238

1.095
.062
-.033

1.222
-------.024

.002
.020
.000

.001
------.007

2.988
1.064
.967

3.394
.976
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NTraff
TRIMean10
StratScale
Stratxcount
StratxNTraff
StratxTRI
Draw
State
Capabilities
Alliance
Capabilities
Initiator
PolityIV
Count1000
NTraff
TRIMean10
StratScale
Stratxcount
StratxNTraff
StratxTRI
N=322/304*
Nagelkerke R2:
.586/.593*

------.479
-.809
.007
-------.098
-------

------.373
------.005
-------.077
-------

------.004
.009
.000
------.002
-------

------.016
------.006
------.013
-------

------1.615
.446
1.007
------2.988
-------

------1.452
------1.005
------.926
-------

4.038

5.062

.000

.000

56.739

157.889

------------------------------------.099
.091
.004
.011
1.104
1.095
------------------------------------------------------------------------.500
.411
.008
.024
1.648
1.508
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------.088
-.068
.018
.057
.916
1.748
*1948 Arab-Israeli War, 1967 Six-Day War, 1973 Yom Kippur War
excluded from analysis

A number of lessons can be garnered from these simple models. First and foremost,
capabilities predict war outcomes, holding significance as every other IV is tested. As an individual
state’s capabilities increase vis-à-vis their opponent’s capabilities, the odds of victory increases.
Similarly, as the capability contributions of partner states increase, the odds of victory increases.
The exponents of alliance contributions are disproportionately higher than capabilities. This has
an intuitive explanation. Most multilateral wars center around two competing powerful actors.
Only in major wars, like the World Wars, do states with relative capability parity fight on same
side. In this sense, the inclusion of weaker states in wars may increase the odds of victory, but
the inclusion of strong states certainly increases the odds of victory. For example,
Wuerttemberg’s .6% capabilities contribution to the Germanic alliance in the Franco-Prussian

96

War likely does little to explain Prussian victory, but Prussia’s capabilities contribution of 44%
almost entirely explains Wuerttemberg’s victory over France. Regardless, the two variables
suggest that the primary and most consistent predictor of war outcomes is capability.
The second lesson is that the democratic victory is predicated on Israel’s victories in 1948,
1967, and 1973. Removing the three wars, individually, we can see a quick progression toward
statistical insignificance. As seen in model 1, significance sits at .009. Removing 1948 lowers
significance to .013, removing 1967 lowers significance to .022, and lowering 1973 lowers
significance to .41. In pairs, removing 1948 and 1967 lowers significance to .32, removing 1948
and 1967 lowers significance to .062, and removing 1967 and 1973 lowers significance to .095.
Without these cases, simply, the democratic victory does not hold. It is also curious that the case
which has the largest impact on significance is 1973, not 1967. The Yom Kippur War was not
“selected” by Israel, whereas the Six-Day War better fits the selection effects thesis – even then
Israel enjoyed only tactical surprise, not strategic surprise, as the course towards war was clear
via mobilization and buildup by both parties to the conflict. Given this, we are forced to take
findings for the democratic victory as what they are: mixed. If there is support, it rests in
predicting draws – which is again problematic because of the disproportionate weight of the
Korean War. The failure of politics and initiation interactions to reach significance also casts
doubt on the selection effects hypothesis, with the implication being that democracies do not
enjoy any heightened benefits from initiation. In short, these simple models suggest that
democracies may be more likely to win wars, but not because they are democracies. They are
more likely to win wars because they enjoy higher gross capabilities, but these models do not
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suggest they are superior is exercising them. This is especially important if capabilities are
exogenous to regime type.
The third lesson suggests that both strategy and terrain impact outcomes. States with
strategic advantage are more likely to win wars and states with strategic disadvantage are more
likely to lose wars. The mixed results relating to terrain indices are more difficult to interpret. At
once, we can see that all terrain variables return significance, either in victory or draws, but the
piecemeal nature of this significance suggests a more complicated and, ultimately, conditional
relationship. Partially, the challenge here is twofold: one, the number of wars is low, and two
terrain applies equally to both states in the data – though unequally in reality. This inequality
stems from how states choose to interact with terrain via the application of the means (strategy).
As the modal strategy is dually attrition, the data discounts the role of terrain. The significance
of both strategy and terrain is exemplified in cases where underpowered states win wars or
overpowered states lose. While the low N and wide diversity of these cases, are best suited to
qualitative study, statistical significance in strategy, terrain, and their interactions, as well as
increase in pseudo R2 scores, suggest that there is a relationship between strategy, terrain, and
war outcomes. This point is further explored in the following chapter. As the division of opinion
on the democratic victory cleaves along paradigmatic lines, testing realist and liberal models
evaluate the assumptions of the paradigms themselves. Below, I present two models which test
the basic premises of a liberal and realist model.
Towards a Realist and Liberal Model of War Outcomes:
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The democratic victory proposition is itself a product of the basic assumptions of
neoliberalism – that despite a general unit functional homogeneity across state actors,
democracies are functionally different types of state actors. Anarchy may be a constant feature
of the interstate system, but the consequences are unequal amongst actors and democracies, by
virtue of democracy, respond to anarchy in predictably different ways. These differences
manifest in distinct international political outcomes along the lines of regime type. Like the
democratic peace, the democratic victory is predicated on domestic political institutions. In turn,
the primary outcome in question, victory, is an endogenous product of the parties to the conflict.
The democratic victory assumes selection effects and battlefield effectiveness are endogenous
products of democracy which make democracies wield capabilities more effectively.
The first test of this proposition is demonstrating that a relationship exists between
democracy and outcomes. We see support of this in all models except those including loss
exchange ratios or those excluding Israel’s three victories. This mixed support continues with full
models, including all independent variables except loss exchange ratios. Below, I use a binary
regime type indicator derived from Polity. While this is a more restrictive measure and therefore
overly reductive and dismissive of the great diversity within both democracies and nondemocracies alike, it fits the spirit of the democratic victory proposition as the benefits should
only be produced by states with democratic features – not states which approach but do not
reach democratic scores. In models with binary coding of democracy, the exclusion of Israeli
cases does not render democracy insignificant (not shown). The exclusion of loss exchange ratios
is necessary for regime type to reach significance.
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Combined Liberal Model
Win
State Capabilities
Alliance Capabilities
Initiator
Binary Democracy
Count1000
NTraff
TRIMean10
StratScale
Stratxcount
StratxNTraff
StratxTRI
Distance
Length
Politics x Initiator
Draw
State Capabilities
Alliance Capabilities
Initiator
Binary Democracy
Count1000
NTraff
TRIMean10
StratScale
Stratxcount
StratxNTraff
StratxTRI
Distance
Length
Politics x Initiator
N=322
Nagelkerke R2: .639

B
3.092
4.366
.859
1.342
-.036
------.569
-.794
.007
-------.115
------------------------3.342
------1.577
------------.575
-------------------.103
-------------------

Sig.
.000
.000
.034
.005
.000
------.002
.016
.000
------.002
------------------------.001
------.011
------------.004
------------------.010
-------------------

Exp(B)
22.026
78.749
2.360
3.826
.964
------1.766
.452
1.007
------.891
------------------------28.274
------4.841
------------1.777
------------------.902
-------------------

While there is no unified realist theory of war outcomes, the paradigm adopts a general
pessimism relating to the role of democracy in outcomes. That is, regime type has little to do with
war outcomes. Rather, realism assumes that capabilities are the primary predictor of war
outcomes. Whereas neoliberalism assumes that democracies are more effective at choosing
when to apply and how to wield capabilities, realism makes no such claim. That is not to say that
one individual democracy may, at a given time, be aided by their democracy, but rather, for
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realists, that no general democratic principle promotes victory. If there is a benefit given by
democracy, is it exogenous to the causal process -i.e. wealth promotes both capabilities and
democratic stability but democracy does not promote capabilities or wealth. The same logic holds
amongst non-democracies. In this sense, unit functional homogeneity is constant but
effectiveness and organization vary on a state-by-state basis. Individual states choose when and
how to accumulate capabilities as a response to system level changes in the distribution of power
– and do so with variable efficacy. Where there is agency, it is limited and exogenous; a response
to the system. This agency is manifested in the application of capabilities via strategy. The
following realist model includes all IVs but excludes regime type. The model demonstrates the
role of capability in predicting outcomes and suggests a host of factors influence the exercise of
capabilities
Combine
d Realist
Model
Win

Draw

State Capabilities
Alliance
Capabilities
Initiator
Count1000
NTraff
TRIMean10
StratScale
Stratxcount
StratxNTraff
StratxTRI
Distance
Length
Loss Exchange Rate
State Capabilities
Alliance
Capabilities
Initiator

B

Sig.

Exp(B)

3.437
4.189

.000
.000

31.080
65.934

.768
-.025
------.375
------.005
-------.076
-------------.638
------3.120

.045
.005
------.020
------.002
------.018
------------.000
------.003

2.156
.975
------1.454
------1.005
------.927
------------.528
------22.654

-------

-------

-------
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Count1000
NTraff
TRIMean10
StratScale
Stratxcount
StratxNTraff
StratxTRI
Distance
Length
Loss Exchange
Ratio

------------.407
-------------------.071
-------------------

------------.027
------------------.050
-------------------

------------1.502
------------------.931
-------------------

N=322
Nagelkerke R2: .578
Conclusion
The underlying question in the democratic victory debate is deceptively simple: what
explains war outcomes? While neither paradigm suggests a monocausal explanation, the division
between the paradigms can be summarized with a simple hypothetical. If two states went to war,
and were equal in every sense except regime type, liberalism assumes a democracy is more likely
to emerge as the victor – either based on some selection effect (i.e. choosing the war) or a
superior battlefield effectiveness. For this assumption to hold, democracy must, at least in a
significant number of cases, produce the conditions necessary for victory. The above models
demonstrate one consistent, albeit imperfect, predictor of victory: capabilities. Therefore,
democracies must either be superior at choosing when to apply capabilities or wield them more
effectively than non-democracies. Democracies must also enjoy a predictably different degree of
agency. This agency either manifests itself in a restricted decision-making process, where
democratic leaders are fearful of electoral retribution and therefore increasingly cautious in
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avoiding folly, or in a superior application of capabilities via strategy31. In the former, there is at
least a reasonable doubt given a dearth of support for the monadic democratic peace (Layne
1995). Perhaps then, these institutional restraints do not constrain war itself, but folly in
selection. In the later, democratic decision makers must select appropriate strategies, both
against an enemy strategy and in light of terrain. If the efficacy of a strategy is decided, at least
partially, by terrain, then selection effects must predict not only “what wars are fought” but also
“where and how wars are fought.”
As the following chapter details, there is little reason to suggest this is the case. Be it
American attrition in the dense and unforgiving tropical broadleaf forests of Vietnam or the
rugged mountains spanning the Korean Peninsula, democracies have hardly been perfect in
selecting strategies for terrain. India fought in the Himalayas in 1962 equipped with cotton
uniforms and little knowledge of the local topography. The democracies of Western Europe failed
at every turn to anticipate German blitzkrieg across favorable flat and trafficable terrain, choosing
instead to build fortified east-facing defensive installations. These missteps are hardly unique to
democracies. The Nazis mistook the steppes of Eastern Europe as trafficable, which turned to
rasputitsa or “general mud” with autumn rain and the movement of a million men. Fascist Italian
forces, invading through Albania, were halted in the mountains of Eastern Greece. Today, when
western democracies enjoy gross advantages in capabilities, terrain continues to stymie the
powerful and aid the weak. American-led mobility devastated state opponents in Afghanistan

31

Alternative military effectiveness, but Cochran and Long (2017) and the replication of their findings in the above
models demonstrate that democracies are not more effective on the battlefield.
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and Iraq only to be rendered ineffective against weak non-state insurgents in mountainous
Afghanistan and urban (and inherently non-trafficable) settings such as Fallujah in Iraq.
The complexity of war warns that we should be cautious in suggesting what promotes
victory. It is fair and intuitive to suggest that capabilities predict success but capabilities do not
always translate into power. Rather, we must consider the factors which impact the application
of capabilities to realize power. For the democratic victory to be supported, democracies must
predictably apply these means more efficiently than non-democracies – choosing when, where,
and how to wage war. Given the reality that place, and therefore terrain, can rarely be selected
independently of cause and motivation and never can be changed except in extremely local
instances, the impetus is on strategy selection in light of both capabilities and terrain.
Democracies and non-democracies alike have selected to fight wars across the globe and in both
easy and difficult settings – with and without appropriate strategy. This raises two further
questions essential to the democracy and victory debate. First, what is the relationship between
terrain, strategy, and capabilities and second, how do states choose to apply capabilities in light
of terrain and their own and opposing capabilities? Without evidence that democracies more
effectively engage terrain, there is little reason to support democracy as an endogenous cause of
victory.
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Chapter 4: Strategy and Terrain in Interstate War Outcomes
“Geometry and movement are the two inseparable problems in geographic theory. Regardless of
the movement, they leave their mark on the terrestrial surface. They produce a geometry, then
the geometry produces movements: circulations in states are created by national frontiers, and
in return they contribute to create these frontiers.” – William Bunge
After gaining independence from France in 1960, Chad found itself engaged in a series of
conflicts (#771 FROLIAT Rebellion and #820 Habre Revolt). The Aouzou Strip, which forms the
border of Northern Chad and Southern Libya, was seized by Libyan forces in the late 1970s. In
response to the Habre Revolt, in which the Libyans had sided with President Goukouni Oueddei
and ultimately declared the territorial unity of the two states, Libya maintained a sizeable military
presence in the disputed region. After the downing of a Libyan plane and the initiation of
sustained violence in mid-November 1986, the War over the Aouzou Strip began in earnest.
Libya, fueled by its immense oil wealth, enjoyed a sizeable advantage in capabilities over its
southern neighbor. Indeed, Ghaddafi’s Libya exceeded Chadian capabilities in four of five COW
National Material Capabilities indicators (Singer 1987). In military expenditures, Libya outspent
Habre’s Chadian forces 33:1, in military personnel, Libya held a 3.5:1 advantage, consumed 77:1
more per capita energy, and outnumbered Chad in urban population 5.8:1. The only indicator in
which Chad exceeded Libya was total population (17.4:1) – hardly a meaningful measure in a
state previously consumed by civil war and still gripped by partisanship. By every measure, the
contest between Libya and Chad was a gross mismatch. Chad which decisively won the war, with
Libya suffering a loss exchange ratio of 7:1 and relinquishing territorial control of the Aouzou
Strip.
The previous chapter details the importance of capabilities above all other considerations
– including regime type - in determining war outcomes. If power is so central to understanding
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war outcomes, why do weak states sometimes win wars and powerful states sometimes lose
wars? In fair fights with relative power parity, what explains one state’s success and another’s
failure? While there is never a monocausal explanation for war outcomes, concomitant to the
complexity of war, discrepant cases, like the one above, are important in detailing an
understudied facet of the war outcomes puzzle: terrain. Beyond a simple understanding of the
space in which wars have occurred (e.g. topographic heterogeneity, landscape heterogeneity,
spatial extent), terrain impacts every other variable in the war equation – including capabilities
and strategy.
The War over the Aouzou Strip details this basic proposition. The war was highly
asymmetrical in terms of capabilities, but capabilities only matter relative to the application of
force. The Libyan armed forces engaged in a general attrition strategy – seeking to overwhelm
the greatly outnumbered Chadian military. Gifted a large number of Toyota pick-up trucks from
France and benefiting from American intelligence, Chadian forces engaged a maneuver strategy
– effectively neutralizing Libyan numerical superiority by disrupting their ability to organize
resistance – in a strategy only enabled by the uniquely trafficable setting of the conflict. Terrain
is a “permanent factor” in war and “terrain determines the peculiar character of military action”
(Clausewitz 2007, 109). The Aouzou Strip is essentially level ground, with a mean topographic
heterogeneity of only 50m across the 3,050 KM2 theater. The desert landscape (approximately
97% desert landscape, 3% grass and shrubland) was essentially entirely trafficable. The
combination of a relatively large and level space and a terrain void of difficult features,
determined the efficacy of competing applications of uneven capabilities. Taken in tandem with
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inherent leadership problems in a predominantly mercenary Libyan army32, Habre’s Chadian
forces suffered minimal losses on a highly strategy-terrain dependent path to victory.
This chapter addresses the role of terrain and strategy in war. First, I provide further
operationalization of terrain as it relates to interstate war. Secondly, I present a basic theory of
the role of terrain in war following Clausewitz’s classical theory– detailing its complicated
relationship with power, strategy, and battlefield effectiveness. This theory operates on the
assumption that power is the primary tool of states in war and it is applied strategically to reach
desired outcomes by all actors in an interstate war. The effectiveness of this application is
partially determined by terrain. Third, I present classification of terrain into four classes based on
ruggedness and trafficability. These classes include low ruggedness – high trafficability, low
ruggedness – low trafficability, high ruggedness – high trafficability, and high ruggedness – low
trafficability. Fourth, I provide analysis of the terrain features of interstate wars between 18162003 using a qualitative comparative method. I conclude with a basic summary of the findings.
This analysis responds to a basic research question: what are the most effective strategies for
these terrains? I suggest that terrain often impacts wars unequally. In rugged and non-trafficable
terrain classes, the ground may humble strong states and shelter weak states. In level and
trafficable terrain, relative power is the primary consideration in understanding war outcomes,
facilitating the strong. As the majority of wars occur in the easiest terrain class (low ruggedness
– high trafficability), power remains the primary correlate of war outcomes.
Terrain as a “Permanent Factor” in War: Space, Place, and War

32

Ghaddafi purposefully maintained a non-professional army as a means of “coup-proofing” his regime, a policy
with serious consequences relating to the military effectiveness of the Libyan armed forces (Gaub 2013).
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In this study, terrain is defined as the physical features and characteristics of land within
the spatial extent of where a war is fought. This definition is built and operationalized on the
foundation of Clausewitz’s definition of terrain: “Terrain… can be resolved into a combination of
the geographical surroundings and the nature of the ground” (142).33 This presents two
important elements in the operationalization of terrain in this study: spatial extent and terrain
features. Clausewitz writes, “one cannot conceive of a regular army operating except in a definite
space” (109). Space has been alternatively conceptualized by a host of prominent thinkers – be
it Kant ([1781] 1998), Leibniz34 (Ballard 1960), Newton ([1687] 1846), or Descartes ([1644] 2017).
Competing conceptions of space have persisted, but for the purpose of this study, the Cartesian
position – that space is defined by length, breadth, and depth – is adopted. This adoption
characterizes the handling of spatial extent (length and breadth) and elevation and landscape
(depth).
War occurs in space – but the local and specific of a war means individual wars occur in
place – and the primary actors in war, land forces, operate in these places. Place encapsulates
both the physical characteristics of space – be it natural or built environments such as forests,
cities, topographies etc. – and the meaningfulness of these physical spaces as imparted by the
consciousness of the beings occupying them. Tuan (1977) writes, “Place incarnates the

33

There is a basic question worth asking here, as Shephard (1990) does, is Clausewitz still relevant? While Shepard
suggests that nuclear weapons, the rise of non-state actors, and developments in statecraft render Clausewitz’s
operationalization of war obsolete. While the author raises valid concerns, it perhaps arises from an over
estimation of the changes in the international system by the end of the Cold War. There is reason to believe that
nuclear armed states will not go to war against one another, but there is compelling evidence that these states will
still engage in conventional conflicts as Mearscheimer (1983; 1989; 1995) suggests as does the 1999 Kargil War. In
response to the latter points, my use of Clausewitz primarily responds to his conception of terrain in ground
warfare.
34
Leibniz’s conceptualization of space was primarily developed in correspondence with philosopher Samuel Clarke.
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experiences and aspirations of a people. Place is not only a fact to be explained in the broader
frame of space, but it is also a reality to be clarified and understood from the perspectives of the
people who have given it meaning” (387). A state’s decision to engage in war and how to engage
in war are determined by these conceptions of place, as the resulting conflict is defined by the
cultural, economic, or military values assigned to these places.
Germaine to this study, this can be taken to mean terrestrial surface. All but three
interstate wars – The Naval War, Off-Shore Islands War, and Taiwan Straits War – prominently
feature combat on land. Even in these cases, where a combination of naval (in the case of the
Naval War) or missile and air combat predominantly caused the number causalities necessary to
reach war severity, the political motivation and consequences of the war relate to control of land.
Spatial extent can be taken to mean the boundaries of a conflict as determined by political and
military actors during conflict and estimated by cartographers after the event – or more simply,
where a war is fought. This has implications for who is fighting and what states are fighting for,
not to mention the peoples who are impacted by the course and outcome of a conflict.
Further, terrain’s “importance is decisive to the highest degree, for it affects the
operations of all forces… its importance may be felt in the very smallest feature of the ground,
but it can also dominate enormous areas” (109). From this, we can take that the features of the
land influence every interaction in a war – meaning we must know these features, or the “nature
of the ground,” to gauge their impact on these interactions. In broad terms, I take these features
mean characteristics which might influence the movement of peoples (e.g. armies, or tools of
armies – horses, tanks, vehicles), provide cover (e.g. for Fabian and punishment strategies), or
change the conditions of war in some other meaningful way.
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Taken in tandem, these considerations drive the selection of terrain data in this study. If
war happens in place, we must know that place. Still, these are relatively limited means of
capturing the “nature of the ground,” but are best approximations of the most essential elements
of these places. As detailed in the last chapter, these include a terrain roughness index, landscape
classification by trafficability, and approximations of area and place. Countless other measures
of given place may be immediately relevant to a specific war – such as climate and weather – but
few measures are as generally applicable to the nature of war. These features impact the way
the humans interact with the land – by altering the cost of movement, sheltering weak actors,
and discounting the ability to bring the cost of war to bear on opponents.
The Application of Means
As Clausewitz suggests, war outcomes are the products of the means. That is, the desired
outcome – victory – are an output of means – capabilities. More specifically, the application of
means. These means are exemplified in war through ground forces. This is not to discount the
importance of air and sea power, especially in terms of support and projection of means, but only
ground forces can control territory and occupy place. The important consideration in this chapter
is the “factors that always accompany the application of the means” (142). The previous chapter
demonstrates the preeminent role of capabilities in predicting war outcomes. Yet in 22 wars,35

35

Franco-Mexican, Mexico wins/transforms, France holds18.79:1 CINC advantage; First Sino-Japanese, Japan wins,
China holds 5.43:1 CINC advantage; Russo-Japanese, Japan wins, Russia holds 2.68 CINC advantage; Estonian
Liberation, Estonia/Finland win, Russia holds 33.06:1 CINC advantage; Russo-Polish, Poland wins, Russia holds a
3.61:1 CINC advantage; Franco-Turkish, draw, France holds 9.82 CINC advantage; Chaco War, Paraguay wins,
Bolivia holds 2.16:1 CINC advantage; Franco-Thai War, Thailand wins, France holds 13.41:1 CINC advantage; First
Kashmir War, draw, India holds 4.53:1 CINC advantage; Arab-Israeli War, Israel wins, Arab League holds 5.72:1
advantage; Vietnam War (Phase 2), Vietnam wins, American led coalition hold 40.78:1 CINC advantage; Second
Kashmir War, Pakistan wins, India holds 4.68 CINC advantage; Six-Day War, Israel wins, Arab League holds 5.54:1
CINC advantage; Second Laotian (Phase 2), Vietnam wins, American led coalition holds 32.90:1 CINC advantage;
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weak states either win or draw despite a gross mismatch. While these unexpected outcomes
occur for a combination of reasons – such as asymmetrical power leading to asymmetrical
political salience of the outcome (Mack 1975; Pape 1996) – it is the application of the capabilities
through strategy which often explain these cases (Arreguin-Toft 2001).
In broad terms, “the factors that influence the application of means” determine the
efficacy of that application. Capabilities are exercised via strategy – or how capabilities are
applied to reach means. I present three strategies following Stam (1996). The modal strategy,
attrition, seeks to use force to defeat the enemy. Maneuver strategies seeks to use movement
and positioning to disrupt an enemy’s ability to maintain opposition. On defense, this may mean
a Fabian strategy. Punishment strategies seek to raise the cost of war beyond a bearable level –
using guerilla or unconventional tactics – even if outright defeat of the enemy is not sought.
These strategies are taken in tandem with a state’s doctrine, as either offensive or defensive.
There are 18 possible strategy-doctrine combinations, with 10 combinations employed. This is an
admittedly limited generalization of the strategies available to a state in war36 and only one

War of Attrition, draw, Egypt holds 3.60:1 CINC advantage; War of the Communist Coalition, draw, American led
coalition holds 34.49:1 CINC advantage; Yom Kippur War, Israel wins, Arab League holds 4.75:1 CINC advantage;
War over Angola, Cuba/Angola win/transform, South Africa and Democratic Republic of the Congo hold 3.17:1
CINC advantage; War over the Aouzou Strip, Chad wins, Libya holds 3.98:1 CINC advantage; Sino-Vietnamese
Border War, draw, China holds 8.60:1 CINC advantage; Cenepa Valley War, draw, Peru holds 2.10:1 CINC
advantage; Badme Border, draw, Ethiopia holds 3.02:1 CINC advantage.
36
Arreguin-Toft (2001) provides an alternative conceptualization of this, with a strategy typology in asymmetrical
contests of “direct attack” and “barbarism” in attack strategies, and “direct defense” and “guerilla warfare” in
defensive strategies. This typology (rightly) eliminates the distinction between doctrine and strategy. This is
because the author’s definition of asymmetrical war assumes the strong state is the initiator and has offensive
intentions. The population of cases, with the inclusion of extra-state wars, suggests this is appropriate. Given that
my population is limited to interstate wars, I follow Stam’s coding of strategy.
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strategy-doctrine is presented per state, per war (with alliances coded as following the dominant
state by capabilities).37
The efficacy of power application via strategy is largely determined by terrain. Novelist
Tim O’Brien recounts the following experience with terrain during his experience in Vietnam:
“…we struggled through the sucking mud of the paddies. The banks of the streams were
especially treacherous. Each step through the soft muck was torture, and every few steps a man
would sink in mud up to his crotch. The gnarled roots of the mangroves could twist an ankle or a
knee in a second. The putrid stench of rotting vegetation permeated the stifling humid air, and
canteens were emptied quickly” (quoted in Tonsetic 2010, 173). This account speaks to the
challenges certain terrains bring. Terrain influences nearly every facet of ground action. Certain
landscapes classes, as in the above anecdote, or rugged terrain may impede the movement of
forces, all while providing cover and protection for others. While the impact of terrain may always
be unequal – aiding one state, while impairing another, even in close proximity – this inequality
is most pronounced in mismatched strategies. For instance, if State A engages in a mobility
strategy against State B’s attrition strategy, we might assume that State A enjoys strategic
advantage and State B suffers strategic disadvantage.

37
It is relatively rare that this is an issue in coding, given that the broad strategy employed rarely changes in the
course of a war. There are issues here in difficult cases, such as WWII. Germans blitzed (offensive-mobility) into
Poland, France, the Low Countries, Norway, and the Soviet Union but engaged in defensive-attrition strategies on
the Western front in defense of their previous advances. This problem is avoided by the disaggregation of
particularly complex wars (WWI, WWII, Vietnam). There are other challenging cases. For instance, during the Ifni
War, Spain adopted a largely defensive-attrition position against offensive-attrition Morocco through 1957. In
1958, France entered the war on the side of Spain, and adopted a defensive-mobility strategy. In cases such as this,
the dominant state’s strategy – France, in the Ifni War – is coded as the strategy by that side. While this omits
important elements as it relates to the course of a war, this is appropriate as it relates to final outcomes.
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This is only conditionally true. The classic example of the above strategic advantage is
Germany’s blitz through Western Europe. This was partially facilitated by new tools of war in the
form of the tank – but the German military was still largely and literally horse-powered. German
forces engaged in “sweeping advance[s] which bypassed strong points for later reduction by
slower-moving elements” (Dupuy and Dupuy 1993, 1113). It was with this “mobility versus
attrition strategy” which defined early German successes against Polish, Belgian, French, Dutch,
Danish, Norwegian, Greek, and Yugoslav forces. In all of these cases and places, with the
exception of Yugoslavia and Greece, German mobility-strategic success was facilitated by terrain.
In Poland (39.57m TRIMean/70.85% Traff), Belgium (61.86m TRIMean/67.81% Traff), France
(58.66m TRIMean/77.68% Traff), Holland (20.25m TRIMean/75.53% Traff), and Denmark (9.03m
TRIMean/70.56% Traff), German forces enjoyed considerable allowance from terrain that was
level and predominantly trafficable. In Norway (160.81m TRIMean/25.07% Traff), German forces
repeated the speed of previous and concurrent successes until they reached the mountainous
area surrounding Narvik – where terrain and British and French support delayed German victory.
Germany maintained this success in moderately more difficult terrain in Greece (232.68m
TRIMean/61.42% Traff) – which had to that point made considerable advances against Italian38
forces – and Yugoslavia (175.52m TRIMean/53.67% Traff). Terrain in the Italian-Greek War largely
benefitted Greece’s defensive-mobility strategy (328m TRIMean/ 56.13% Traff). The initial Italian
offense, made through Albania, encountered fierce resistance in the mountainous Epirus region.

38

Terrain in the Italian-Greek War largely benefitted Greece’s defensive-mobility strategy (328m TRIMean/ 56.13%
Traff). The initial Italian offense, made through Albania, encountered fierce resistance in mountainous Epirus
region. After Italian advances stalled, a Greco counteroffensive and mobility strategy quickly pushed Italian forces
back into Albian territory. The tide would only change when Germany entered the fight.
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After Italian advances stalled, a Greco counteroffensive and mobility strategy quickly pushed
Italian forces back into Albanian territory. The tide would only change when Germany blitzed into
Macedonia in relatively easier terrain (with Greek forces tied down in the east). In Yugoslavia,
there was little to be done to stop the German invasion. Following a coup on March 27th, 1941,
German forces invaded a mere ten days later on April 6th (Dupuy and Dupuy 1993; Clodfelter
2017). The million strong Yugoslav army failed to mobilize amidst the tumult and suffered an
astounding loss exchange ratio of 179:1.

Picture 1: Danish Soldiers Don Ice Skates in 1940 to Quickly Traverse Ice (Public Domain,
Algemeen Nederlands Persbureau)
The tide of German victory turned famously in the East, but not immediately. The
German-Soviet War was among the most brutal in human history and the landscape contributed
to this brutality (39.27m MeanTRI/69.94% Traff). At face value, the terrain seems favorable to
German mobility strategy. However, several factors combined to remove strategic advantage.
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The first is the massive spatial extent of the war. World War II is the largest of all wars in human
history by spatial extent, with participants from every continent and fighting occurring across
Europe, Asia, and North Africa. My approximation of the spatial extent of the war in its
aggregated form is a massive 2,190,850 km2 – with a conservative estimation of the GermanSoviet War comprising 1,148,208 km2. In this sense, the sheer scope of the war increased the
cost of movement. Secondly, the contest was a “fair fight,” with the Germans holding a small but
comfortable CINC advantage (1.63:1).39 In practice though, the parity was greater in that German
forces were divided between several fronts and maintaining previous gains, both in earliest
stages of the war in Yugoslavia and Greece, and later following the Allied campaigns in North
Africa, Italy, and Normandy. The initial stages of Operation Barbarossa matched approximately
three million Axis forces against three million Soviet forces, with roughly another million forces
scattered through the Soviet Union. Third, while terrain was nominally level across the spatial
extent of the war, the landscape was only conditionally trafficable. The dominant landscape
classes, mostly various croplands, pasturelands, and grasslands transformed in wet weather and
under the movement of massive armies into a muddy quagmire – slowing the movement of
infantry, horses, tanks, and materiel.

39

Germany enjoyed advantages in four of six NMC categories: military expenditures (4.20:1), Military Personnel
(1..69:1), Iron and Steel Production (1.34:1), and per capita energy consumption (1.80:1) – as well as a soldier
quality ratio of 2.49:1. The Soviet Union held advantaged in total population (2.17:1) and urban population
(1.28:1).
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Map 1: German-Soviet War 1941-1945 (Sutton 2018)
These elements, taken in tandem, demonstrate the unique relationship between power,
terrain, and strategy. While the Soviets expected invasion, Operation Barbarossa benefitted from
tactical surprise. It commenced with a two-fold plan of attack: German and Romanian forces
planned to blitz toward Kiev and on to the Dnieper Valley in the south, while the other prong
would drive to Warsaw then onto Smolensk and Moscow. Finnish forces, following their defeat
in the 1939-1940 Russo-Finnish War (Winter War),40 were to threaten Leningrad from the north.
The initial stages of the war between July and November 1941 were among the most impressive

40

Soviet victory over Mannerheim’s Finnish forces was pyrrhic, with Russia suffering a 5.091 loss exchange rate
despite a 53.40:1 CINC advantage. Ultimately, the USSR would gain a slight territorial buffer at a steep cost that
demonstrated Soviet vulnerabilities to their now belligerent Nazi neighbors.
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campaigns ever: German forces managed to inflict an astounding three million casualties (about
a million and a half of these were prisoners), but they did so at a cost of 800,000 casualties (Dupuy
and Dupuy 1993, 1183). Yet terrain and time caught up to Nazi forces. Unable to deal a killing
blow given unexpectedly challenging terrain41 – compounded by Hitler’s decision to engage the
Balkans42 – and facing a seemingly endless supply of Soviet reinforcements, winter set in upon
German forces in summer dress. The sheer spatial extent of the war, coupled with a surprisingly
harsh landscape, proved a stumbling block to German mobility. Further attempts to regain
mobility would falter into sieges in non-trafficable urban settings such as Stalingrad and
Leningrad – all while the Soviet war machine slowly rumbled into gear.
We can summarize this theory of the role of terrain in war as such: War occurs in space,
but individual wars occur in place. These places provide meaning and motivation for the actors
involved as well as the people who define the place. Actors apply (strategy) means (capabilities)
to achieve the ends (outcomes). The characteristics of place (Cartesian length, breadth, and
depth) change the efficacy of this application. Length and breadth are quantified in spatial extent
(approximate total area) and depth in terrain (topographic and landscape heterogeneity).
Changes in these characteristics have serious consequences on the realization of the ends. The
question, then, is how can we use these quantifiers to predict the efficacy of applied means?
More simply, how does terrain impact strategy? In the following section, I attempt to classify the
various terrains where interstate wars have been fought.

41

Especially in route to Moscow. The “general mud” or Rasputitsa made trafficability low across the conditionally
trafficable terrain following autumnal rains.
42
Finnish forces under Mannerheim also refused to continue their campaign beyond Finland’s antebellum (Winter
War) national boundaries.
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Where Wars are fought: Classifying Terrain by Ruggedness and Trafficability
Between the Franco-Spanish War of 1823 and the 2003 Invasion of Iraq, interstate wars
were fought in nearly every region of the world between a diverse range of states – with lower
levels of violence or violence between alternative types of actors occurring in likely every state
in the world. These 94 wars occurred across a wide set of places and, as a result, the diversity of
these wars is immense. I remove four from consideration, the Naval War, Taiwan Straits, OffShore Islands, and Kosovo War given their detachment from terrain. The most basic classification
is by geographic location. These wars were fought on every continent, with the majority fought
in Europe and Southeast Asia. While this does little to detail the proverbial “nature of the
ground,” there are basic elements inherent in this – which actors are fighting, the political
motivation of the fighting (especially great power competition and imperialism), and predicts
some degree of landscape class. It also demonstrates that interstate wars seem to occur
concomitantly to the existence of states. Perhaps this is tautological, but this point carries
implications for the nature of world politics. Regardless, this classification has limited use in
predicting war outcomes.
A second simple, but much more useful, classification is by ruggedness and trafficability
compared to surrounding regions.43 A terrain roughness index measures topographic
heterogeneity – 1km2 in these data.44 Trafficability details the percent trafficable landscape
classes in each. In this sense, wars can occur in one of four basic settings: low ruggedness and

43

See chapter 3 for operationalization and data collection methods for this original data.
A terrain ruggedness index is generated by calculating the difference in elevation (in meters) from a center cell
and eight adjacent cells (in this study, cells are 1 km2 in area). These differences are then squared and averaged,
then the square root of this value produces a TRI (Riley, et al. 1999).
44
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high trafficability; high ruggedness and high trafficability; low ruggedness and low trafficability;
high ruggedness and low trafficability. The binary classification of ruggedness (e.g. rugged or not
rugged) is relatively arbitrary in this classification. I take ordinal ruggedness classes from Riley et
al. (1999)45 and set the threshold for ruggedness at 162m average change per km2
(intermediately rugged). This choice was made relative to the distribution of ruggedness by cases.
A relatively small number of cases exist in the ordinal class above the next class (moderately
rugged). This is a largely a product of Riley et al.’s typology, as the elevation range for each class
expands dramatically as each class increases. An average change of 0-80 km over the span of 1
km2 might hardly be noticed by one traversing the area, but changes beyond 162m are very
substantial.46 Trafficability is also relatively difficult to classify. The measure is already an
aggregate of 28 independent landscape classes coded in binary measures as trafficable and nontrafficable. I take the dividing line between a high trafficability and low trafficability at 50%. The
implication here being that a landscape is comprised of trafficable or non-trafficable majority
landscape class combinations.

45

1) level (0-80 m), 2) nearly level (81-116 m), 3) slightly rugged (117-161 m), 4) intermediately rugged (162-239
m), 5) moderately rugged (240-497 m), 6) highly rugged (498-958 m), and 7) extremely rugged (959-4367 m). No
wars occur in the extremely rugged TRI category.
46
As a frame of reference for committee members and myself: the TRIMean of metro-Detroit is approximately
14m, Oxford, MS is 25m, Irvine, CA is 43m, Williamsburg, VA is roughly 16.5m, and Washington D.C. is 25.5m.
Michigan’s Porcupine Mountains State Wilderness Area – which do not qualify as mountains geologically but are as
close as we come to mountains – has a mean TRI of about 100m. The most rugged landscape in Michigan fails to
exceed the nearly level classification. Michigan Pictured Rocks also has a similar TRI. It would be impossible,
outside of the city of Munising, to use serious mobile units here. The only place would be trails or engineered
roads.
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Figure 1: Classifying Terrain by Ruggedness and Trafficability
4) High Ruggedness; Low Trafficability

3) High Ruggedness; High Trafficability

2) Low Ruggedness; Low Trafficability

1) Low Ruggedness; High Trafficability

Applying this classification, a majority of wars are fought in the “easiest terrain” class of
low ruggedness and trafficability with 53 wars (WWI and WWII disaggregated are included in this
count). In the remaining three categories, there exists a relatively even distribution of wars. 14
wars occur in the high ruggedness – low trafficability class, 15 wars in the low ruggedness – low
trafficability class, and 20 wars in the high ruggedness – high trafficability class. Intuitively, this
suggests that war is more likely to occur is these environments. More importantly, it suggests
that states are inclined to choose to fight in these places. In crafting measures of spatial extent,
I determined the locations where the majority of fighting occurred. On one hand, this may
suggest that armies choose to fight where the cost of movement is lowest. However, this is
largely a luxury of the strong and those who initiate. When the cost of movement is equal,
stronger states should enjoy the benefits of strength. Weaker states may, if possible, seek to
move fighting away from these places. This should be especially true in mismatches of technology
or materiel. A strong state may enjoy the advantage of mobile armor, such as Italy in the ItalianGreco War. Yet the tank was inconsequential in the intermediately rough terrain of North-Eastern
Greece.
Limitations in Terrain Data
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It is worth noting here inherent flaws in my operationalization and data collection. I code
landscape class as either trafficable or non-trafficable. This is perhaps misleading. Human history
demonstrates that our species is capable of not only living but thriving in incredibly challenging
environments. Yet this binary classification provides a general disposition of each class as
generally trafficable or non-trafficable based on the ease of movement. This is much more
pronounced in the movement of armies (and the scale of participation needed for violence to
amount to war dictates that large numbers of peoples are mobilized). While HYDE data is far
more accurate and precise than previous attempts at classifying terrain, the classes themselves
are fluid in their trafficability. That is, they are conditionally trafficable. An exogenous event, like
weather or human modification (the Dutch destroying dikes and flooding their own country in
response to Nazi threat), can make a normally trafficable environment non-trafficable. Beyond
this, there are certain permanent features of the land which structure space: Lakes, rivers,
valleys, hills, etc. These features are often present in the easiest of terrains yet their importance
is profound. An entirely level and trafficable place may be easy to traverse until one of these
points is reached – i.e. a river without a ford requiring either a permanent bridge, an ad hoc
structure (such as pontoons), or tactical diversion to an easier crossing. The tradeoff capturing
such an expansive measure of landscape is losing the peculiar. These are often prominent and
defining features of specific battles, such as fords on the Rappahannock during the Battle of
Chancellorsville, but do not define entire wars or landscapes. Thus, this measure is keeping with
the general theme of explaining war outcomes writ large.
Beyond this, my terrain data offers a snap shot of the full spatial extent, rather than the
tracking its evolution over time. The tides of war often change. For instance, in the Saudi-Yemeni
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War, Saudi forces used mobile armor to route Yemeni forces across the desert landscape.
However, once Yemeni forces were backed into Sanaa, the mountains halted Suadi movement.
In this sense, the impact of terrain was unequal over time. This is general problem that exists in
every case – but is largely an unavoidable one at this initial stage of data collection. These
problems can be addressed through future iterations of data collection. Regardless, this simply
suggests an intuitive point: just as war cannot be divorced from place, it cannot be divorced from
time. This motivates the mixed methodological approach of this project by making the limitations
of statistical analyses clear and necessitating further qualitative analysis and innovations in future
data collection.
Prior to the following analysis, it is worth addressing the question of time period. The
previous chapter suggests that the broad time periods are not predictive of the correlates of war
outcomes but this is only on a macro level. Since wars occur in place and time, it is beyond doubt
that the modes of war impact the course of war. The temporal range of this study, nearly 200
years, suggests that the modes of war change by war (i.e. horses to combustion engines, black
powder to smokeless). These changes should impact strategy. On one hand, at least in major
wars between great powers, the changes likely develop in tandem. Even at unequal levels, the
effects should be similar. In asymmetrical war, the technological inequalities are likely more
pronounced. While this is speculative, there are serious real-world examples. Israeli air
superiority in 1967 enabled their major victory, but by 1973 mobile and static SAMs and infantry
shoulder mounted missiles neutralized this superiority. Terrain again rears its head here. Nontrafficable terrain, like dense forests, or rugged terrain, like mountains, limit disparities in
technology and weaponry. Operation Rolling Thunder in Vietnam dropped more ordinance than
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all of World War II combined but did little to break the NVA just as insurgents in Afghanistan have
evaded American air strikes in vast mountains. While this is not explicitly considered in the
following sections, this issue is implicit. The cost of movement, especially in easy terrain, should
decrease with mechanization. In tough terrain, that point is more ambiguous and likely
conditional. Helicopters and paratroopers may quickly advance but tanks, trucks, and other
vehicles still cannot climb mountains and pass through dense forests, swamps, or other obstacles
(at least not without the presence of roads). There is room to suggest here, that despite all the
advancements in movement and weaponry, infantry remain the dominant unit in warfare.
Granted the role of infantry has evolved – as infantry may now operate antiaircraft weaponry,
have improved equipment, and can operate unique communications tools – their primary
purpose has remained static: to occupy and control territory.
Secondly, changes in technology have drastically reduced the number of deaths related
to war’s greatest killer: disease. Where warfare exists, there is fertile environment for disease.
This basic reality has defined warfare since the beginning of civilization. World War I, for all of its
tremendous and unprecedented bloodletting, cost fewer lives than the Spanish Flu. This trend
would only change with the development and adoption of antibiotics – specifically penicillin –
following WWII. Certain regions hold diseases which are particularly problematic, such as
Malaria. In these regions, terrain often facilitates transmission of these diseases. For example,
malaria transmitting mosquitos breed in standing water. Parasites like Schistosomatidae are
endemic in various water supplies. There is no simple way to measure this problem but it is again
relatively implicit in the terrain data. Regardless, like time, there is room for further study on this
topic.
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Terrain Classifications in Comparison
The following presents a qualitative and comparative analysis of varying classes using
mini-case studies. The purpose here is not the demonstration of exact causes of war outcomes
but rather the identification of an existing relationship between power, strategy, and terrain. This
goal is more modest than the previous chapter but perhaps more important. If the previous
chapter demonstrates that power is the primary predictor of war outcomes, then discrepant
cases are of importance. Unless otherwise noted, cases are synthesized from Sarkees and
Wayman (2010a), Clodfelter (1992; 2017), and Dupey and Dupey (1993).
Figure 2: Scatterplot of Wars by Terrain Classifications

Low Ruggedness – High Trafficability
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This is the “easiest” terrain to fight a war in and is the modal class by number of wars.
These spaces are all “level,” “nearly level,” or “slightly rugged” by ruggedness index. It is notable
that many of the largest wars fit this class. There is a small but significant relationship between
roughness and spatial extent. As spatial extent (count) increases, ruggedness decreases. This is
summarized by Tobler’s (1970) first law of geography. Tobler writes, “everything is related to
everything else, but near things are more related than distant things” (236). Given this, wars with
larger extents are generally waged on level or near level ground. This carries implications for the
nature of wars in this class that pivot in two directions. Wars in this class are best suited to
mobility strategies given the low cost of movement, but the scale of larger conflicts often
demands attrition strategies. This suggests a possible conditional relationship between terrain
and strategy selection. That is, states do not always employ the most efficient strategy for a given
terrain. Alternatively, certain strategies may cause wars to increase in spatial extent.
The first point, that larger wars are often fought in low ruggedness – high trafficability
terrains, is likely more than a product of spatial relativity and a quirk of geography.47 As war is
purposeful behavior, it is fair to assume that the locations that wars are fought are equally
purposeful. A number of reasons may explain this point. First, many of these large wars are
European conflicts. Disaggregated WWI48 and WWII, Franco-Prussian War, and Seven-Weeks
Wars are all fought in the metropole of world power during each of the years of these wars. In

47

There is no hard and fast metric to classify wars by size but an intuitive means of distinguishing wars by size is
relativity. Larger wars are wars above one standard deviation from the mean of all wars minus outliers.
48
The Eastern Front and Western Fronts covered approximately 479,873 km2 and 90,877 km2 respectively. The
largest spatial extents of WWII included the German-Soviet War (1,148,208 km2, larger than all of WWI), Western
(456,538 km2) German-French War (155,691 km2), and German-Polish (127,589).
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this sense, they are locations of extreme territorial importance and near or adjacent to major
population centers. Further adding to this point, with the exception of the Franco-Mexican War,
power projection is relatively limited and distance between the initiator and target is small.
Conceptualized alternatively, many of these wars involve contiguous participants. While
contiguity is almost a natural feature of war (and the highest correlate of war occurrence),
contiguity is more abundant in spatially larger wars.49 Finally, these wars are often longer
conflicts (the exception being The Vietnam and Laotian Wars, with both being medium conflicts
by space but particularly long). This suggests that spatially ‘big’ wars evolve and grow into their
size over time. This adds to the complex relationship between spatial extent and strategy.
Mobility strategies are best suited for use in high trafficability – low ruggedness terrains.
Conceptually, the dominant landscape classes present in this terrain class provide for low cost
movement. These classes, ranging from hard pact deserts and grasslands, to sparse shrublands
and croplands, are generally open spaces, void of major and persistent obstacles. That is not to
say they do not exist – as the threshold for trafficability this classification is 50%. This class also
avoids major changes in elevation. While this class captures a wide range of ruggedness (0m161m), these terrains are generally level. This does not mean that they are void of major
geological features – an errant hill, pit, or even sizeable peak – but ruggedness does not define
the whole of the landscape. These odd features may structure or divide a space though and have
a large impact on tactical advantages or disadvantages locally.

49

Contiguity here including Japan and China, contiguous through the Sea of Japan and East China Sea.
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The examples of Nazi Germany and Israel embody the benefits of mobility in easy terrains
and present something of an opportunity for a least-similar cases comparison (authoritarian and
democratic regime types). As previously discussed, Nazi German forces achieved quick and
decisive victories against France, Belgium, Norway, Holland, Denmark, Greece and Yugoslavia –
faltering only when conditionally trafficable terrain and time halted Operation Barbarossa.
Beyond this, these fights (with the exception of the Soviet Union) were gross mismatches. Given
this, the case of Israel provides an even more intriguing look at this terrain class as Israel prevailed
in three of their five major wars at a major capabilities disadvantage. The implications also
comment on the validity of the democratic victory. As Desch (2002; 2008) notes – and my work
replicates in the previous chapter – the significance of democratic regime type is rendered null
when the Arab-Israeli, Yom Kippur, and Six-Day wars are removed from the population of wars.
The suggestion here is that the significant relationship between democracy and victory is largely
a relationship between one democracy and victory. Importantly, Israel’s democracy50 had very
little to do with their success. Rather, as discussed below, Israel overcame dramatic disadvantage
in capabilities given a favorable terrain-strategy combination – a benefit not derived from
selection effects.
Table 14: Israeli Wars, 1948-1982
ArabIsraeli
Wars
ArabIsraeli
(1948)
50

State

Initiato
r

Conca
p

Trafficabilit
y

TRI

Count

Israel

Target

14.89
%

84.34%

96.08m

~3,85
4 km2

Doctrine
Strategy
Defensiv
e
Mobility

Outcom
e
Israel
Wins

Like many states in the POLITY data, Israel’s scores are potentially problematic. Alternative measures of
democracy call Israel’s consistent democratic standing into contention. VDem scores for 1948 code Israel as an
autocracy in 1948 and as a democracy in 1967, 1969, 1973, and 1982 (Coppedge, et al. 2016).
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Six Day
War
(1967)

War of
Attritio
n (1969
– 1970)

Yom
Kippur
(1973)

War
over
Lebano
n
(1982)

Arab
League:
Egypt,
Syria,
Lebano
n,
Jordan,
Iraq
Israel

Initiato
r

85.11
%

Initiato
r

15.30
%

Arab
League:
Egypt
(U.A.R.),
Jordan,
Syria
Israel

Target

84.70
%

Target

21.77
%

Egypt

Initiato
r

78.23
%

Israel

Target

17.38
%

Arab
League:
Egypt,
Saudi
Arabia,
Jordan,
Syria,
Iraq
Israel

Initiato
r

82.62
%

Initiato
r

52.35
%

Syria

Target

47.65
%

Offensiv
e
Attrition

85.44%

59.01m

~6,12
2 km2

Offensiv
e
Mobility
Defensiv
e
attrition

Israel
Wins

90.78%

27.61m

~2,61
5 km2

Draw

96.24%

60.73m

~2,38
9 km2

Offensiv
e
Attrition
Defensiv
e
Attrition
Defensiv
e
Mobility
Offensiv
e
Attrition

81.63%

205.74
m

~359
km2

Offensiv
e
Attrition
Defensiv
e
Attrition

Israel
Wins

Draw
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Map 2: Arab-Israeli War, 1948

In the Arab-Israeli War (1948), Six-Day War (1967), and Yom Kippur War (1973), Israel
faced significant power disadvantages yet managed to win decisive victories – though this may
be overstated given inherent disadvantages in attempting to combine alliance capabilities into a
coherent effort (in this case, the Arab League). The initial war, the First Arab-Israeli War, has deep
and complex roots which came to a head on May 15th, 1948 (Sarkees and Wayman 2010a;
Clodfelter 1992; Dupuy and Dupuy 1993). The United Kingdom, which held a mandate over
Palestine following the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) and fall of the Ottoman Empire in World
War I, failed to achieve agreement between Arab and Jewish parties. The issue was turned over
to the newly formed United Nations which agreed to partition Palestine. Arab and Jewish groups,
rejecting the Partition Plan, engaged in a series of violent engagements through May 1948 (nonstate war #1572), until the termination of the British mandate on May 14th of 1948. One day later,
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on May 15th, Israel declared independence and was immediately recognized internationally,
marking the beginning of the interstate war between Israel and the Arab League (Egypt, Syria,
Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq). It worth noting here, that a state aged one day receives little benefit from
democratic features. Rather, Israel’s war would be defined by survival.51 Bloody fighting would
continue, despite two U.N. orchestrated truces,52 through October 31st, 1948 when Iraq, Syria,
Lebanon, and Jordan withdrew from sustained fighting. Israel then turned its full attention to the
Egyptian front in the south, where on January 7th 1949, Egypt withdrew from hostilities. The war
was defined by Arab advances, which were then stymied by Israeli mobility – a strategy aided by
errs and difficulties in Arab League organization and Israel’s ability to reorganize and mobilize
during breaks in fighting.

51

Perhaps the greatest example of “undemocratic” activity in pursuit of survival on behalf of Israeli forces, is the
assassination of the Swedish U.N. mediator Count Folke Bernadotte during a U.N. mediated ceasefire. This
assassination was likely orchestrated by the Stern Gang. While not approved by the young Israeli government, the
presence of such paramilitary organizations, suggests fledgling state capacity at that time.
52
Making this one of few COW wars which have sizeable gaps in fighting and thus two start dates.
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Map 3: Six-Day War, 1967

The end of the first Arab-Israeli War hardly settled the causes of the first war, adding over
a million displaced Arab Palestinians. These problems were exacerbated by British, French, and
Israeli victory against Egypt in the Sinai War of 1956 (interstate war #155), the subsequent U.N.
peacekeeping mission (withdrawn in 1967), and the closing of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli
shipping. In response to growing tensions in the region – including the formation of the PLO and
Fatah in 1964 and 1965 respectively, limited Israeli attacks in Syria and Lebanon, and PanArabism – Israel launched a preemptive attack against Egypt on the morning of June 5th, 1967.
The Egyptian air force was largely destroyed on the ground on the first day of the war and the
Sinai fell to Israeli control in four days. On the Jordanian front, the Old City of Jerusalem fell on
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the second day of fighting, with Bethlehem, Hebron, and Etzion on the third day. Against Syria,
Israel maintained its success by storming the Golan Heights. Israel demonstrated a masterful use
of mobility, combining air strikes, amphibious landings, deception, and speed. Israel’s use of
speed was best exemplified in the Sinai, when Egyptian Field Marshall Amer ordered a general
withdrawal and Israeli forces turned the retreat into a route.
Map 4: War of Attrition, 1969

Despite the 1967 war being quick and decisive in favor of Israel, the underlying political
issues in the region were far from settled – and ultimately exacerbated by Israeli gains in the
Sinai, Gaza, and Golan. President Nasser declared a War of Attrition on March 6th, 1969. Various
Arab leaders hypothesized that advantages in capabilities held by the Arab states, especially in
population, could only be actualized in a longer conflict. The war would be defined by a year and

132

a half of artillery shelling along the Suez, with sporadic Israeli commando raids. While Israel
enjoyed a significant air advantage, Egyptian SAMs, delivered by the Soviet Union, proved costly.
The war would end in a stalemate, with Israeli costs mounting and Egypt unable to break Israel’s
hold of the Sinai. The joint attrition strategy, coupled with defensive terrain advantages provided
by the Suez, made the war efforts especially futile without a much larger escalation.
Map 5: Yom Kippur War, 1973

Hostilities would again flare up to the point of war in 1973, bolstered by recurring tensions
in Palestine, a limited Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon in response to Fatah, and continued
Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights and the Sinai. Arab states, primarily Egypt and Syria,
sought two basic objectives: at minimum, to restore credibility lost in the 1967 war and, at
maximum, the reconquest of Israeli occupied territory (Clodfelter 1992, 1051). The Arab League
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achieved a rare tactical surprise on Israel, duping Mossad. On October 6th, 1973 Egypt and Syria
launched a daring two-front invasion of Israel – armed with an array of new weaponry that
diminished Israeli air and mobile armor advantages.53 Following an astounding aerial and artillery
bombardment, Egyptian armies crossed the Suez – paddling at first, then across pontoons.54
Syrian forces quickly advanced into the Golan Heights, until reaching the Israeli “purple line”, a
defense-in-depth of 20km including an exterior minefield, antitank ditch, and over 100 pillboxes
and blockhouses. While initially successful at playing Israel’s own game, Israel would make a
dramatic stand. In the Golan Heights, Israel repelled Syria forces, as well as limited Jordanian,
Moroccan, and Iraqi forces, driving deeper into Syrian territory. On the Sinai Front, forces
engaged in a series of brutal fights – including the largest tank battle since 1943. Israel forces
were again able to use a defensive mobility strategy to lead enemy forces into disarray – including
the use of paratroopers into Africa.

53

These weapons included a range of static SAM II missiles, mobile SAM III missiles, SAM VI missiles mounted on
tank chassis, infantry SAMVII Strella missile launchers, and ZSU-23 antiaircraft guns. Clodfelter (1992) writes, “the
two weapons that had so dominated the battlefield in 1967 – the Israeli fighter-bomber and tank – would come up
against [Soviet supplied] new weapons that would greatly diminish that dominance. In many ways the new
antiaircraft and antitank missiles would have as revolutionary an impact on modern warfare as has the longbow
and arrow on Medieval battlefields at Crecy in 1346 and Agincourt in 1415. This represented a new emphasis on
defense and defensive weapons” (1053-1054).
54
In an interesting anecdote relating to trafficability, the Suez formed a barrier between Africa and Asia. The dunes
in the Israeli held Sinai were 18-30 feet high. Egypt overcame this challenge through the use of high pressure water
cannons to clear a landing area.
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Map 6: War over Lebanon, 1982

In the final interstate war to date between Israel and its neighbors, Israel faced off against
traditional foe Syria over Lebanon in 1982. This war occurred in terrain class three, high
ruggedness – high trafficability. Both Syria and Israel had previously intervened in Syria, in
response to a litany of political issues salient to these states. Israel initiated when both states
reinforced their positions in Lebanon. While the war is notable for its aerial combat (the highest
volume since the Korean War), extensive ground fighting occurred, with Israeli forces pushing
closer and closer to Beirut. The war would conclude with a sustained siege of the city, with
thousands of Lebanese civilians killed in the process. The war would end in stalemate between
Israel and Syria – but the PLO was driven from the city after much of West Beirut was destroyed.
Still this victory against the non-state actor was pyrrhic. The PLO had killed less than 1,400 people
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(only 326 were Israeli) in 12 years. Israel would lose 455 soldiers and suffer another 2,380
wounded in action in the war – mostly from Syria (Clodfelter 1992, 1075).
These five cases raise several questions, with important answers speaking to the nature
of war outcomes. The first, did Israel benefit from its democratic regime? The short answer is no.
Israel declared independence and was invaded by its Arab neighbors on the same day in 1948.
Not only did the state of Israel not select the war, it would only formalize its democratic
institutions after the cessation of hostilities – thus victory was not aided by selection effects.
While Israel did select its most decisive victory in 1967, this selection was a bold gamble. Perhaps
this demonstrates some foresight, but war itself was imminent. The selection was that of tactical
surprise – not strategic surprise. While the war was among the most swift and decisive in modern
military history, it failed to resolve any of the underlying political issues – and ultimately
exacerbated them leading to three additional wars in the next fifteen years. Israel would not
again “select” a war until its 1982 war with Syria over Lebanon in rugged terrain, leading to
stalemate. In the only case where selection supports victory, the advantages are best explained
by strategy. However, there may be some inherent benefit which Israeli democracy promoted:
support from the United States. Advantages in technology greatly aided Israeli mobility in 1948,
1967, and 1973. However, by 1973, these technological advantages were partially negated by the
Cold War power politics of Soviet support for Egypt and Syria. This too may be better explained
by power competition and geopolitics than ideology and valence democratic norms.
The second question is, did strategy influence war outcomes? Again, the answer is simple:
yes. Israel engaged a mobility strategy in its three victories and attrition strategies in its two
stalemates. In 1948, 1967, and 1973, Israel used speed – facilitate by paratroopers, amphibious
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landings, and mobile armor – to disrupt enemy organization and supply lines. At times, especially
in the Sinai in 1967 and 1973, this speed caused major routs against numerically superior forces.
The answer becomes more complicated when terrain is considered. The major theaters of these
wars are broadly level and trafficable. This is especially true of the northern Sinai – and across
the Suez in North Africa. This was partially facilitated by a geographic disconnection from war
goals. The modis operandi of Israel was survival. In 1948 this threat was existential, and while
this was less so in 1967 and 1973, continued existence was strategically tied to the maintenance
of a geographic buffer found in occupied territories. In this sense, holding place beyond the
antebellum boundaries of Israel was objectively tertiary. This freedom allowed Israeli forces the
latitude to out maneuver Egyptian and Syrian forces. The tables would turn in 1969 and 1982.
The man-made terrain boundary of the Suez partitioned the War of Attrition and the defensive
weaponry (especially SAM antiaircraft missiles) and offensive artillery made trafficking the
boundary challenging. Israel adopted a similar attrition strategy and accepted stalemate when
limited moves to challenge Egyptian positions halted. Compared to 1948, 1967, and 1973, Israel
was tied to place – maintaining the status quo. In similar sense, Israel sought the control of a
major urban center in the 1982 War over Lebanon and faced rugged terrain. The control of place,
rather than outright defeat of an enemy over a relatively wide space, proved to limit the
incredibly successful Israeli war machine.
Taken in tandem with the case of Nazi Germany, a terrain-strategy relationship is
apparent. These states, in low ruggedness – high trafficable settings, quickly and decisively
defeated opponents with haste using mobility strategies. Only when facing the indefinite
combination of non-trafficable terrain and seeking political to gain or maintain control over
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specific place – beyond the defeat of enemy forces – did these states falter. This is true in the
case of Nazi Germany (Stalingrad, Leningrad, Normandy) and Israel (the Suez, Beirut). This also
suggests that the modal strategy for this class and all wars, attrition, is best suited for longer,
drawn out fights over political control. This is especially true of non-trafficable terrains in this
broadly trafficable terrain class - specifically cities and urban areas. The primary predictor of
these attrition fights remains power – as the impact of terrain is relatively equal rather than as
an equalizer.
Low Ruggedness – Low Trafficability (2)
The second terrain class, low ruggedness – low trafficability, is the class of some of the
most devastating, consequential, and unequal wars of the twentieth century. Notable wars in
this class include the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, the Russo-Finnish War of 1939-1940 (Winter
War), and Vietnam War. An additional ten wars populate this class – including World War II’s
German-Norwegian War and the final phase of the Vietnam War between North and South (after
American withdrawal). This class is perhaps the most diverse of the terrain classes. While all share
generally level terrain, the landscape classes which make these places non-trafficable are wildly
different. In part this makes analysis challenging but there is broad room for comparison. For
example, in the Lithuanian-Polish, Estonian Liberation, and Latvian Liberation Wars, the
landscape classes are majority non-trafficable. The landscape classes here are dominated by a
single class, temperate evergreen broadleaf forests (tmpenf). In general terms, these forests
make travel more difficult but hardly impossible. These forests are not particularly challenging
for infantry and vehicles can, with some difficulty, pass through the intermediately dense forest
– especially via roads, which are not challenging to construct in such settings. However, other
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landscape classes are entirely different. In Vietnam, the dominant classes include tropical
deciduous broadleaf forests (trpebf; 12.15%) and tropical evergreen broadleaf forests (trpdbf;
52.03%) are much denser. Infantry must labor through the flora, and even contend with
challenging fauna,55 and the propensity for these environments to become flooded or saturated
with water in rainy seasons exacerbates this problem even more.
This environment provides a unique setting for weak opponents. In fact, of the 14 wars in
this setting, six are victories by weak states facing gross mismatches (First Sino-Japanese,
Estonian Liberation, Latvian liberation, Franco-Thai, Vietnam Wars), with an additional one draw
in a gross mismatch (War of the Communist Coalition). The Russo-Finnish War is also notable for
the gross inequality in the loss exchange rate suffered by the dramatically stronger Russians (5:1).
I suggest that this environment acts as a power equalizer for weaker states, especially those
fighting at home. It does so by limiting the use of advanced technologies (mobile armor and air
power) and placing an emphasis on small scale skirmishing. I present three cases which
emphasize this hypothesis: the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, the Russo-Finnish War of 19391940, and the Vietnam War of 1965-75. These cases provide a unique insight into the role of
terrain, as well as the influence of strategy and terrain. The first fight matches attrition strategies,
the second Russian offensive-attrition against Finnish defensive-mobility (Fabian), and the third
North Vietnamese offensive-punishment against American and coalition defensive-attrition. We

55

Vietnam is home to an array of venomous snakes (Asian Cobras, King Cobras, Coral Snakes, Kraits, Vipers). There
are tales of the NVA and Viet Cong booby trapping areas with snakes, occasionally tied from low hanging branches
to surprise unsuspecting American G.I.s. A myth arose about “two-step” snakes. A soldier was bitten and two-steps
later, the soldier would die. While this is an exaggeration, these challenges certainly made these landscapes
increasingly difficult.
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see relatively equal effects from terrain, less on strategic efficacy, but rather on the application
of power.
Table 14: Russo-Japanese War, Russo-Finnish War, and Vietnam War
Terrain
Class 2
Wars
RussoJapanes
e (19045)
RussoFinnish
(193940)
Vietna
m War,
Phase 2
(19651975)
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ability

TRI

Japan
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m
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Target
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Target
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r
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%
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%
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%
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m
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Defensive
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t
Defensive
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Soviet
Union
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The cliché surrounding sports upsets, when a true underdog defeats a powerhouse
program, reads, “that is why we play the game.” This is the narrative usually associated with the
Russo-Japanese War. On paper, the Russians were stronger and more capable than the Japanese,
enjoying a 2:68:1 CINC advantage. However, the million-plus man Russian army was thousands
of miles from the two-front war and the only connection between the men and action was a
5,500 mile ride on the single-track Tran-Siberian Railroad toward Port Arthur (not to mention a
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100 mile gap at Lake Baikal. These realities suggest a fair-fight. In this sense, this war is the
weakest link to the previous hypothesis, but the role of non-trafficable terrain at the Siege of Port
Arthur and at the Battle of Mukden in Manchuria – not to mention the gravity of this war shaping
the early twentieth century balance of power – suggests that the role of terrain must be
explained here. There are also, horrific as they may be, Machiavellian lessons to be found in
Japan’s imperial barbarism in the region following the conflict.
Map 7: Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05

War began on February 8th, 1904 with a tactical surprise attack by the Japanese on Port
Arthur (present day China). The fight would ultimately determine dominance over Korea and
Manchuria. Clodfelter (1992) notes that this was largely a contest between Russia’s Army and
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Japan’s Navy. Russia consistently faced the challenge of projecting power, both ground and naval
forces, across a massive distance. There are two major incidents of note relating to the role of
terrain in this consequential fight: The Siege of Port Arthur and the Battle of Mukden. The Siege
of Port Arthur ranks among the most memorable of sieges in military history – costing the lives
of thousands of Russians and Japanese soldiers. There is a general note to be made about sieges
and terrain – urban settings are often the focus of competition in war because of their political,
strategic, and geopolitical importance. The port had served, and would serve to whomever held
it, as a source of power projection capabilities in the region. Port Arthur, like any urban area, is
largely non-trafficable – but in the case of a fortified and walled site, this is especially true. The
cost of moving against the port in blood would add up to some 11,000 Japanese lives, not to
mention thousands of Russians. Clodfelter (1992) writes, “About 22 percent of the Japanese
wounded died, compared to a usual 12 to 15 percent in other wars of that era. The reason for
this high fatality rate was not due to poorer hygiene or medical care in the Japanese army, but
because of the phenomenal bravery of the Japanese infantry in direct assaults, particularly at
Port Arthur – where head wounds were more likely because of the angle of fire discharged from
Russian rifles downhill at the massed ranks of the attacking infantry” (650).
The real test of terrain lies across Liaodong Bay into Southern Manchuria proper. The
region is nominally nearly-level (though the means of war at the time, horses, were less apt to
scale rugged terrains than later machines equipped with rubber wheels and driven by internal
combustion) but challenging by landscape class. In places which were not wooded (much of the
area surrounding Mukden was open cropland), the cropland was only conditionally trafficable.
Winter conditions set in by the time of the battle (February 21-March 10, 1905) along the 40-
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mile front. The numerous streams in the region were intermittently frozen and croplands
challenging to traffic due to the frozen furrows (Sisemore 2015). As one Russian cavalryman
wrote on Mukden:
"In General, Our Cavalry Has Had To Operate Over Terrain Which Were
Unfavorable To It. In The Mountains It Encountered Rocks And Torrents That Often Could
Not Be Crossed By Fording. On The Plains There Were Other Difficulties: The Fields Were
Quagmires And The Roads Were Abominable. Finally, We Lacked Good Maps. Such Were
The Difficult Conditions Under Which Our Cavalry Had To Act, Conditions Which Have A
Very Great Influence On The Operations Of The Army. Our Cavalry Could Only March Very
Slowly; In A Single March Of About 20 Versts (A Verst Is 1066 Meters) One Troop Had To
Ford Thirteen Streams” (capitalizations in original, Quoted in Nidoine 1907,685).
Taken broadly, the Russo-Japanese war may be the weakest link to the hypothesis but the
great power disparity (even when mitigated by the challenges of massive projection) was partially
equalized by terrain. The joint strategy of attrition found the Russians and the Japanese in major
pitched battles. These fights, whether at Port Arthur or Mukden, would foreshadow the coming
brutal fights of the twentieth century. Attrition strategies broadly seek to destroy enemies
through pitched conflict and terrain aided Japan by limiting major elements of the Russian war
machine (cavalry) at major moments of the conflict. Following Mukden, the remainder of the war
would be relatively quiet with sporadic action, Japanese victory at Sakhalin, and final Russian
defeat on the seas. The war would end with the Treaty of Portsmouth, brokered by President
Roosevelt, the evacuation of Russia from Manchuria, and Japan cementing itself as the dominant
power in the region – a position from which barbarous acts would be committed across
Manchuria and Korea under Japanese occupation.
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Map 8: Russo-Finnish War, 1939-40

The Russo-Finnish War, perhaps better known as the Winter War, was a brutal prelude to
Soviet involvement in World War II. The war is most famous for the tremendous cost of Soviet
pyrrhic victory. A range of factors led to Soviet ineffectuality. Famously, the war occurred in the
wake of the massive purges of the Red Army’s officer class under Stalin in the 1930s. When
combined with the brutal terrain, the Soviets found themselves mired in quagmire. Recognizing
the Nazi threat to the west, the USSR sought a territorial cushion near Leningrad. To this end, the
Soviets invaded on November 30th, 1939. The war was a mismatch of the highest proportions:
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the Finnish population counted only 3.5 million to the Soviet Union’s 180 million and the Finns
were outgunned in every sense. Yet the Soviets immediately faced fierce resistance along the
famed Mannerheim Line – named for brilliant Finnish tactician Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim56 –
along the Karelian Isthmus separating Finland and Leningrad (St. Petersburg).
Terrain would neutralize the dramatic Soviet superiority, at tremendous cost to the
Russians in blood and materiel. While much of Northern Finland is extremely rugged, the theaters
of action were relatively flat. However, they were sparsely populated and heavily forested.
Where there were not trees, there was water.57 Mixed with heavy snowfall and bitter
temperatures,58 the Soviet advance was slow and faced a Fabian styled Finnish defense. Soviet
forces were stymied at every turn and when they were not being frustrated by hit-and-run
attacks59 out of the vast forests, Soviet forces froze to death where they stood and tanks refused
to run in the cold. The Soviets also enjoyed massive air superiority and dropped 150,000 bombs
(7,500 tons) to no avail. The dense forests provided ample cover for camouflaged Finnish troops.
In the end, Soviet forces would break the Mannerheim line. Armed with 54 divisions, Soviet forces
launched a renewed attack, firing over 300,000 artillery shells in one 24-hour period before the
attack. These forces finally broke the Finns near Summa. The Soviets gained the small territorial
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Mannerheim would first demonstrate his tactical prowess during the Finnish Civil War against the Finnish Red
Guard.
5757
I code water as trafficable for this war because the water remained frozen for the duration of the war. Deeply
frozen ice in the, at times, -40 F weather supported men and armor alike. However, the ice was susceptible to
breaking under mortar fire as occurred in the later days of the conflict as the Finns fired upon colored tanks on a
white backdrop. Even then, breaks in ice are relatively localized, meaning a sizeable hole in the ice in one place has
no impact on the structural integrity of ice even a few feet away (Sprague 2010, 169).
58
Between December 11th and January 8th, ~27,500 Russians were killed, wounded, or froze to death on the
Eastern border.
59
Simo Häyhä, a Finnish sniper, would gain the nickname “White Death” during the Winter War. He achieved an
unmatched 542 confirmed kills during the 105 day war – all with iron sights. See Saarelainen (2016).
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cushion they sought at tremendous cost: 1,600 of 3,200 tanks, 725 planes, and between 175,000
to 200,000 thousand KIA (to Finland’s 23,157).60 The brutal winter weather and non-trafficable
terrain turned a gross mismatch into a killing field. In every sense, Soviet victory was pyrrhic. The
conflict set the stage for Finnish participation in the Nazi invasion of Russia.
Map 9: Vietnam War, 1965-1975

The Vietnam War is perhaps the greatest example of the role of difficult landscape
equalizing asymmetrical power. Nominally, the Vietnam War, per this dissertation, occurred
between February 7th, 1965 to April 30th, 1975 with the fall of Saigon to NVA forces. However,
the complexity of the war is as great as the loss of life in the several decade-long conflict. The
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According to Clodfelter (1992, 791). The more conservative COW places the Soviet death toll at 126,875 (Sarkees
and Wayman 2010a, 143). Using Clodfelter’s toll, the loss exchange rate jumps to an astounding ~8:1 as opposed
to the already gross ~5:1 calculated in the LERD dataset (Cochran and Long 2017).
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war traces its roots to the Sino-French War of 1884-1885, when France established dominion
over Indochina – perhaps even earlier with centuries of Chinese incursions into the region. As
Clodfelter (1992) notes, there are unique challenges in determining a start date of the war given
the conflict is nearly continuous, at least beginning with the First Indochina War between
Vietnam and France (1222).61 Regardless, the question at hand reads: how did terrain (low
ruggedness – low trafficability) influence the outcome of the war? This question, and its
implications, suggest that the primary consideration should be the war between North Vietnam
and the United States – as well as her allies, South Vietnam, Cambodia, South Korea, the
Philippines, Thailand, and Australia. North Vietnam fought the war at an immense disadvantage
in capabilities. On average, between 1965 and 1975, North Vietnam held a mere 2.3% of the total
conflict capabilities while the United States enjoyed an amazing 34.60:1 advantage in CINC
scores. The common narrative is that the United States did not lose the war but abandoned it.
Surely the United States enjoyed enough of an advantage in capabilities that they could have
continued their participation in perpetuity. Yet the brutal combination of the NVA’s punishment
strategy and terrain allowed North Vietnam to raise the cost of the war beyond a point bearable
by the United States. In this sense, one cannot discount the persistence of Vietnam in achieving
victory, nor the NLF through 1968.
American involvement began in earnest with their support of the Diem Government in
October 1961 as Saigon fought a brutal conflict against North Vietnamese trained and supported
Viet Cong (VC) guerillas. The initial American role was advisory, expanding in 1964 with the arrival
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Clodfelter suggests that one could conceive of the war as the “Asian Thirty Years War.”
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of General William Westmoreland. The stage was set when the ambiguous Gulf of Tonkin incident
occurred in August. America, under President Johnson, committed to bringing the war to the
North – while the North determined a direct engagement with the South and her allies. Following
a VC attack at Camp Holloway on February 7th, 1965, the sustained hostilities between the two
states began. The U.S. initially engaged the North primarily through the air, beginning on March
2nd. Operation Rolling Thunder continued for three years and was the largest bombing campaign
in human history, unrivaled in sheer tonnage of explosives dropped across North Vietnam. On
the ground, the American doctrine was largely defensive – with the goal of preserving South
Vietnam and halting NVA and VC advances. The initial landing of 3,000 Marines at Da Nang on
March 8th, 1965 would escalate continuously over the course of the conflict. The NVA and VC
engaged in terror and punishment attacks against American and South Vietnamese targets –
pouring men and materiel along the Ho Chi Min Trail.
When conventional confrontations did occur, American superiority was evident.62 The
first of these fights, the Battle of Van Thuong, demonstrates the duality of the fight. 5,000
Marines devastated 2,000 VC defenders between August 18-21 1965, killing 638 at a cost of 51
KIA Marines (Clodfelter 1992, 1232). Simultaneously, Communist forces infiltrated and destroyed
a special forces camp at Dak Sut in guerilla fashion. This would be the tale of the conflict, while
American forces managed tactical victories with superior firepower, mobility, and materiel,
Communist forces secured punishing strategic victories – at great cost. The United States lost a
fraction of the men but lost the war. Here, the interaction of terrain and strategy came to the aid
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This point should not discount the capabilities that did exist among Communist Forces. Aided by the Soviet
Union, the NVA enjoyed the use of incredibly reliable Kalashnikov rifles, T-Series tanks, and MIG jets.
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of Communist forces. Vietnam is notoriously difficult to traverse. The landscape is nearly 70%
non-trafficable and conditionally more so. The dominant landscape classes – 52% tropical
evergreen broadleaf forest (trpebf) 12% tropical deciduous broadleaf forest (trpdbf), and 15%
cropland following C3 photosynthetic pathways63 (c3crop) – are challenging enough, but when
weather and seasonality is considered, movement across the spatial extent was arduous. While
the terrain challenged all who fought in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia the impact of terrain was
unequal.
American defensive-attrition was hindered while NVA and Viet Cong offensivepunishment was bolstered. Elements of American supremacy were rendered null. Despite the
historically unprecedented bombing campaign, neither the resolve nor the manpower of the NVA
and VC were broken. Even horrific innovations in the art of war in response to landscape, such as
the defoliant Agent Orange, could not penetrate nature’s shield. Thousands may have died in the
process – and millions more would live with its vestiges in cancers, birth defects, and elevated
dioxin levels – but the structural impact of terrain could not be overcome. Armor was limited to
trafficable areas, meaning the might of American industry could not be brought to bear on the
primarily foot-based VC in their jungle refuges. The Maoist guerilla tactics employed by the NVA
and VC across dense forests limited direct confrontation, except in places of their choosing.
The massive American troop presence is also relatively misleading to in terms of real
strength, as some 88 percent of forces served in a support or administrative role - meaning there
were roughly eight times as many “clerks, cooks, truck drivers, and telephone operators as
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C3 plants of note include rice, cultivated in flooded paddy fields. Vietnam also produces deepwater rice,
especially near the Mekong Delta, where water is substantially deeper.
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grunts, cannon-cockers, tankers, and other combat personnel – something never before
attempted in military history” (Clodfelter 1992, 1297). When American infantry were used, they
were largely used as bait to draw out the VC and NVA so air and artillery could be used against
the Communists. Terrain along with inherent ‘home-field’ advantages and the difficulty of
“winning the hearts and minds” of the population, minimized gross American preponderance.
The benefit of victory – nominally containing the spread of communism – simply would not justify
continued American participation at such costs. In this sense, as much as the war’s outcome was
dependent on American withdrawal, it is more so North Vietnamese expert (but costly) use of
terrain to benefit strategy that raised the cost of American participation.
High Ruggedness – High Trafficability (3)
The third terrain class, high-ruggedness – high trafficability, is largely the setting for
mountainous warfare. Rugged settings, especially those at high elevations, limits the presence of
non-trafficable fauna (dense forests) and large bodies of water (wide rivers). Given this,
particularly rugged settings limit available landscape classes to those which are traditionally easy
to traverse. Limited trees growing on rocky cliff faces, grasses and sparse shrubbery dominate
these spaces. However, ruggedness – and often, but not exclusively, high elevation – eliminates
ease of movement. Antiquity’s most famous example of such warfare is the Punic Wars. In the
Second Punic War, Hannibal famously traversed the Alpines through Gaul into Italy with a
compliment of war elephants. The Carthaginians and their tribal allies would face little fighting
in the process, yet would lose some 18,000 men to cold, crevasses, and avalanches.64 In some
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Supposedly, Hannibal himself prodded the ground during his descent into Italy – causing a massive avalanche
which would kill thousands of his soldiers.
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two thousand years since the Carthaginian invasion, warfare in rugged terrain has hardly become
easier. Peruvian soldiers faced defeat in 1883 in the high peaks of the Andes Mountains at the
hands of Chilean forces during the War of the Pacific. ANZAC soldiers between 1915-16 in
Gallipoli faced horror on the shores of the Dardanelles. Indian and Pakistani soldiers prepared for
the new Millennium with hand-to-hand fighting on Tiger Hill deep in the Himalayas during the
1999 Kargil War. Cliff faces, bluffs, snow, and the like give alternative meaning to William
Tecumseh Sherman’s adage, “war is hell” by forcing movement to be reliant on foot traffic, and
emphasizing close quarter combat with limited communication, often with unique high-altitude
weather and conditions. More than any other terrain class, forces not only have to fight each
other, but the land itself. Armies always respond to settings-borne challenges like disease, but
rarely does the terrain itself present such challenges as avalanches, landslides, cold, and others
concomitant to ruggedness and elevation.
I present three of the nineteen wars in this class for case study. These three wars, the
Assam War (1962), Badme Border War (1998-2000), and Kargil War (1999), demonstrate
relatively extreme variations in rugged warfare. The first war, the Assam War, pits the much
stronger PRC against India. Chinese forces, prepared and trained for mountain warfare, soundly
defeated their Indian enemy. This war occurred between two other wars in the same terrain
class: the 1948 First Kashmir War and 1965 Second Kashmir War. The second, the Badme Border
War, sees a more common role of mountainous terrain as a boundary of war – serving to divide
the conflict between highly rugged areas. Opposing forces avoided the most rugged setting,
choosing instead to fight on the periphery of the most rugged space. Such is the case in the
majority of wars in this class, where forces engage in the bulk of the fighting at the base of

151

mountains, only fighting in and traversing mountains when necessary to reorganize opposition65.
Despite the fact that most violence occurs outside of these extremes, they are defined relative
to rugged space. This war is unique also for its recent use of trench warfare. The third war, the
Kargil War, returns to the Himalayas in the only interstate war between nuclear armed states in
history. The highly localized and relatively limited (in terms of loss of life) but brutal close quarters
combat of the war complete with modern equipment and tactics demonstrate the continuity of
mountain warfare.
Strategy is also limited by the terrain. In all but four cases, attrition strategy is selected by
both sides. The discrepant cases – First Russo-Turkish War, Italian-Greek War (WWII), GermanGreek War (WWII), and German-Yugoslav War (WWII) – are proverbially exceptions which prove
the rule. In the Italian-Greek war, as previously discussed, the Greeks used rugged terrain to halt
Italian advances before using a mobility strategy in their counteroffensive into Albania. The
German blitz into Yugoslavia was aided by a Yugoslav coup and their inability to organize any
semblance of resistance. Against the Ottomans, Russia demonstrated a rare moment of effective
mobility through the Haemus Mountains in the Balkans. The daring move by General Hans K.F.A.
von Diebitsch-Zabalkansky outmaneuvered the Turks, taking Adrianople and forcing the
Ottomans to sue for peace (Dupuy and Dupuy 1993, 847). Regardless, the defining strategy of
rugged terrain is attrition. This is only true for interstate-wars though, as general punishment or
guerilla strategies are often employed by weaker opponents in civil wars. The Afghani insurgency
has used the extremely rugged terrain of Afghanistan and Pakistan to evade the massive strength
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This point is broadly applicable to larger wars in class I, low ruggedness – high trafficability, as well. In WWII,
American forces certainly engaged in numerous fights in the mountains of Italy but the bulk of the fighting
occurred at the bases of mountains in Italy or sought to avoid them all together when possible.
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of NATO forces since 2001 – limiting the efficacy of American air strikes. The nature of rugged
warfare decreases mobility and allows for persistent opposition – via shelter in remote and rocky
places.
Table 15: Assam War, Badme Border War, and Kargil War
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Map 10: Assam War, 1962

The Assam war pitted the PRC against India in one of the most inhospitable places war
has ever been fought. The rugged Himalayas form the border between China and India. Neither
state engaged air or naval forces in the conflict, which was focused on the border between the
two massive states. Chinese forces advanced on October 20th in two locations: Ladakh (east of
Kashmir) and in the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA), north of the Assam. Between October 2025, Chinese forces – trained and equipped for mountain warfare – defeated Indian forces at Thag
La Ridge. Chinese forces, despite being divided by the Crisis in the Taiwan Straits and facing
materiel constraints given the growing Sino-Soviet split, were better prepared for the challenges
of rugged terrain. The PRC had gained valuable experience in Korea against United Nations forces
and in Tibet. Chinese forces enjoyed other non-violent advantages necessary for the high-altitude
fight, namely warm and padded uniforms. Indian forces suffered insufficient knowledge of the
topography of the region, while wearing cotton, summer uniforms (Calvin 1984). The Chinese
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repeated their successes between November 17-21 at Se La and Bombi La on the western edge
of the NEFA. Both sides engaged in attrition strategies. The PRC handedly defeated their Indian
foes and tensions in the region continue to the present. Pakistani victory in the subsequent
Second Kashmir War would be aided by continued Chinese threat, with Indian forces on guard in
the Assam region to the persistent Chinese threat.
Map 11: Badme Border War, 1998-2000

The 1998-2000 Badme Border War, fought between Ethiopia and Eritrea, demonstrates
the peculiar influence of rugged terrain by spatially framing the contest. The war was fought on
two fronts, each centered around a border town. In the East, the town of Badme and, in the west,
the town of Tserona. The mountainous Ethiopian highlands extend across the spatial extent of
the war, with particularly rugged areas between the two fronts. The border was loosely defined
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across the Tekeze River (Setit) flowing though the highlands.66 After a decades long march
towards independence (1975-1991), Eretria peacefully seceded in 1993. However, the border
remained ambiguous and a source of contention. On May 6th, 1998 Eritrean forces entered
Ethiopian controlled territory and engaged forces there. The war would change course and
severity in the early months of the conflict67, before nominally ceasing in late 1998. However,
hostilities would quickly reignite in February 1999 and thousands of forces were killed in brutal
fighting.
The war, like many is this terrain class, had boundaries defined by terrain. The most
extreme areas of the local highlands separated the two major fronts of the contest.68 During a
general lull in fighting following a joint Organization for African Unity, U.S., and Rwandan peace
proposal, both sides dug extensive trenches. What followed was akin to the trench warfare of
WWI, complete with human wave attacks. Ethiopian General Samora Yunis ominously stated,
“the Eritreans are good at digging trenches and we are good at converting trenches into graves”
(quoted in Gebru 2009, 345). The war would cost the lives of some 80,000 people including
civilians (Clodfelter 2017, 559). Eritrean forces were only broken when, using donkeys to traverse
the highlands, Ethiopian forces captured Barentu – forcing an Eritrean retreat on the Western
front. The Eritreans, backed into a mountain, had little room for reorganization and were forced
to accept tactical defeat. This contest would ultimately end in strategic stalemate, with borders
essentially mirroring the status quo antebellum. The two states, among the world’s poorest, were
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The site is also famous for the use of chemical weapons in the 1930s by Facist Italian forces in their Invasion of
Abyssinia.
67
Both sides of the conflict employed Ukrainian mercenary pilots in an initial but relatively limited air contest.
68
Nominally, a third front existed in the southeast near Assab.
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mismatched in capability, with Ethiopia enjoying a 3:1 advantage in CINC scores. Yet the rugged
nature of the fight again limited the mismatch, forcing soldiers into a seemingly antiquated mode
of war. Meanwhile, peoples in the two states faced chronic hunger and disease.
Map 12: Kargil War, 1999

The 1999 Kargil War is far and away the most rugged war between 1816 and 2003, with
a TRI of 669m – nearly 170m more rugged on average than the next most rugged war (Assam
War). The average change in elevation per km2 is roughly 1.5 Empire State Buildings. The Kargil
War also holds the distinction of being the only war in history between two nuclear armed states.
The small spatial extent is likely due to the deterrent effect of these nuclear weapons, but is also
likely due to the extreme conditions of the war.69 The Kargil War occurred entirely on the Siachen
Glacier, the second longest glacier in the non-polar world. The landscape was defined by brutal
changes in elevation, glacial crevasses, and narrow passes between Himalayan peaks. The
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This war is not entirely anomalous to the proposition that nuclear weapons have abolished war amongst their
possessors. The war was extremely limited compared to previous fights between India and Pakistan and failed to
expand beyond the region.
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disputed Kashmir region precipitated nearly constant violence between the two states, with
violence reaching war-level intensity in 1948 and 1965. The violence again came to a head when
around 700 Pakistani and 500 Kashmiri guerillas infiltrated the border, seeking to occupy five
peaks in the region, and Pakistani artillery opened on Indian positions. Indian forces would retake
the mountain peaks one by one over the course of the some 70 day conflict.
The most famous locality of the war was Tiger Hill. The peak is the highest of the five
points captured by Pakistani forces, allowing for line of sight for the region, improved
communications, and direction for artillery. During the night, a small contingent of Indian forces
scaled a local cliff face (some 300m) in a commando raid, while 200 of their comrades attempted
an equally daring but more conventional approach up the peak. In limited but brutal combat,
Indian forces overcame their Pakistani foes. The additional peaks would fall to the Indians in
similarly unconventional and extremely dangerous ways. While limited aerial assaults occurred
during the war and artillery would hammer the remote peaks, the war was defined by small
groups of forces fighting in close quarters. The death toll would be low, with approximately 700
Pakistanis and 475 Indian battle-related deaths (Sarkees and Wayman 2010a, 184).
High Ruggedness – Low Trafficability (4)
The most challenging terrain class, high ruggedness-low trafficability, is the setting for
fourteen wars. Every war in this class is coded as engaging joint attrition strategies. Again, this is
a diverse set of wars but they share a general distinction: potential for brutality. Namely, this
recognition comes from two examples of modern blood-letting. The 1941-5 American-Japanese
War and the 1950-3 Korean War. There are examples of limited wars in the category, to the point
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that they are the modal type. The First, Third, and Fourth Central American Wars pitted regional
rivals against each other but the combination of terrain and limited state capacity limited the
number of battle deaths.70 Similarly, wars in the process of Italian Unification – Italian-Roman
and Neapolitan – wars also occur in this class but are again relatively limited engagements when
compared to the comparatively greater death tolls in the Austro-Sardinian War and the War of
Italian Unification. Several wars also occur in Greater China but are again relatively limited,
including the Sino-French War (12,000 deaths), Changkufeng War (~1,700 deaths), Second
Laotian War (~14,000 deaths), Sino-Vietnamese Punitive War (~21,000 deaths). While the death
toll is larger in these fights, especially in the conflict between China and Vietnam, these are all
relatively limited conflicts. Finally, the remaining fights, First Spanish-Moroccan War (~10,000
deaths), the Ecuadorian-Colombian War (~1,000 deaths), and Cenepa Valley War (~1,500
deaths), are all limited. Each, however, are testaments to human commitment to war even in the
gravest of conditions. The extreme examples across the Pacific and on the Korean Peninsula
demonstrate the depths we are willing to go to realize political objectives. I present narratives of
these cases, not only because of their paramount importance in the history of recent world
politics, but because they are something of outliers in both scale and place. The AmericanJapanese and Korean Wars would cost millions of lives on the battlefield and even more in civilian
lives and those laid low by disease and wounds.
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The Second, Third, and Fourth Central American Wars did not exceed 1,100 battle deaths. The First Central
American War claimed roughly 4,000 lives. There were some 20 “mini-wars” across Central America in the later
half of the nineteenth century and intro the early twentieth century. Only these four exceed the threshold of war.
Presumably, many of these smaller conflicts also occurred in this terrain class.
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Map 13: American-Japanese War, 1941-45

The American-Japanese War is not only part of a much greater conflagration that was the
Second World War, but is also part of a locally complex fight across China, Burma, and into India.
Still, Imperial Japan’s fall would primarily come at the hands of the United States’ incipient power.
The war would be defined by a series of individual campaigns, often centered on very local areas
separated by sizeable distances contiguous only by water. The war then is defined by projecting
power, already a difficult feat across water, to fight in rugged and non-trafficable terrain. This
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combination made for a war unprecedented in human history. Adding to this, the use of new
weapons in new ways – massive incendiary bombing campaigns on wooden cities like Tokyo and
the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki – would bring an astounding death toll
to the war. While the war famously began on December 7th, 1941 with the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor, America entered a war years, if not decades, in progress. Japan made its fateful
first step into empire with its victory over Russia in 1905, and would continue its rise throughout
the region through 1941 when, simultaneous with Pearl Harbor, Japanese forces attacked Hong
Kong, Wake Island, Malaya, Singapore, and Burma (a few days later on December 23).
American forces enjoyed a sizeable CINC advantage in the conflict (5:1) against their
Japanese foes. However, American forces would be divided between Europe and the Pacific, and
Japanese forces enjoyed the benefit of surprise in their opening actions. Clodfelter (1992) reports
rough parity in military personnel, with 2,169,000 American and 2,391,000 Japanese forces.71
Coupled with the brutal terrain, the American power advantage was limited at the beginning of
the war and would only be assured when American forces gained control of the seas after the
devastation of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor – beginning with American victories at the Battle
of the Coral Sea (May 7-8, 1942) and Midway (June 4-7, 1942). American naval superiority would
be an essential element of the war, more so than likely any other great power war in modern
history, as each campaign was only contiguous by water. American control of the seas, and thus
American power projection capability, was realized with victories at Guadalcanal, fought
between the islands of Guadalcanal and Tulagi (August 1942-February 1943), the Solomon Islands
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Japanese forces were divided among several fronts as well, with a large portion stationed within Japan proper.
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(March-October 1943), the Central Pacific Campaign (February 1943-June 1944), Leyte Gulf
(October 1944), and finally, in the Philippines Campaign (December 1944-January 1945). Given
the island-hopping nature of the American offensive, these victories, as well as America’s
eventual air superiority, proved essential to the American campaign – providing projection,
logistical support, and bombardments.
The first American offensive of the war came in August 1942 in the Solomon Islands. By
this time, Japanese forces had spread across the pacific – an even briefly into North America in
the Aleutian Islands.72 The campaign demonstrated the extreme consequences of modern war in
extreme terrain. The Battle of Bloody Ridge (Edson’s Ridge) showed the challenge of terrain as
heavy forest covered Japanese positions from aerial and naval attacks and rugged hills
confronted American foot traffic. This challenge would be repeated in across Guadalcanal and in
major campaigns in the Solomon Islands, New Guinea, the Bismarck, Gilbert, Marshall, Mariana,
Palau Islands before the reconquest of the Philippines. Fighting for the Philippines raged from
Leyte to Luzon and cost thousands of lives. American forces made final assaults into Borneo
before the most vicious fighting of the war occurred on the small islands of Iwo Jima and
Okinawa.
Iwo Jima is a mere 4.5 long and 2.5 miles wide. On this small rocky island, covered in trees
and dense shrubland, some 27,000 soldiers would die. The rugged island was the site of the third
most costly battle by lives for the Americans in WWII, with only Okinawa and the Battle of the
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The undefended Aleutian Islands of Attu and Kiska were taken in June of 1942. The battle to retake Attu would
cost the Japanese forces all but 29 forces after a final Banzai charge in May of 1943. Japanese forces would slip
away unchallenged under dense fog from Kiska. This would be the only fight of the war in the Western
Hemisphere.
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Bulge costing more American lives. The battle was won “inch by bloody inch” (Clodfelter 1992,
928). By the time the famous photograph of the American flag being raised on Mount Suribachi
was snapped, the terrain had taken its toll. The ferocity of the fighting was surpassed on Okinawa.
Only the fight at the Meuse-Argonne in WWI spilled more American blood than the taking of
Okinawa (Clodfelter 1992, 929). The jointly rugged and non-trafficable terrain took its toll on the
mass of American forces. With incredible sacrifice by both sides – let alone the native Okinawans
– the battle marked the end of major ground battles in the Pacific. The fight was capped with the
mass suicide of civilians on the island’s cliffs – a fitting testimony to the futility of war. The Soviet
Union joined the fight in the Pacific in Manchuria on August 8th, 1945 and Japan’s fate was sealed.
With the dropping of the atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan accepted America’s
demand of unconditional surrender on August 15th, 1945 – V.J. Day. The war would be
characterized by the terrible combination of terrain, power, and will. Thousands and thousands
of Japanese soldiers chose to end their lives in massive Banzai charges rather than surrender, all
after fearless and intractable defenses of extreme locations.
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Map 14: Korean War, 1950-53

Less than five years later, America again joined a massive war in Asia. The Korean War is
perhaps the mostly costly stalemate in the history of war. The war brought unprecedented
international participation. Still, the primary fight was primarily between the Koreas, then
between the United States and South Korea against China and North Korea. The bloodletting
essentially was for naught, as the war would conclude with little change – only death. Like the
American-Japanese War, the terrain contributed to the brutality. The war was a direct result of
the settlement of WWII and the Cold War. Imperial Japan first occupied Korea in 1910 and upon
defeat in 1945, the Peninsula was partitioned by the Soviets in the North and Americans in the
South. The Chinese Civil War – easily among the costliest conflicts in human history – supplied

165

the Immun Gun with veteran forces. After a series of minor prodding attacks, North Korea
launched a full-scale invasion of the South on June 25th, 1950. From the first days of the war, the
South Koreans were outgunned, outmanned, and outmatched. Three days later, Seoul fell and a
mere one-quarter of ROK forces remained active. Shortly thereafter, the young United Nations –
after some skirting of the Soviet Union and the exclusion of the PRC – authorized action in the
defense of the fledgling South. Limited American forces arrived on June 30th and were quickly
pressed by advancing North Korean forces. A single and brief naval engagement on July 2nd would
be the only fight on the sea. American air superiority quickly devastated the entirety of the North
Korean Air Force by mid-July. Still, these limited victories could not stop the drive south. The
American ground forces, a shell of their previous WWII strength, fought constant rearguard
action down the Peninsula toward Pusan.
The Naktung Bulge Campaign at the Pusan Perimeter turned the tide of the North’s
advance. At Masan, the American counteroffensive across rugged terrain, with fights atop places
– aptly named for the “Forgotten War” – like “No-Name Ridge,” blunted the North’s drive. Allied
forces would hold, at high cost, the perimeter. Then, in dramatic fashion, MacArthur began the
famous amphibious landing up the Peninsula at Inchon on September 15th, 1950. Success here
and new successes at Pusan would change the nature of the war. Allied forces began the process
of ridding the South of the North – aided by the American made division of North Korean forces
at Inchon and disorganization and demoralization stemming from difficult terrain. Allied forces
began the drive North, completely clearing the enemy forces from South Korea and, fatefully
advancing into the north. The routed North retreated with Allied forces in pursuit towards the
Yalu river. In a moment of cognitive dissonance – with no allied relations with the PRC and PRC
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being forced to play an international game of telephone through India, to Britain, to America –
the Chinese entered the war in late October 1950.
With the entrance of the Chinese, the war entered its third and most brutal period. The
war, now into North Korean territory and even more rugged terrain than the South, would be
characterized by massive human wave attacks.73 In November, American forces would suffer
their worst defeat of the war at the Battle of Ch’ongch’on. Retreating American and Turkish
Forces were ambushed along a narrow pass adjacent to the Ch’ongch’on River. Chinese forces
had significant experience with ‘off-road’ combat, meaning they were better prepared to
traverse the rugged terrain. With the new year, Chinese forces crossed the 38th parallel. In a
stalwart terrain-aided defense, allied forces – such as American and French forces at Chipyongni – repulsed human wave attacks. Allied forces then struck back, pushing Chinese forces
northward. Famously, MacArthur was relieved of command by President Truman in April 1951.
In this phase of the war, terrain would deeply cost the numerically superior Chinese. At the
Ch’ongpyong Reservoir, allied forces would kill some 70,000 Chinese at a cost of 7,000 men in
defensive position along the rugged hills. Now overextended, depleted, and disorganized, the
Chinese were driven north and suffered massive losses. 200,000 Chinese were slain in the first
half of 1951 alone. Facing stalemate, the two sides began the peace process and began the
“outpost war.” This final phase, into 1953, involved heavy artillery strikes against fortified targets.
Peace was realized but never codified and little changed in three years of war.
Predicting Strategy Selection

73

Though the first human wave attack would not occur until early the next year in February 1951.
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These classifications and narratives are only once piece of the war puzzle among many.
Another central piece is strategy selection. As previously detailed, strategy is the application of
the means. If there is validity to the democratic victory, then democracies must more effectively
wield capabilities through the effective selection of strategy given terrain. That is, for victory to
be truly promoted by democracy, there must be an endogenous cause. This suggests that we
must explore the correlates of strategy selection as well. The following is a preliminary test of
strategy selection.
In the below model, I use multinomial logistic regression to predict advantage,
disadvantage, or neutral advantage as the dependent variable. I include state capabilities,
alliance capability contribution, initiation, regime scores, terrain ruggedness, trafficability, and
spatial extent. The reference category is the modal category of neutral advantage. While this is a
preliminary test of predicting strategy selection, it is telling that neither capabilities nor regime
type predicts either advantage or disadvantage. This suggests that traditional measures of power
and regime type (including binary measures, not shown) are not factors in choosing appropriate
strategies. In this sense, states with higher levels of capabilities are not inherently better at
wielding them. Similarly, democracies do not inherently choose superior strategies. Terrain, with
the exception of spatial extent, does however predict advantage. This implies that states do
consider terrain in selecting strategies. An intuitive point, but a necessary first step in establishing
how states choose to exercise power.
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This readily available data does little to demonstrate a causal relationship, but rather
suggests that there is promising room for future research on the topic. Regardless of the
paradigm and by definition, the topic of strategy inherently explores agency. It raises three simple
questions: who makes decisions, why they make these decisions, and do these answers cleave
along predictable lines? From a structural position, there can be a basic assumption that the
strategy is partially selected by terrain. The above demonstrates that state actors do this. The
answers necessarily become more complex and divisive as we move into the first and second
image. I suggest that future research should contend with domestic political structures – i.e.
civilian control of the military or the military industrial complex – as well as particularly
challenging topics like experience (lessons from temporally recent wars), domestic organizations
(parochial priorities and perceptions), and individuals. The challenge is then producing
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generalizable assumptions in a low-N and high variable environment. For instance, in 1979 during
the Sino-Vietnamese Punitive War, Vietnamese forces were equipped with the experience of
decades of fighting against stronger French and American enemies – not to mention armed with
Soviet and captured American arms and munitions. The Peoples Liberation Army, on the other
hand, had not innovated their tactics during the Cultural Revolution. They choose to engage in
human wave attacks reminiscent of the Korean War. The PRC also had the wisdom to withdraw
after inflicting their punishment rather. How can this experience suggest a generalizable pattern
of strategy selection? Innovative data, methods, and operationalization will all be necessary to
examine this critical question, paying particularly consideration to the structural question of
capabilities and terrain.
Conclusions
The above demonstrates a deeply complicated relationship between terrain and war
outcomes. Terrain at times facilitates the powerful and at others humbles them. Terrain at times
exposes the weak and at others shelters them. While war is a general phenomenon that defines
international politics with relatively predictable patterns of behavior, the local nature of war in
place is what makes individual wars unique affairs. While an imperfect classification, the sorting
of conflicts by ruggedness and trafficability provides a broad set of lessons on the role of terrain
in war. If strategy is the application of power and terrain changes the efficacy of strategy, then
terrain is an important predictor of outcomes. The easiest class, low ruggedness – high
trafficability, is the setting for most wars between 1816-2003. The modal strategy is attrition, but
this terrain class is uniquely suited for mobility strategies. Even still, the local and peculiar are
always conditional and variations in weather, season, and human action can change the
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conditions of war. In low ruggedness – low trafficability, terrain may shelter the weak and abase
the strong – even superpowers like the Soviet Union and the United States. Fabian defenses and
punishing guerilla strategies serve the weak – though often at great cost. In high ruggedness-high
trafficability, mountain warfare reigns. The terrain sets boundaries for action and forces troops
into difficult and labored movement. The final and most difficult class, high ruggedness-low
trafficability, is the setting for several small and limited wars and the some of the most brutal
conflicts in human history. The indefinite combination of elevation changes and challenging
landscape forces states in major wars to incur great losses.
Here there is room for questions about the selection of strategy. Future research should
address this fundamental question: why and how do states select their strategy? This may require
a deeper coding of strategy beyond a tripartite coding. The selection effects hypothesis, which is
already dependent on Israel in 1948, (target), 1967 (initiator), and 1973 (target) and has little to
do with Israeli democracy, implies states with democratic features would better apply the means
of war. There is good reason to doubt this as the selection of strategy is rarely the function of
either a mass public or an elected legislature. The reality likely lies in a combination of factors.
Past experience, such as previous wars – as in the case of Mannerheim in Finland or Ho Chi Min
in Vietnam – give decision makers and soldiers practice in the art of war. Other factors may limit
success in selection and battlefield effectiveness, just as Stalin’s purges decimated the Soviet
officer class. This may even suggest problems within democracies in selection. That is,
democracies may select wars on the basis of idealistic goals, such as the spread of democracy to
ensure security on the basis of valence democracy or stopping the spread of competing
ideologies as in American interventions in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. This may be better
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explained by the impetuousness concomitant to power. Unchecked power internationally, like
unchecked power domestically, is dangerous and prone to missteps. Given this, future work
should consider strategy as a dependent variable.
In conclusion, there are broad lessons for states in war. The only sure way to prevent loss
in war is to avoid war. Yet, it is is a general inevitability in an anarchic world that states must
prepare for war or pay the cost of weakness. Still, the costs of war can be mitigated by
appropriately applying forces against an enemy. When possible, states should only fight wars
when they enjoy at least a 3:1 advantage in power. This rule is only appropriate when the
objectives are predicated on the defeat of enemy forces – not realizing an abstract political
objective like winning hearts and minds. With these goals, mobility strategies – which use
maneuver to disrupt enemy organization – facilitate strength more than any other strategy.
Strong state power advantages are only realizable in appropriate environments. Weak states, if
willing to engage in Fabian or punishment strategies in difficult terrain, can overcome gross
mismatches and inflict considerable damage against dramatically stronger opponents – even if
victory escapes them. Difficult terrain makes for difficult application of power. While not explicit
in this study, this point is relevant for powerful states which might expect quick victory in contests
against always-weaker non-state actors. Post-Cold War America, arguably the strongest state in
terms of capabilities in human history, experienced this lesson – though seemingly has not
learned it – through nearly twenty years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq. The defeat of their state
opponents in Afghanistan and Iraq came swiftly based on the might and mobility of the American
military but extremely weak insurgencies have survived in difficult terrains, killing thousands of
Americans and hundreds of thousands more civilians – certainly an unacceptable cost in pursuit
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of abstract ideals. Still the first point holds for the world’s strongest state, facing no existential
threat, the United States should engage in a grand strategy of forbearance, abandoning the
general bellicosity and belligerence it has demonstrated in unipolarity. However, to quote
Kenneth Waltz’s prophetic words in 1993, “I would not bet on it” (Waltz 1995, 79). We, may,
hope that there is still time before it is too late in a nuclear and multipolar world. In a world in
crisis, stranger things have happened.
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Chapter 5: Learning from Interstate War Outcomes
“Our modern liberal culture, of which American civilization is such an unalloyed exemplar, is
involved in many ironic refutations of its original pretensions of virtue, wisdom, and power.” –
Reinhold Niebuhr, the Irony of American History
The outcomes puzzle is complex. No explanation will ever fully explain why states win,
lose, or draw in war. At best, we are left with understanding the correlates of war outcomes, as
informed by paradigmatic theory. This, the realm of normal science, is the arena for this
dissertation. The essential findings of my work suggest that capabilities conditionally predict
outcomes, with their application via strategy and the terrain factors which impact their
application. Democracy is correlated with victory – i.e. democracies are more likely to win wars
– but this does not imply causation. If victory is an output endogenous to democratic regime
type, democracies must be superior in applying capabilities and interacting with terrain. The
weight of the evidence presented here suggests that democracies are not superior in these
endeavors. We are thus at a crossroads. The democratic victory is compelling but incomplete. It
has placed the proverbial cart before the horse by failing to adequately explore a more
fundamental causal relationship between capabilities, strategy, and terrain. The implication is
that further research is necessary to explore the relationship between democracy and these
factors.
However, proponents of the democratic victory, like the democratic peace, have treated
these flaws with contempt. Supporting the democratic peace in light of its flaws, Russett (1993)
writes, “understanding the sources of democratic peace can have the effect of a self-fulfilling
prophecy. Social scientists sometimes create reality as well as analyze it… repeating the norms
as descriptive principles can help make them true” (136). In similar vein, proponents of the
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victory have reiterated the norms of selection effects and military effectiveness. Rather
constructing a reality of invincible democracies, these claims have only supported policies that
erode American power and have cost trillions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of lives since
the end of the Cold War in democratic foreign adventures. America and the world are not safer
in some self-fulfilled prophecy. The victory has been our hubris and decay our nemesis.
Learning from the Democratic Victory Debate
Chief proponents of the democratic victory, Reiter and Stam, conclude their 2002 book
Democracies at War by presenting American foreign policy implications of the democratic
victory. Broadly, they call for a general optimism for American unipolarity in the twenty-first
century, one which need not be afraid of war because victory is the bulwark of democracy. They
express great faith in the notion that democracies do not engage in wars of folly and when they
are confronted with war, they do so with superior effectiveness. The authors write,
“Contrary to the fears of some naysayers, democracies have consistently been
able to fight off attacks from autocratic predators and will continue to endure. They wisely
avoid foolish war, and when they are forced to fight, their soldiers typically perform better
than do their autocratic counterparts. This gives us confidence in the sustainability of the
international trend to democracy. Several factors are pushing an increasing number of
nations to democratize. Among these, rising global levels of material prosperity, the
appearance of other democracies themselves, and the decreased ability of autocrats to
manage and manipulate news information make the further spread of democracy more
likely. In addition to these factors, we can say confidently that democracies can safely
defend themselves from the threat of outside predators” (203).
These conclusions continue with broad policy prescriptions. The authors express that
America is made more secure by the spread of democracy globally on the basis that democracies
both do not go to war with one another and may stem any returning tide of advancing
authoritarianism should conflict arise through the victory. To better realize security, the United
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States should not fear interventionism, so long as it is “a more enlightened interventionist
policy.” The implication being, where there is fertile soil for democracy, “military force can
promote social stability and the advance of democracy.” The authors “urge policy makers to be
willing to use force for this end if the conditions for success, especially a society that enjoys the
proper institutional, cultural, and economic conditions, seem to be present” (204). They conclude
their text with continued optimism, writing “the installation of democracy presents no Faustian
bargain, no dangerous tradeoff in the face of global anarchy. Counter to the fears of many
scholars and politicians, national leaders need not subvert liberty in order to preserve it. (205)”
Reflecting on an additional 16 years of American unipolarity, these conclusions seem
largely misplaced. To begin, we are in the midst of a problematic period for democracy, globally
and in the United States. Diamond (2015) opines, the past decade has been “a period of at least
incipient decline in democracy” (142). Alternatively conceptualized, Schmitter (2015) suggests
the period has been one of “crisis and transition but not recession,” with previous overly
optimistic assessments of democratic gains and consolidation. The quality of American
democracy has certainly suffered as well, as has liberalism. Seventeen years of continuous war
and an additional eleven years of intermittent war, ironically in the name of democracy
promotion with little to no fruit to bear, has contributed directly and indirectly to this erosion.
Beyond this, the assumed inefficacy of authoritarianism in light of a supposedly changing world
has proven false. Not only did Russian democracy give way to oligarchy, giving rise to persistent
electoral authoritarianism, but the Russian state seemingly used the tools of a democratic society
(one it was not meant to understand) to sow discontent in the 2016 American Presidential
Election. Similar patterns emerged amongst equally persistent authoritarian regimes, while many
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pseudo-democratic states were ultimately illiberal in nature. My suggestion here is not that
democracy itself is somehow flawed or that there is some inherent or unavoidable defect in
American democracy unknown to previous authors. This is hardly the case. Rather, that America
has ironically has been the author of its own misfortune, as well as the misfortune of millions of
souls abroad, in the name of democracy promotion. The best laid plans of the democratic victory
– like the best laid plans of previous utopian thought – went awry. Rather than promote security,
it has only cost blood and treasure, while strategically overextending the United States in light of
looming multipolarity.
The work of this dissertation suggests an additional key element to this problematic
prescription: incomplete information. The prescriptions of the democratic victory advise that
democracies, especially powerful democracies, do not need to be afraid of war. They are bound
by institution to avoid folly. Yet this prescription was made with entirely incomplete information,
akin to traveling to a destination without quality directions. The war outcomes puzzle is simply
incomplete at present. While this dissertation strives to make additions to the problem, it is
hardly a finished product. As a general truism, informed by the massive bloodletting of the
twentieth century and the continued potential for it in the twenty-first century, states should
always be fearful of war, responding with a general cautiousness at each turn. To suggest
otherwise or to suggest a monocausal route to future security, is self-evidently dangerous. I
believe that my work demonstrates that we have a great deal yet to uncover as it relates to war
outcomes. In the following, I present six lessons to guide the formulation of policy as it relates to
war. Rather than novel propositions, these are cautious and historically rooted proposals with
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the explicit aim of avoiding the mistakes of recent American foreign policy (and international
politics more broadly) that have defined my lifetime.
Lesson One: Democracies should not tie security to regime type
Foreign policy is crafted with the goal of realizing tangible objectives. In an anarchic world
populated by sovereign states with war-making capability, security is always the chief objective.
Security is also fleeting and, in a nuclear world, always imperfect. This tension drives the course
of international politics. Proponents of the democratic peace and victory suggest that democracy
is the most stable ground to build security policy upon. Amongst democracies, war is no longer a
tool of foreign policy and the security dilemma is largely mitigated, at least in the arenas of
democratic dyads. A world with a higher volume of democracies is more secure. Democracies
also enjoy inherent advantages in war, meaning they can be assured that in the arenas where
insecure power politics and the specter of war remains, they will likely win the day should they
be tested. In this conception, democracies are secure in both proverbial “zones of peace” and in
“zones of turmoil.”
Realist thought and the work of this dissertation, suggests that as democratic states
increasingly craft policies on these pillars, the problem of insecurity may in fact be exacerbated.
There are significant problems with the democratic peace. While regime type predicts peace, it
does not cause peace. American history itself raises concerns with the peace, both in 1812, when
the only two states globally which could be conceived of as democracies went to war, then in
1861 the two American democracies fought one another. Realism suggests the peace a product
of a larger trend in the distribution of capabilities. Democracies, especially among Western
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Europe, Japan, and South Korea, enjoyed the security umbrella of the United States, meaning
American military might vis-à-vis the Soviets and then into unipolarity explains a lack of security
competition and war amongst these states. As power defuses away from the United States in the
twenty-first century, tying the hopes of security to democracy is ill founded. In the case of the
victory and further detailed below, democratic successes and failures are best explained not by
regime type but by capabilities. If democracy has played a role, it has been in the ironic pursuit
of democracy as security, embroiling American and other western democracies in quagmire
globally against state and non-state actors alike, shielded from the might of the American military
by terrain. To actively pursue democracy as a cure for insecurity is to make democracies less
secure. If the democratic peace and victory are valid propositions, war will not occur in zones of
peace and democracies will be success in zones of turmoil. If it is not, and we act as if it is,
democracies will be ill suited for multipolarity. This folly may destroy nations.
Lesson Two: Capabilities advantages provide for security, but only conditionally. Thus, states
should only initiate wars to achieve concrete and explicit objectives, not abstractions.
The chief predictor of victory is capabilities. If insecurity is concomitant to both the
possibility of war and the general difficulty in predicting war outcomes, security can then be
measured by the extent of capabilities a state possesses. States should craft foreign policies on
the basis of capabilities following the old proposition that a state with a 3:1 advantage is secure.
However, as these advantages only conditionally hold, states must consider the application of
capabilities and the factors which impact their application when seeking to realize capabilities as
power. The lesson is then that states should craft policy on the 3:1 advantage but recognize its
limitations. Capabilities advantages are not carte blanche invitations to achieve all objectives.
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The odds of victory in the conventional sense of defeating enemy forces are favorable but will
become decreasingly so as secondary and tertiary objectives are added. In this sense, the strong
should only select wars if capabilities can effectively be brought to bear on the enemy toward
the primary objective of military victory. Either fighting to supplant an abstraction (like winning
hearts and minds to liberalism and democracy) or fighting in terrain which limits the full exercise
of capabilities are recipes for quagmire. Even states with extreme advantages, or perhaps
especially these states given temptations towards hubris, should explicitly consider the degree
to which power can be realized through capability. The only sure way to avoid defeat in war is to
avoid war itself. Security is best realized through capabilities advantages and forbearance – while
recognizing that advantages can promote insecurity in other states. The ultimate goal, especially
for the world’s most powerful state, should then be preponderance without threat.
Lesson Three: States should select strategies in war jointly on the basis of capabilities and terrain
States apply capabilities in war through strategy. Here, we see the bulk of state agency in
the process of war - deciding where soldiers, arms, and materiel are placed, how they pursue
objectives, and how they interact with the ground. When choosing war, states must consider
how they may strategically apply capabilities. That is, if war is predominantly chosen for political
reasons (i.e. grievance) and evaluated on perceived probability of success, states should heavily
consider strategy in this process. More specifically, the potential efficacy of strategy in light of
objectives. This is simple enough from the perspective of relative capabilities but becomes
increasingly complex when considering terrain. History is riddled with examples of states seeking
war in terrain in which they are ill prepared, even in home-field contests. Be it the Nazi invasion
of Russia in summer dress or American reliance on unmanned aerial vehicles in the mountains of

180

Afghanistan, strategic advantage is only as effective as terrain allows it to be. The most effective
states in war are those that recognize their own strategic limitations and do not pursue objectives
beyond what strategy can reasonably produce. Selecting war on the basis of informed strategy
can prevent the trap of pursing abstract objectives beyond which traditional strategies and
capabilities can obtain. For instance, American “shock and awe” and mobile invasion (a maneuver
strategy) made quick work of the Iraqi state in 2003 but this rapid victory was only the first step
in a long quagmire. Reasonable assessment of strategic advantage would readily suggest that
advantage is lost once the state is defeated. Without a clear exit plan per the Powell Doctrine,
the war is among the greatest blunders in American history (second only to Vietnam, arrived at
in similar fashion).
Lesson Four: States should select wars on the basis of place
Whereas space is an abstraction, place is a reality. Without a full understanding of place
as including terrain, increasingly abstract objectives are likely to be pursued beyond victory – if
victory can only be achieved through an understanding of terrain. Intuitively, states already do
this to a degree. The motivation for war is always purposeful and informed by place. If place is
the combination of the peoples and institutions which give space meaning, the additional crucial
element of place is terrain. Again, states presumably engage terrain in force planning, but the
central thesis of this work suggests that states should select war itself while considering terrain.
States must not only know their enemy but the place where an enemy occupies. History is again
riddled with states with imperfect knowledge of where fighting will occur and a subsequent
misapplication of means. Perhaps this is an unavoidable defect in the nature of state decision
making but one with tremendous potential cost. Beyond this, the best laid plans are subject to
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change given the complexity of war as conflicts evolve. The United States likely never intended
to engage the NVA and VC in Cambodia and Laos but the war evolved as such to make these
arenas central as the hinterlands became metropoles of violence.
When states select war on only one element of place, place is made an abstraction.
Fighting to win hearts and minds of the Vietnamese misses the question of how best to defeat
an enemy shielded by terrain. If we can assume that states enter war with rank ordered objects,
chief among them disruption of an enemy’s ability to maintain resistance (i.e. victory), the failure
to consider place as the “nature of the ground” allows states to too quickly seek objectives
secondary or tertiary to victory. Doing so is a sure path to quagmire. The American objective of
victory in Afghanistan, quickly realized against its state opponent, was decided without ample
consideration of its ability to bring the might of American capability to bear on non-traditional
actors post-transformation (i.e. those without uniforms, with unconventional objectives, using
“illegal” tactics) in terrain that limits full exercise of capability. States wisely limiting objectives
on the basis on a full understanding of place, such as the PRC’s decision to limit its 1979
engagement with Vietnam to a relatively limited punitive action in the hinterland, may avoid
these pitfalls. Take the American experiences in Iraq in 1990-1 and 2003. Following Iraq’s invasion
of Kuwait, American led UN forces made quick work the world’s fourth largest army, concluding
the war with the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty. The 2003 experience, albeit with less
international consensus, would be equally swift, instead ending with the collapse of the Iraqi
state. However, the nature of occupation and failure to realize the implications of pursing
abstract objectives in an abstract place (ill prepared for urban pacification against, again,
nontraditional adversaries) costs trillions and well over 200,000 lives (including civilians).
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Realization of these abstract objectives are not nearer today than in 2003, nor in neighboring
states in which the U.S. has intervened, including Syria, Libya, and Yemen – each now embroiled
in its own civil war.
Clear historical precedence suggests that those who are willing to wager everything, can
overcome great disadvantages, albeit at great costs. These cases, and in all cases of asymmetrical
warfare where a grossly mismatched state overcomes overwhelming capabilities, demonstrate
this primarily as a strategy of the weak. The Finns mastered a Fabian styled defense against
overwhelming Soviet advantage, to the point that their contiguous foe accepted an entirely
pyrrhic victory. Vietnamese forces, be it against the French, Americans, 74 fellow Vietnamese, or
Chinese enemies, sacrificed generations of souls in the name of independence – all while acting
antithetically to basic rules of war. The Mujahedeen in Afghanistan, gifted advanced weaponry
by their then American allies, withstood Communist invasion for a decade, only for their heirs to
withstand American invasion for nearly two more decades. In all these cases, and nearly every
case where a grossly mismatched state wins out, the winner fought for survival. In this sense, the
alternative to victory was death of the state or equivalent organization. If we are to assume that
states are mortal actors in some sense – they rise, they fall, and history provides no example of
a permanent political organization immune to the ravages of political and international entropy,
then we should also assume that those facing death are dangerous. These actors are willing to
sacrifice everything to assure their survival.
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The Americans “fell victim to one of the classic blunders, the most famous of which is ‘Never get involved in a
land war in Asia,’ but only slightly less well known is this: ‘Never go in against a Sicilian, when death is on the
line!’”(Vizzini 1987).
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Merely fighting for survival does not ensure success. Rather, this drive must be bulwarked
by terrain. Weak states with the will to wage total war in challenging terrain enjoy inherent
advantages. Their stronger adversary may seek to use of their advantage but are hamstrung in
their application of force. Polish, Belgian, Danish, Dutch, and French leadership and soldiers
certainly knew that failing to halt the Nazi advance meant death but were utterly incapable of
stemming the blitzing tide of German mobility. Even if we see acts of bravery made possible by
the threat of total political domination, such as Polish lancers75 on horseback charging German
armor among history’s final and futile cavalry charges, they were no match for the onslaught of
German capability. Facing even greater capability differentials, Finnish forces, under constant
Soviet bombardment, utterly rendered Soviet numerical and materiel advantages null. Similarly,
NVA and VC forces were shielded from the unprecedented application of force in Operational
Rolling Thunder by dense tropical canopies, as well as the ground itself through tunnels and
underground bunkers. The only forces capable of engaging these terrain-aided soldiers had to do
on their level: on the ground and in close quarters. Once capabilities are increasingly equalized
by terrain, these contests become questions of will and effectiveness – at once driven by strategy
and at once driven by the political situation. States must do their homework before war to know
place or face folly.
Lesson Five: Unchecked power is dangerous (to the powerful)
The weak are willing to bear the cost of total war in the name of survival but the strong
are not. Facing no existential threat, the strong shoulder a general hubris concomitant to military
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While the Uhlans were armed with sabers, their use against Nazi infantry and armor is myth. The wielding of
sabers was entirely ceremonious.
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might. Indeed, we might say that the deaths of empires are sowed in this hubris. The modern
international system76 began with such hubris, and was constantly redefined by it. With victories
from Margeno to Austerlitz, Napoleon’s forces carved away the ancien regime throughout
Central Europe. Only Britain, insulated by water, and Russia, shielded by terrain, stood to French
forces. Only then, spurred on by strength and victory, would Napoleon face Waterloo in 1815 as
a result of grave overextension and general folly in light of strategy and terrain. One hundred
years later, having conquered all of Western Europe save for Britain, the Nazi’s turned their gaze
toward the Soviets. While slowed by missteps of their Italian allies in the Balkans, their folly was
again overextension and an underappreciation of terrain. The ferocity and skill of the German
military machine, as well as all the brutality born of National-Socialism, could not overcome mud,
let alone a Soviet state facing death. The American experience of the past twenty years
demonstrates this against non-state actors. The strong do not need to fear defeat, though history
suggests this confidence is hubris. As Reiter and Stam (2002) posit, “Democracies win wars in
large part because they attack only when they are very confident they will win” (2002). After
some 17 years of war in Afghanistan and nine years in Iraq (and an additional six of limited
engagement), as well as numerous other interventions in Libya, Yemen, and Syria, what was
dubbed “confidence” is clearly hubris. The vast cost in blood and treasure, let alone the utter
destruction of the social conditions we may expect democracy to be born of, has not brought
democracy to any of these states. Death and quagmire is Nemesis’ retribution.

76

Generally, the modern international political system is given a start date of 1648, with the Peace of Westphalia. I
prescribe this date (The Napoleonic Era) in line with the modern alignment of power across the major state actors
per Small and Singer’s (1982) Correlates of War conceptualization. Further, the date of January 1, 1816, begins the
temporal scope of this study.
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Here we can apply an update to Madison’s assertion that unchecked political power is
dangerous. This general proposition is self-evidently true in international politics given the
modern history of imperialism and aggression. Indeed, major elements of paradigmatic thought
and prescriptions including balance of power theory and collective security are responses to the
problem of unchecked aggression and power. The caveat here is that unchecked power may also
be dangerous to the powerful. If unchecked powers are unafraid of defeat and increasingly willing
to wage war for abstract reasons beyond victory, they are susceptible to engage in unwise wars
– in the sense that their power may be limited by place. Power humbled by terrain is nothing
new: the Alps are the graveyard for thousands of Carthaginians, Indochina the graveyard for
French, Japanese, Americans, and Chinese, and Afghanistan the graveyard for the Macedonians,
British, Soviets, and Americans. In the American case, promoting democracy is simply the excuse
for digging the grave.
Lesson Six: The democratic victory is ironic
Even if there is not a causal relationship between democracy and war outcomes, there is
reason to believe that war impacts the quality of democracy. Even more so, war impacts the
quality of liberalism. From an American perspective, few things should be more troubling after
nearly three decades of war – from the Gulf War, Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and
dozens more actions globally. It may be fair to say that American political culture engages
multiple political traditions (Smith 1993), but the liberal tradition is it’s defining thought (Hartz
1955/1983; Abbott 2001; Desch 2007a). If liberalism is predicated on the protection of rights –
that is to say, restrictions on government – and “war is the health of the state,” then there is
cause for concern (Bourne 1918/1998). Be it Upton Sinclair’s arrest for publicly reading the Bill
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of Rights on Liberty Hill in San Francisco in 1923 or warrantless wire taps and unchecked NSA
data collection today, the consequences of war continually degrade the quality of American
liberalism at home. Beyond this, there is an inherent tension between liberalism and efficacy in
war. The impetus for brutality, often a necessary strategy in pursuit of victory, is generally at odds
with liberalism but often wins out at liberty’s sake and is ironically engaged in her name. Indeed,
America’s first genuine step onto the world stage as a major power in 1898 was immediately
followed by entirely illiberal action in the Philippines against one-time allies, nominally in pursuit
of promoting a civilizing mission of liberalization. Here the American’s inherited the Spanish
Water Cure as a tool of interrogation, akin to modern waterboarding. As Andrew Carnegie
quipped in opposition to the war, “you seem to have about finished your work of civilizing the
Filipinos. About 8,000 of them have been civilized and sent to heaven. I hope you like it.” Dozens
of other illiberal actions, ranging from the massacre at My Lai to torture at Abu Ghraib, did little
to promote victory (though wholesale brutality may have) while generally setting illiberal
precedent in pursuit of victory.
In this tension we see a certain irony, reminiscent of Niebuhr’s (1952) famous critique of
Cold War American foreign policy. In pursuing victory, states must kill. Indeed, one cannot
conceive of war without killing and violence. In the name of democracy, liberalism, or against
some evil, we may consider war to be a tragic adventure. Niebuhr writes, “If men or nations do
evil in a good cause; if they cover themselves with guilt in order to fulfill some high responsibility;
or if they sacrifice some high value for the sake of a higher or equal one they make a tragic choice”
(xxiii). However, if in this pursuit, liberalism or democracy is permanently damaged, we may
consider this to be an ironic pursuit. Niebhur adds, “if virtue becomes vice through some hidden
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defect in the virtue; if strength becomes weakness because of the vanity to which strength may
prompt the mighty man or nation; if security is transmuted into insecurity because too much
reliance is placed upon it; if wisdom becomes folly because it does not know its own limits – in
all such cases the situation is ironic” (xxiv). As America has traded conventional state enemies for
either non-state actors (and therefore more easily shielded by terrain or hospitable populations)
or abstractions, the irony has only deepened. The irony lies in the reality that war against these
targets are largely unwinnable, meaning that victory as an abstraction is always escaping, while
degrading the very thing it seeks to protect. Perhaps we could find success in great brutality
(slaughter of populations supporting insurgents, chemical weapons, etc.) but to do so would be
the wholesale trade of liberal values. History suggests we prefer its piecemeal erosion. This is
directly at odds with conclusions some have taken from the democracy and war literatures (both
peace and victory): that democracies should tie security to the spread of democracy because
democracies do not fight wars against one another and that democracies are likely to win the
wars they fight. The greatest temptation for irony stems from this point by inherently justifying
war as a tool of spreading democracy, all with the presumption of a high odds of success.
As the war outcomes puzzle becomes clearer, in part I hope through the additions of this
dissertation, the irony should also be less opaque. This is not to say that these lessons imply that
America, or Western liberal democracies more broadly, should altogether abandon war as a tool
of foreign policy. As Clausewitz writes, “the fact that slaughter is a horrifying spectacle must
make us take war more seriously, but not provide an excuse for gradually blunting our swords in
the name of humanity. Sooner or later someone will come along with a sharp sword and hack off
our arms” (260). The specter of war haunts the modern world as it did the past. Rather, we should
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heed a call to the modal realist American foreign policy prescription: preponderance without
threat. More simply, preponderance without war. This is also not to outright dismiss the
democratic peace or victory. Indeed, evidence does suggest that democracies have been reliably
more peaceful in their affairs with one another and democracies win the majority of their wars
(even if we charge that democracy does not cause peace or victory). But in a world with
increasingly high stakes in terms of population growth, rising urbanization, and rapid
technological change – meaning even more lives are in the crosshairs than ever before – and that
is still governed by the international politics of uncertainty, to cast our lot with democracy is a
dangerous gamble. Worse yet would be to aggressively pursue democratization through force,
armed with the quasi-teleological notion that democracy will win the day.
Concluding this lesson, we may turn to Abraham Lincoln’s Lyceum Address, presented in
1838. Lincoln stated,
"Shall we expect some transatlantic military giant to step the ocean and crush us
at a blow? Never! All the armies of Europe, Asia, and Africa combined, with all the
treasure of the earth (our own excepted) in their military chest, with a Bonaparte for a
commander, could not by force take a drink from the Ohio or make a track on the Blue
Ridge in a trial of a thousand years. At what point then is the approach of danger to be
expected? I answer. If it ever reach us, it must spring up amongst us; it cannot come from
abroad. If destruction be our lot we must ourselves be its author and finisher. As a nation
of freemen, we must live through all time or die by suicide."
A century and a half later, America still faces no existential threat. Even more so, in
unipolarity, America faces no state or non-state threat that is not of its own making. Guarded by
terrain – taken here to include the insulation of oceans and distance – and armed with the
strongest military capability in human history, the United States is secure. Our suicide will not be
the dramatic bloodletting of 1861-65, but the weeping wound of decades of foreign adventures,
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infected by illiberalism and superbia. As we approach multipolarity, time is running out. We may
yet stem the tide of irony but such a change would require a ‘Cincinnatus-like’ relinquishing over
position and role – a feat unprecedented in the modern era.
Future Research
The additions made in this dissertation are small pieces in a very complex mosaic. I believe
that more than anything else, the introduction of novel methods to the political question of war
outcomes highlights the need for the field to seriously consider the role of terrain in war – while
taking lessons from other fields. More specifically, it highlights that the concept of place is
underappreciated, if not partially ignored, when we fail to get quality data. The three additions
in this work – TRI, trafficability indices, and spatial extent – improve the state of the art. Even so,
they lack key elements that should be expanded in further studies. The first is further
operationalization of the concepts themselves. My work demonstrates that terrain impacts
outcomes but this is only conditional. Future research should seek to identify identifying the
elements which bring terrain to the forefront of consideration and include them in analysis. This
is increasingly complex given the temporal and geographically diverse nature of war, but
generally we can suggest that several factors interact with terrain. First is climate and weather.
Climate allows us to make relatively broad predictions about certain landscape classes in specific
places in time. A lake may become trafficable if frozen just as a temporal broadleaf forest loses
its leaves. Weather is less predictable but often has a more immediate impact on terrain. A heavy
rain, mixed with the weight of men and machine, may turn gentle undulating plains into a hellish
mud.
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Second is time or temporal setting. Wars happen in time and over time. In this sense, the
period in which a war occurs should have an impact on its outcome. Humans have constantly
changed the way we interact with the world around us and the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries have increased the rate at which change has occurred. We went from horse traffic to
space travel in less than two centuries. The rate at which one can move between spatially
separate points increased dramatically. However, this rate has always been unequal, with some
enjoying the fruits of innovation and others stagnating. While this is inherently measured in some
fashion within CINC data, greater operationalization is necessary. Further, wars occur over time.
Other’s work, namely Bennett and Stam (1996; 1998), address this problem by disaggregating
individual wars by year. Still a year is perhaps too long a time period – though given the diversity
of war, no single unit of time is universally appropriate. An army may win in the summer only to
freeze in the winter or win on one battlefield only to lose on another. Further work should
address this problem, partially through disaggregation, and partially through novel conceptions
of time – perhaps thematically by campaign, but this too requires exceedingly high amounts of
data to be generalizable. Doing so may also allow for increasingly precise terrain metrics apart
from the whole of the war.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, is the question of strategy selection or how states
select their strategy. Likely there is no monocausal explanation, but an answer (or best
approximation) will address the lasting paradigmatic problem of agency. In other words, do
democracies select strategies differently that nondemocracies? While I suspect the answer is no,
it is an intriguing question. As Clemenceau stated, “war is too serious a matter to entrust to the
military” (quoted in Suarez 1932). In a nuclear world this may be the case, but is less clear in
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conventional war; the modal type. Indeed, democratic politicians may push for non-military
objectives, such as the promotion of democracy or seeking media-friendly but strategically and
tactically ill-advised endeavors. Akin to Allison’s (1969) seminal work, future work should address
questions beyond the assumption of the state as a monolith. Strategy selection as organizational
output is likely conditioned by past experience (incremental learning lacking creative
spontaneity), parochial priorities and perceptions, and standard operating procedures. Similarly,
strategy selection as bureaucratic politics must consider players in positions, as well as the
influence of domestic institutions such as the military industrial complex. As Desch (2007b) notes,
tensions between political and military leadership in the Bush administration pushed strategy
and tactical decisions towards politicians – to the detriment of American military effectiveness in
Iraq. The future validity of the democratic victory rests in these questions on strategy.
Finally, expansion of the scientific study of terrain also allows us to explore the
relationship in the other direction. How does war impact terrain? While numerous works have
explored the question of the impact of war on ecology, advances in various ecological and
geographic technologies and methods, such as remote sensing, are fertile soil for new study. This
topic is a natural dovetail. The use of terrain in war is the exploration of how humans interact
with the world around them. Never in human history have humans been capable of such dramatic
effect on their environment. Beyond this, trends in climate and human settlement patterns are
changing the essential nature of terrain- be it in deforestation, sea level rises, or urbanization.
Presumably, this will change the nature of war in the future as place changes. The study of
ecology provides a holistic approach to the study of war.
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There are a great many questions which remain either partially answered or entirely
unaddressed in the war outcomes puzzle. It is the duty of responsible scientists both to pursue
these answers and to be cautious in generating prescriptions from partial understandings. In an
anarchic world where war is an ever-present possibility, the stakes are high. Coupled with
looming multipolarity and the prospect of a changing power landscape, states and scholars alike
should practice forbearance, lest we inaugurate the folly of our predecessors. We must ask, do
we want a twenty-first century like the twentieth? If the answer is no, we must be vigilant in
formulating responsible prescriptions and policy rooted in both science and history – all while
recognizing inherent limitations in our own work. When the stakes include the destruction of
entire societies, we must tread lightly into the future and remember the past. If not, we will
destroy nations.
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Appendix A: Terrain Variables Codebook
Spatial Extent:
Spatial extent is derived from polygons determined by georeferenced maps. Spatial extent is an
approximation of the total area of a given war, presented in km2.
Terrain Ruggedness Index (TRI):
•

•
•
•
•
•
•

TRI for each pixel is calculated by measuring the difference in elevation between it and its
eight adjacent neighbor pixels. These differences are then squared and averaged, with
the square root of this value producing a TRI (Riley, DeGloria, and Elliot 1999, 25). TRI
variables include:
TRI Mean: Average of TRI values in meters of given war.
TRI Median: Median value of TRI values in meters of given war.
TRI Standard Deviation: Standard Deviation of TRI values in meters of given war.
TRI Minimum: Lowest recorded TRI value in meters of given war.
TRI Maximum: Highest recorded TRI value in meters of a given war.
TRI Categorical: Categorical values of TRI Mean from Riley, Degloria, and Elliot’s (1999)
coding:
o 1: level (0-80 m); 2: nearly level (81-116 m); 3: slightly rugged (117-161 m); 4:
intermediately rugged (162-239 m); 5: moderately rugged (240-497 m); 6: highly
rugged (498-958 m); and 7: extremely rugged (959-4367 m). No wars occur in the
extremely rugged TRI category.

Landcover Classes:
Data presents percent of each class present for each war. These classes include:
1. Tundra (tun)
2. Water (wat)
3. Urban (urb)
4. Desert (desert)
5. Tropical Evergreen Broadleaf Forest (trpebf)
6. Tropical Deciduous Broadleaf Forest (trpdbf)
7. Temperate Evergreen Broadleaf Forest (tmpebf)
8. Temperate Evergreen Needleleaf Forest (tmpenf)
9. Temperate Deciduous Broafleaf Forest (tmpdbf)
10. Boreal Evergreen Needleleaf Forest (borenf)
11. Boreal Deciduous Needleleaf Forest (bordnf)
12. Savanna (sava)
13. Grasslands/Steppe following C3 photosynthetic pathway (c3grass)
14. Grasslands/Steppe following C4 photosynthetic pathway (c4grass)
15. Dense Shrubland (dshrub)
16. Open Shrubland (oshrub)
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17. Polar Desert/Rock/Ice (pdri)
18. Secondary Tropical Evergreen Broadleaf Forest (strpebf)
19. Secondary Tropical Deciduous Broadleaf Forest (strpdbf)
20. Secondary Temperate Evergreen Broadleaf Forest (stmpebf)
21. Secondary Temperate Evergreen Needleleaf Forest (stmpenf)
22. Secondary Temperate Deciduous Broadleaf Forest (stmpdbf)
23. Secondary Boreal Evergreen Needleleaf Forest (borenf)
24. Secondary Boreal Deciduous Needleleaf Forest (sbordnf)
25. Cropland following C3 photosynthetic pathway (c3crop)
26. Cropland following C4 photosynthetic pathway (c4crop)
27. Pastureland following C3 photosynthetic pathway (c3past)
28. Pastureland following C4 photosynthetic pathway (c4past)
Trafficability:
Landcover classes are aggregated by percentage as either trafficable or non-trafficable, following
Dupuy (1983). War landscapes are presented by percent trafficable or non-trafficable
Cover types are coded by trafficability:
Land Cover Type
Tropical Evergreen Broadleaf Forest
Tropical Deciduous Broadleaf Forest
Temperate Evergreen Broadleaf Forest
Temperate needleleaf Forest
Temperate Deciduous Broadleaf Forest
Boreal Evergreen Needleleaf Forest
Boreal Deciduous Needleleaf Forest
Savanna
C3 Grassland/Steppe
C4 Grassland/Steppe
Dense Shrubland
Open Shrubland
Tundra
Desert
Polar Desert/Rock/Ice
Secondary Tropical Evergreen Broadleaf
Forest
Secondary Tropical Deciduous Broadleaf
Forest
Secondary Temperate Evergreen Broadleaf
Forest
Secondary Temperate Evergreen
Needleleaf Forest

Trafficable
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0

Non-Trafficable
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1

0

1

0

1

0

1
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Secondary Temperate Deciduous
Broadleaf Forest
Secondary Boreal Evergreen Needleleaf
Forest
Secondary Boreal Deciduous Needleleaf
Forest
Water/Rivers
C3 Cropland
C4 Cropland
C3 Pastureland
C4 Pastureland
Urban land
*coded as trafficable during Russo-Finnish
War given winter conditions

0

1

0

1

0

1

0*
1
1
1
1
0
11

1
0
0
0
0
1
17
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While the study of war occurrence is among the primary considerations of the field of
international relations, only recently has attention turned towards the study of war outcomes.
This attention is best represented by the democratic victory proposition, which suggests that
democracies win the majority of their wars by virtue of being democratic. However, elements of
this study are currently incipient. In turn, this dissertation generates a novel set of variables to
measure the impact of terrain on war outcomes, including measures of spatial extent,
topographic heterogeneity, and land cover heterogeneity. These metrics are generated for all 94
interstate wars in the correlates of war population between 1816-2003, as well as disaggregated
forms of WWI, WWII, and Vietnam – bringing the total to 105 wars. These data are then used to
analyze war outcomes using multinomial logistic regression. The results suggest that, at present,
the democratic victory proposition is incomplete. Further research is needed to explore the
complex relationship between state capabilities, strategy, regime type, and terrain.
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